A Real Lebanese Govt Would Destroy Hezbollah Now

If Lebanon had a real government, it would seize on this opportunity cut down Hezbollah. It would destroy its armed forces, eliminate it as a state within a state, and probably outlaw it in favor of some other group to represent the Shi’a community; but in any case reduce it to just another political group among many.

How often has Lebanon had such a chance as it does now, when Hezbollah has been decapitated in its communications? It should be jumping on the opportunity.

Any real government would be doing that.

But Lebanon does not have a real government. Its quasi-government has neither the military force to do it, nor the moral capacity to reach the right decision.

Should Israel do it for Lebanon?

It is a serious consideration.

There is a strong moral case to be made for it. Many Lebanese would be grateful to Israel for it in the long term. And it would bring a much more peaceful Levant.

There is also a strong practical case for it. It could bring Israel far greater safety and peace for the long term, despite some cost at present.

In war, one must press an advantage to the hilt. Momentum is crucial: an enemy can give up and fold, if advantages are properly pressed.

Israel has a limited timeframe of special advantage, while Hezbollah communications are vastly weakened.

It is Israel’s professional responsibility to press its new advantage now, and do it fast — in the limited timeframe when the advantage is fresh and countermeasures have not been taken.

Israel cannot, however, do it the easy way that a Lebanese government could in principle do it: by a ground operation directed solely against the Hezbollah apparatus, while ignoring all the missiles that are directed against Israel. In Israel’s case, it would risk suffering mass casualties if it failed first to obliterate most of the Hezbollah missiles.

So should it strike the missiles and destroy as many of them as it can at this moment? How could it best do this?

And how many days does it have, before it loses most of its greatly increased advantage in command and communications?

It is its professional responsibility at this time to find the answers to these questions, and to do so with great speed.

The IDF and Mossad are presumably doing this.