Beyond Proportionality: Rethinking Western Views on the Houthis

Last night, the United States carried out its most extensive strike yet against the Houthis in Yemen, targeting radar installations, air defenses, and missile systems. The attack resulted in at least 31 deaths and over 100 injuries, significantly weakening their operational capabilities. This marks a shift in Washington’s approach, signaling a move away from its traditionally restrained stance on regional threats. The coming weeks will determine whether Trump will break out of the West’s flawed strategic framework—one that repeatedly misinterprets proportionality and defaults to appeasement.

The Problem with Western Proportionality

Western leaders often assume that military retaliation should be symmetrical—matching the adversary’s level of force. While this may work in conventional warfare, it is ineffective against non-state actors like the Houthis, who thrive in an environment of ongoing conflict. By adhering to this limited view of proportionality, multiple US administrations have failed to deter aggression and, in some cases, have encouraged it. Conversely, proponents of proportional responses argue that they minimize civilian casualties and uphold international law, thereby maintaining moral high ground and global support.

They also argue that disproportionate responses risk escalating conflicts rather than deterring them. For example, some analysts contend that increasing military pressure on non-state actors like the Houthis could drive them to strengthen alliances with Iran or escalate asymmetric attacks in response. However, history suggests that when confronted with overwhelming force, groups like Hezbollah have recalibrated their tactics to avoid unsustainable losses.

Biden’s Miscalculation: Misunderstanding the Houthis

The decision to remove the Houthis from the US terrorist list was based on the belief that diplomatic engagement and humanitarian incentives could alter their behavior. This assumption ignored their ideological foundation.

The Houthis, as an Iranian-backed proxy, operate on a doctrine of confrontation, not compromise. Their official slogan underscores this reality: “God is great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse upon the Jews, Victory to Islam.” Iran uses the Houthis as part of its broader regional strategy to pressure Saudi Arabia and disrupt global trade. By supplying weapons and intelligence, Iran expands its influence without direct confrontation. This mirrors Tehran’s playbook with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shia militias in Iraq, leveraging proxy forces to destabilize adversaries while maintaining plausible deniability.

The Houthis’ actions stem from a long-term commitment to regional dominance through religious and ideological warfare, not economic or political incentives. The notion that de-escalatory measures lead to moderation has been repeatedly proven wrong. After being removed from the terrorist list in January of 2021, the Houthis did not step back; they escalated attacks on shipping lanes, expanded their military reach, and strengthened ties with Iran. That year, drone attacks rose by 377%, missile attacks by 153%, and combined attacks by 56%, demonstrating that de-escalatory measures emboldened rather than moderated their actions.

Optimism guided past Western approaches to other militant groups. For instance, in the 1990s, attempts to integrate the Taliban into Afghanistan’s political framework failed because Western policymakers underestimated their ideological rigidity. Despite diplomatic overtures, the Taliban continued harboring al-Qaeda, culminating in the 9/11 attacks.

This is not an isolated mistake that is exclusive to the United States. Similar miscalculations have occurred with Hamas. Israel, for example, allowed millions in Qatari aid into Gaza in hopes of reducing tensions, only for Hamas to divert funds into weapons and military infrastructure. Too often, Western policymakers focus on diplomatic optics rather than policies that genuinely deter aggression.

The Flawed Assumption of Proportionality in Asymmetric Conflicts

The principle of proportionality makes sense in conflicts between state actors, where both sides operate within a shared framework of deterrence and escalation. However, it is ineffective when applied to non-state actors who do not follow the same strategic rules.

In Western societies, even limited attacks can cause economic and psychological disruptions. Stability is central to governance, and any security breach—whether through terrorism, cyberattacks, or military strikes—has widespread consequences for their globalized economies and pluralistic societies. Groups like the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah, however, operate in war-torn environments where violence is part of everyday life. Their leadership and support bases are accustomed to conflict, making them more resistant to limited retaliation. Unlike in the West, where stability is expected, these groups thrive in chaos, adapting quickly and leveraging external support to sustain their operations.

When a Western country responds proportionally to an attack, the enemy often absorbs the cost while achieving its objectives. This creates a strategic imbalance: The cost of aggression remains manageable for the enemy, while the aggression itself is far more severe and painful for the West.

Rethinking Proportionality: Targeting Vulnerabilities

To effectively counter groups like the Houthis, military responses should focus on disrupting their ability to function rather than simply matching the scale of their attacks. This does not mean reckless escalation but rather a strategy that makes continued aggression unsustainable.

Historical examples demonstrate that decisive military action can deter further conflict. The 2006 war with Hezbollah is a key example. Initially, Israel responded with limited strikes, but when the conflict escalated, they shifted to a sustained military campaign. As Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah later admitted:

“If I had known on July 11 [2006] that the operation would lead to this result, I would not have conducted it.”

That conflict led to 17 years of relative quiet on Israel’s northern border. Similarly, in Operation Defensive Shield (2002), Israel dismantled key Palestinian militant infrastructure, effectively ending the Second Intifada.

In the late 2000s, Somali pirates hijacked ships for ransom, peaking in 2011. The US and allies responded with naval patrols, armed security, and direct military strikes. These efforts nearly eradicated piracy by 2017, proving that decisive action can deter non-state threats.

A more effective strategy against the Houthis should follow a similar approach—targeting logistics, leadership structures, and supply networks to force them into a position where continued aggression is no longer viable.

The Objective: Deterrence, Not Regime Change

One of the most common misinterpretations of hardline military strategies is the assumption that they aim for total victory or regime change. In reality, such objectives are often unrealistic and can lead to further instability. The goal should not be the outright destruction of the Houthis but rather the imposition of consequences severe enough to alter their strategic calculations.

The real issue extends beyond the Houthis themselves. Yemen’s fragmented political landscape, its growing alignment with Iranian influence due to demographic issues, and deep ideological divisions mean that even if the Houthis were removed, another militant faction could rise in their place. Similar patterns have played out across the region—where the removal of one extremist group often leads to the emergence of another.

That is why deterrence, rather than regime change, is the more effective strategy. Sustained, targeted action can weaken the Houthis’ military infrastructure, disrupt their economic resources, and increase the costs of their aggression to the point that they are forced to reassess their actions.

A Shift in Western Strategic Thinking?

The West’s approach to radical non-state actors has failed because it remains trapped in a framework designed for state conflicts. The Biden administration’s misreading of the Houthis is part of a larger trend—mistaking de-escalation for stability and applying conventional military logic to unconventional threats.

Proportionality should not mean equivalence. It should be a flexible strategy focused on enemy weaknesses while maintaining broader stability. The key to deterring groups like the Houthis is not symbolic retaliation but sustained military pressure that forces them to reconsider further escalation. They need to be challenged at a level that even they can not take for long. Until Western leaders embrace this approach, they will continue engaging in conflicts where their adversaries dictate the terms.

The real question is not whether the West can defeat the Houthis—it is whether it is willing to impose enough pressure to make them reconsider their fight. Show them pain they cannot endure, and they will learn not to test you again. Without that, the cycle of conflict will continue, always favoring the enemy.