Bangladesh radicalises after the change in government

As events continue to develop in Bangladesh, the growing influence of radical Islamist groups, such as Jamaat-e-Islami, is becoming increasingly evident in the country’s evolving political landscape. Jamaat-e-Islami, a party that was involved in war crimes during Bangladesh’s 1971 liberation war, has long been a controversial and divisive force in the nation’s politics. Under the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, groups like Hefazat-e-Islam, which advocate for stricter Islamic laws and oppose secularism, have gained prominence. This shift has fueled rising tensions and violence, particularly targeting government institutions and minority communities.

With Sheikh Hasina’s government ousted and Awami League members selectively targeted, the influence of religious fundamentalists is poised to grow further. The interim government of Yunus has leveraged dissatisfaction with the Awami League’s secular and socialist policies, using religion as a counterbalance. One of the government’s first actions was to lift the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami and engage with Mamunul Haque, the leader of Hefazat-e-Islam. This move has emboldened more radical groups, who now feel protected by the authorities and act with increasing impunity.

Since the fall of the Hasina government on August 5, 2024, there has been a surge in hate speech and violent attacks on religious minorities, particularly targeting the Sufi community. Reports indicate that around 50 attacks have occurred on Sufi shrines, with hardliners and radicals primarily responsible. Volunteers and devotees are gathering to protect these shrines from further destruction, as calls for stronger protective measures grow louder.

Moderate Muslims and religious minorities, including Bangladeshi Hindus, hold groups like Jamaat and Hefazat accountable for much of the recent violence against minority groups, secular intellectuals, and journalists. The spread of violent extremist ideology has long posed a security threat in Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority state. Throughout its tenure, the Awami League faced significant challenges as the country’s only secular party, struggling to maintain a pluralistic identity while balancing ties with influential Islamic clerics.

Since the fall of the Awami League in 2024, atrocities against religious minorities have intensified, often incited by misleading online information. This pattern of violence typically begins with local accusations that minority members have insulted Islam, quickly spreading through social media to incite larger-scale attacks.

Political and religious leaders have exploited the emotions of the public to gain influence, further fueling communal unrest. Local clerics have also played a significant role, using their authority over religious interpretations to influence communities, often to further personal or political agendas.

The rise of religious extremism in Bangladesh is not just a political issue but reflects an identity crisis, where the historically pluralistic Bengali-Muslim identity is being overshadowed by a more rigid Islamic identity. Indonesia’s past shows that political crises can give rise to militant movements, where religious fanaticism becomes synonymous with national pride. Radical groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Hefazat-e-Islam, and Ansarul al-Islam promote an increasingly intolerant version of Islam that equates being Bangladeshi with Islamist ideals.

The growing radicalism in Bangladesh has broader regional implications, particularly for Southeast Asia, where Muslim populations are significant. Links between Bangladeshi extremists and their counterparts in Southeast Asia, especially in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, are strengthening. For example, a small but troubling trend has emerged among Bangladeshi migrant workers in Singapore and Malaysia, some of whom have recruited others to participate in violence back home. These networks often have ties to groups like Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), the Bangladesh arm of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).

Sheikh Hasina’s government had previously cracked down on these groups, but with her ousting, extremist elements like ABT are expected to regain strength. Transnational connections between Bangladeshi Islamist groups and radical organizations in Indonesia have also grown, with shared ideologies and, at times, operational cooperation. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia, for example, has had historical ties with groups in Bangladesh. Global jihadist movements, including al-Qaeda and ISIS, have further facilitated these connections, helping to foster cross-border radicalization.

The rise of groups like Hefazat-e-Islam in Bangladesh and the Islamic Defenders Front in Indonesia illustrates how seemingly non-militant civil society organizations with radical agendas can influence national policies. These groups have gained support by tapping into social issues and anti-globalization sentiment, molding the political landscape.

While some Western diplomats may downplay the threat posed by Islamist extremists in Bangladesh, viewing these movements as fringe groups, the reality is more alarming. The current political transition, combined with weak state institutions and inadequate law enforcement, has created fertile ground for violent extremism to thrive. Moreover, the state’s inability to control trafficking in people, weapons, and drugs provides a steady income stream for extremist networks.

The implications of these developments for Bangladesh and the broader region are concerning. Without the political will to combat radicalization, groups like Jamaat-e-Islami and Hefazat-e-Islam will continue to gain momentum, leading to a further deterioration of security in Bangladesh and a potential increase in cross-border radicalization throughout Southeast Asia.