Challenges of A Post-Hamas Gaza

Yesterday, the Israeli government launched an extensive ground operation in Gaza, resulting in at least 103 fatalities. In parallel, it instructed residents of Khan Younis to evacuate immediately, having already cleared civilians from Rafah. This escalation followed weeks of aerial strikes and mounting cross-border fire. Meanwhile, the US administration continues direct negotiations with Hamas to halt the fighting, though the outcome remains uncertain and could undermine Israeli objectives. Regional capitals and the United Nations have urged restraint amid fears of humanitarian collapse. It is therefore essential to consider the immediate hurdles that stakeholders will face if Israel opts for full military occupation of Gaza.

Once Hamas relinquishes control of Gaza, the territory will require the rapid establishment of a civil administration to rebuild infrastructure and deliver health, education and welfare services. Although Jerusalem could maintain military oversight until a permanent framework emerges, forging a civilian regime that satisfies Israel’s security concerns will prove extremely challenging without sustained involvement by Israel or the United States. Fatah’s previous governance in the West Bank saw sporadic antisemitic incidents that prompted the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to operate beyond the limits set out in the Oslo Accords. Any new administration must therefore demonstrate robust measures to prevent extremist violence and reassure neighbors of Gaza’s peaceful intentions.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has already endorsed a post-war blueprint for Gaza under US supervision, paving the way for an American-led, Israeli-backed civilian administration. Washington brings significant experience in crafting political solutions in ethnically divided regions such as Northern Ireland and South Africa, while remaining Israel’s closest diplomatic ally and arms supplier. A Gazan government structured under US oversight, with ad hoc Israeli military assistance, could allay regional safety concerns — but only if both the Knesset and the US Congress authorize funding and legal mandates for this model. Securing such legislative backing will depend on convincing lawmakers that the arrangement strengthens stability without exposing either democracy to undue external influence.

Beyond Gaza’s internal governance, security guarantees must be provided to its immediate neighbors, Israel and Egypt. Although the IDF may occupy Gaza as it did the West Bank, a protracted presence risks resembling de facto colonization, inviting international censure and diplomatic sanctions. Responsibility for Gaza’s defense should thus rest with a force or administration able to cooperate closely with both the Israeli and Egyptian militaries, ensuring predictable, regulated cross-border movement of goods, aid and people. Crafting such an arrangement will require a comprehensive peace settlement incorporating a measure of Palestinian self-determination alongside formal reconciliation mechanisms with Israel, perhaps modeled on joint security commissions.

Gaza could maintain its own defense force, provided credible deterrence replaces a constant IDF footprint. Stationing Israeli troops indefinitely within Palestinian territory poses significant political and ethnic challenges. Instead, the United States might establish a military base in Gaza — similar to its deployments in Japan and South Korea — to uphold a regional balance of power, foster inter-communal cooperation and collect strategic intelligence. Such a presence could reassure all parties and facilitate joint training exercises between Gazan, Israeli and Egyptian personnel. However, this proposal would hinge on approval from both the Knesset and the US Congress, as well as broad regional consent, to avoid accusations of permanent foreign occupation.

With Hamas removed from the political arena, Jewish and Arab communities in Gaza and southern Israel must learn at least to tolerate one another’s presence. Under an interim military administration, most daily governance and commercial transactions will involve Gazans and Israelis negotiating directly. The central task will be restoring mutual trust to facilitate cross-border travel, trade and access to shared resources without discriminatory restrictions. While historical grievances run deep and have fueled enduring mistrust, the necessity of peaceful coexistence on both sides of the Gaza–Israel frontier is undeniable. Confidence-building measures, such as mixed municipal councils or joint infrastructure projects, could lay the groundwork for longer-term reconciliation.

Rebuilding mutual confidence in an ethnically divided region is no easy task. Temporarily, a US military presence could guarantee security and act as a neutral buffer — provided an American base is established under clear, time-limited terms. During this period, Gazan and Israeli officials would engage under US auspices, learning to treat one another as equals with mutual respect. Confidence-building initiatives — ranging from joint emergency drills to cultural exchanges — could further cement this nascent trust. Yet sustaining American engagement will demand that Washington regard Israeli–Palestinian mediation in Gaza as a strategic priority rather than a brief diplomatic interlude, requiring continued high-level attention from the White House and Congress.

Looking beyond the immediate tasks, Gaza’s long-term status will become fiercely contested among regional powers and the United States. On one side, Israel and the US have signaled reluctance to endorse full Palestinian sovereignty, citing existential security concerns and blocking UN membership for any prospective state. On the other, Saudi Arabia and France stand ready to support Palestinian nation-building, even if it entails significant concessions on Israel’s security requirements. In the absence of recognized statehood, Israel and the US would retain direct oversight of Gaza’s defense; if sovereignty is granted, a Gazan government could act independently, potentially pursuing policies at odds with Israeli or American interests.

Ultimately, Gaza is likely to assume one of three futures: a province within a broader Palestinian state, an independent polity in its own right, or a territory under continued occupation. Israel’s fifteen-year blockade of land, air and sea routes between Gaza and the West Bank has long enforced separation, but the war’s aftermath presents an opportunity to redefine that relationship. Granting Gaza meaningful autonomy — perhaps through a federated Palestinian system or a special administrative arrangement — could satisfy both Israeli security imperatives and Palestinian aspirations. The precise model will hinge on negotiations over borders, resource sharing and the scope of Gaza’s legislative and security powers.

In summary, once Hamas is removed, Gaza must overcome four interlinked priorities: forming a capable civilian administration, securing assurances for neighboring states, fostering peaceful coexistence with Israel, and determining a sustainable political status. Realizing these aims will demand coordinated efforts by Israel, the United States and other international partners, underpinned by sustained political backing and substantial resources. Success hinges on shared governance structures, robust security frameworks and genuine dialogue — supported by confidence-building measures, legislative authorizations and international guarantees. Without such a comprehensive approach, Gaza’s post-Hamas future will remain precarious, and the window for lasting peace may swiftly close.