Hague: “Israel has lost some of its support in Britain”
TOI May 24 2013.
What we may have here is a strong case for accentuating the positive as far as Israelis (and Palestinians) are concerned.
This apparent decline in international standing cannot bode well for future Israeli relations with the rest of the world and this year can easily see them plummet still further if no viable peace process comes into being. Indeed, our esteemed Foreign Secretary may well be playing down the overall situation with that typically British fondness for understatement.
But what to do when every option appears to be so thoroughly negative anyway?
Israel cannot accommodate all Palestinian aspirations. To do so would play havoc with its security considerations and fundamentally undermine the primary purpose for what is its very existence.
Palestinians, as the nominally designated appellants here, cannot accept terms less than those already stated by them and even these may not constitute the minimum acceptable within the body of worldwide Arab public opinion.
A number of Arab and Israeli negotiating positions have evolved over time and these have been put forward by both sides on various occasions. But not one has ever really captured the moment or succeeded in progressing much beyond the talking stage. And so the prospect of some new and effective arrangement appearing on the scene would seem vanishingly small just now.
With so many negative indicators preventing positive movement in virtually every direction, what then is to be done?
The answer can only be to bundle all these factors together and then step far enough outside them to address or, at the very least, temporarily bypass their persistent demands for attention.
After living dangerously for the last 65 years and more, the prospect of not having to do so ever again must surely have some appeal for both Israelis and Palestinians alike.
And, as an added bonus, the human race might rise appreciably higher in its own estimation. Now that would be something to see later in 2013.