Are We Responsible for Another Person’s Insecurities? Bava Basra 79-82

Doing What He Wants

Our Gemara on Amud Aleph uses a play on words from a verse (Numbers 21:30) to describe the fate of the sinner who denies that God will hold him accountable:

ונשים עד־נפח אשר עד־מידבא

We have wrought desolation at Nophah, which is by Medva

The name of this place, Medva, also is a pun indicating that God will eventually bring justice and “do as He pleases.” (“Ad De-Baiy”, in Aramaic means “what he wants” which is phonetically similar to Medva.)

The phrase is ambiguous. Who is the “He”, and what does “He” want? The simple reading is that He is God, and “what He wants” means to say as follows: Though God may take His time to mete out justice in this world for His reasons, in the World to Come, God will not hold back and give each sinner as he deserves (see Rashbam, ibid.) However, Rashash (ibid) suggests a different idea. He says the “he” is the sinner. The meaning is then that God allows the sinner to do as he wishes in this world, due to the principle that “God leads along the path that the person wishes to follow” (Makkos 10b). This is an extraordinary principle of our theology. God values human free will so greatly that He does not interfere and may facilitate the wishes and behaviors that the person desires, even if not correct.

There is an amazing example of this from Gemara and Tosafos Yevamos (62a) discussion of Moshe’s rationale for accepting celibacy upon himself.

Celibacy is not typically considered pious or proper in Jewish practice. But Moshe reasoned, “If the Jews had to separate from sexuality in order to experience revelation at Mount Sinai, kal v’chomer I myself must constantly refrain from sexuality, since God appears to me at any time.”

The Gemara reports that God agreed with Moshe’s reasoning, as later on, after the Torah was given, God states, “The Jews shall return to their tents, but you, stay with me.” As if to say, the rest of the nation can return to their tents (wives and families), but you, Moshe, have a special role.

Tosafos here asks and answers a question, which leads to a remarkable philosophical conclusion about how God relates to human free will. Tosafos wonders why Aharon and Miriam were challenging Moshe’s decision to be celibate. It is one thing to doubt the logic of his kal v’chomer. However, if God Himself endorsed the decision, how can they complain and disagree? Tosafos answers: Aharon and Miriam were claiming, based on the teaching in Makkos (10a), “In the way that a person wants to go, so too from heaven he will be led.” However, Aharon and Miriam did not take into account the additional principle of, “When one desires to be pure, God does more than lead but even assists”, and thus Moshe was indeed justified because his intentions were pure. (This last part is based on the commentary of Chokhmas Shelomo, Op. Cit.)

To elaborate on Tosafos’ answer, Aharon and Miriam might have argued, “True you reasoned a good kal v’chomer, and as we know, the Torah is not in Heaven (Bava Metzi’a 59b), so once you decided what you wanted to do, God “agreed”. That just makes it right enough. But still, our argument is stronger and you should not have ruled that you are allowed to be celibate. Then, God would have agreed to that too!”

This is an astounding and remarkable theological statement. As a loving and respectful parent, God is so supportive of human self-determination, that there is room for Him to sometimes endorse human assessments and free-will, even if it is not the most correct manner. True, in this instance Aharon and Miriam underestimated Moshe in several ways and so they were wrong, but theologically speaking, the principle that allowed them to think that they could be right, even though God endorsed Moshe’s reasoning, would still seem to be valid.

To Know, You Must Let Go

Our Gemara on Amud Aleph discusses the sale of pigeons produced from a dove coop:

The buyer must leave the first pair of doves from the brood for the seller. The reason that an extra pair of doves must be left behind is to ensure that the first brood will not fly away. The Gemara also rules that the buyer must also leave a second pair from the brood of the children.

The Gemara questions this logic: If the reason is that she is attached to her daughter and the mate which one leaves for her, this should also be true with regard to the daughter, i.e., she too will become attached to her mother and the mate which one leaves for her. Why then, is it necessary to leave behind a pair of the daughter’s own brood to ensure that the daughter will not leave?

The Gemara answers: A mother is attached to her daughter, whereas a daughter is not attached to her mother. Therefore, in order for the daughter to remain in the dovecote it is necessary to leave the daughter’s brood with her.

This brings to mind the Yiddish adage that a Jewish mother can take care of ten children, but ten children cannot take care of one mother. Despite the adage, it is the nature of the world. As children grow up, they become less attached, but their parents still remain more attached. It is also reflected in the verse (Bereishis 2:24):

עַל־כֵּן֙ יַֽעֲזָב־אִ֔ישׁ אֶת־אָבִ֖יו וְאֶת־אִמּ֑וֹ וְדָבַ֣ק בְּאִשְׁתּ֔וֹ וְהָי֖וּ לְבָשָׂ֥ר אֶחָֽד׃

Hence a man leaves his father and mother and clings to his wife, so that they become one flesh.

We have seen many times how the relationship of husband and wife is a symbolic representation of the emanations and patterns of how God and Man relate. Tikkune Zohar 92a, using this verse says: Just as during intimacy there should be no physical barriers, literally clothes, and metaphorically any emotional distance, so too there should be no barriers when praying to God. This is symbolically represented in the halacha that one should pray the Amidah by a wall, with nothing else in between.

Chassidic thought takes this even further. The “father” represents chochma raw knowledge, truths and facts. Just as the father provides the tiny seed, which contains everything in the microscopic point, so too there is a pure simple truth from which everything emanates. The “mother” is bina understanding and inference. Just as the mother takes the seed and grows it into a child, so too understanding takes raw knowledge and truth, and uses reasoning to apply the knowledge. However, to fully know and transcend beyond human limits, there needs to be an integration of both aspects, which can only come by letting go of holding onto either truth too rigidly. We can come to Godly knowledge by integrating truth and understanding, and then letting those two go enough to see beyond the veil of physicality and reality. Consequently, the verse reads as follows: Therefore a man will let go of his grip on blunt truth and his grip on his ability to infer, and make the intuitive leap to become one, and attach to God. (See Likutei Halachos, Yoreh Deah, Laws of Shaving 4:7. This fits well with our description of intuition that we discussed in blogpost Psychology of the Daf, Bava Basra 78.)

Are We Responsible for Triggering Another Person’s Insecurities?

Our Gemara on amud beis reports that one sage rebuked another for asking him a question about a subject that he was not familiar with, as this causes unnecessary embarrassment.

Rambam (Laws of Sales14:14) codifies this as a form of ona’as devarim hurtful speech. Magid Mishna (ibid) refers to our Gemara as the source.

Sefer Chassidim (972) takes this moral sensitivity even further:

If someone knows himself to be renowned as sharp-minded, he shouldn’t even sit to listen to another’s derasha whom he suspects sees himself as intellectually inferior, for the speaker will see him and be embarrassed.

This is a high degree of sensitivity and respect for another’s feelings. Let us analyze this principle: Presumably, Sefer Chassidim holds that the junior person will be embarrassed to speak in the presence of the much wiser and renowned sage. This will cause him to be flustered and make errors, leading to even more embarrassment. This seems to be evident from Sefer Chassidim’s words. However, Pirush Kadmon (a 17th century commentary on Sefer Chassidim) explains it differently:

He will be embarrassed because the presence of the wiser sage will cause the audience members to gossip and say, “How brazen is this so-called rabbi who thinks he can lecture in front of this great sage?”

We must ask, why didn’t Pirush Kadmon go with the simple explanation? I believe he held that since there was no direct action, and when one gets up to speak, it is, so to speak (sic), at your own risk, the elder sage has no responsibility for what it will cause the younger sage to think or feel. It is not comparable to our case in the Gemara, because there the person asked a question. He took physical action, when he should have suspected that the question was not within the knowledge base of the person whom he asked. That was a verbal act, and therefore ona’as devarim. However, while perhaps (if I am right) that Pirush Kadmon held that one is not responsible for causing another person’s insecurities without causative action such as speaking, why is Pirush Kadmon’s reason more compelling? I believe the reason is that in Pirush Kadmon’s scenario, at least a rabbinic form of lifnei iver (causing someone to sin) applies. For example, we have a teaching (Arachin 16a):

A person should never speak (excessively) about the goodness of another, as through speaking about his goodness it will somehow cause criticism to be spoken as well.

Rashi gives two reasons: Either he will come to speak about him in a derogatory manner, as he will eventually note the exceptions to his goodness, or his listeners will temper his praise by mentioning that individual’s bad qualities because they will have some kind of jealous or critical response.

When it comes to lifnei iver, the bar may be higher. Thus to even indirectly cause others to say l’shon hara is forbidden, which is known as avak l’shon hara. This is why Pirush Kadmon forbids attending the lecture, not because the other’s self-esteem issues will be triggered, but because he will cause the listeners to be critical and say l’shon hara.

I cannot tell for sure if my analysis is correct, but the halachic difference is significant, because it revolves around how much we should have to worry about another person’s triggers.

How Dishonest is Dishonest?

Our Gemara on amud aleph discusses the conundrum of declaring bikkurim and reciting the appropriate ritual, even if those particular offerings may not actually be first fruits:

What is objectionable about reciting verses from the Torah even if they aren’t bikkurim?

Rav Ashi said to him: The problem is due to the fact that this practice has the appearance of falsehood, because he issues a declaration before God that is possibly untrue, as he might not own the ground. Rav Mesharshiyya, son of Rav Ḥiyya, said: The declaration is not recited lest he come to remove the fruits from their obligation of teruma and tithes, if they are treated entirely as first fruits. For this reason one does not recite the passage, to ensure that their unique status is maintained.

Sefer Daf Al Daf brings down a fascinating discussion about the Talmudic and halachic principle of mechezei ke-shikra appearance of falsehood. Turei Even states (Megillah 20b) that it is merely a rabbinic prohibition, perhaps like maris ayin, the prohibition against appearing to sin, even when doing what is actually permissble. However, the hagahos of Rav Boruch Frenkel argues, and holds that it is Biblically prohibited and included under the general commandment to stay away from falsehood (Shemos 23:7).

Rav Chaim Kanievsky (Derech Emunah, Bikkurim 4:4, Biur Halacha “Meviy”) asks: How can this case of mechezei ke-shikra be Biblically prohibited, when Sefer Yereim (235) holds that the Biblical prohibition of staying away from falsehood is only regarding monetary matters? Rav Kanievsky answers, it may be true that there is no Biblical violation of mechezei ke-shikra in regard to bringing doubtful bikkurim, but it still may be considered a lack of appropriate fear of God. Wouldn’t one be afraid to say anything that even had the appearance of falsehood in front of a flesh and blood king, let alone God? And, we do see a special requirement of precision and avoidance of dishonesty in prayer for that very same reason.

The idea of honesty and precision in prayer is something not often stressed but I believe important theologically. In order to have a connection that is authentic, we must be honest with ourselves and then with God. This is similar to what we discussed in blogpost Psychology of the Daf, Bava Basra 80, where Tikkune Zohar 92a, using this verse says: Just as during intimacy there should be no physical barriers, literally clothes, and metaphorically any emotional distance, so too there should be no barriers when praying to God. This is symbolically represented in the halacha that one should pray the Amidah by a wall, with nothing else in between. Additionally, there are sources in Chazal that stress the importance of honest language in prayer, see for example Mishna Berura 46:33, 197:24, 582:16, 591:12, 623:2, Baer Heytev 475:9, 591:8, Magen Avrohom 299:9. Also see Maharal Be’er Hagolah, Be’er 4:12. In addition, see Zohar I:184a, where a similar idea is expressed, namely that one must pray with clarity.