Does the IDF Harm Israel’s Security?

The industrial and technological revolution has profoundly transformed the nature of warfare, ushering humanity into a new era where civilian populations have become a major factor in military considerations. This aspect gradually took on a decisive role in the consciousness of global leaders after World War II. Consequently, rival powers have become increasingly hesitant to engage in armed conflict. This was notably the case during the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962), which, despite sixteen days of extreme tensions, did not escalate into nuclear war. Instead, it resulted in an agreement between the two superpowers, facilitated by the “red telephone”—a stark contrast to the terrorist attack that had triggered World War I.

Another crucial factor is the ratio of civilian to military casualties, which has become increasingly significant. Following the bombing of Hiroshima, a new form of warfare emerged between the great powers: the “Cold War,” which lasted forty-five years without direct military confrontation. No battles were fought, and no human losses were recorded—neither among soldiers nor civilians. The United States ultimately prevailed over the Soviet Union without resorting to military offensives, securing victory through scientific, economic, social, and ideological means. In my view, this type of confrontation will define future conflicts.

To assess whether the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) harm Israel’s security, we will refer to the work of Haim Asa and Yosef Agassi, On War, published by the Hemed Library, Yedioth Ahronoth (2020). This book presents the theories of the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz (1832) and the Israeli philosopher Gershon Weiler (1984), both of whom published works bearing the same title. One may also mention Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations(1962) by the French philosopher Raymond Aron.

According to the authors, the Battle of Waterloo represents the last example of traditional warfare, after which the very conception of conflict changed. In a chapter dedicated to Israel’s wars, they highlight a distinction between military consciousness, which is constantly evolving, and the emerging civilian perspective: “The theater of war in which Israel finds itself is led by elites primarily loyal to military consciousness, relegating civilian consciousness to a secondary role. And this phenomenon continues to intensify over time.” (p. 102). In light of this analysis, I sought to delve deeper into these historical trends and draw new conclusions. This article, to some extent, serves as the missing link in the reflections of these two thinkers, who presented war as a phenomenon in perpetual transformation within human consciousness.

From the Yom Kippur War to the second half of 2014, twelve wars have taken place, sometimes referred to as “operations” due to their scale. These conflicts have profoundly impacted Israel’s security and disrupted the peace of its citizens. They include, among others, Operation Litani (March 1978), the First Lebanon War (Peace for Galilee, June–September 1982), Operation Law and Order, Operation Accountability, Operation Grapes of Wrath (1985–2000), the First Intifada (1987–1993), the Second Intifada (2000–2005), Operation Defensive Shield (March–May 2002), the Second Lebanon War (July–August 2006), Operation Cast Lead (December 2008), Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012), and Operation Protective Edge (July–August 2014). Additionally, it is important to recall that certain wars led by the United States have also placed Israel in direct conflict, notably the First Gulf War (January 1991) and the Second Iraq War (March 2003). Since 2014, Israel has not initiated any large-scale military operation, though the IDF continues to carry out targeted actions in response to persistent threats along the country’s borders.

A critical analysis of Israel’s security since the Yom Kippur War highlights several major trends. In my view, direct threats from neighboring states have significantly diminished. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which any of these states would have a genuine interest in launching an offensive against Israel. However, a significant threat remains: that of armed militias operating in Lebanon and Gaza, which remain deeply embedded within civilian populations. Over the past forty-seven years, all Israeli wars and military operations have been directed against these groups rather than sovereign states. In the face of these asymmetric threats, military leaders have been compelled to react swiftly—not with the aim of achieving long-term strategic objectives, but to respond immediately to enemy provocations and avoid the perception of detrimental inaction.

The enemy is pursuing a clear objective: to provoke a military escalation that Israel is striving to avoid. As a result, Israel’s responses appear to be primarily driven by a spirit of retaliation against violations of its sovereignty, while also sending a clear message to Israelis: any attack on our soldiers and citizens will be met with firm retaliation. However, none of these wars have succeeded in annihilating the enemy. At best, they have provided temporary respite. Furthermore, they have neither fundamentally altered the balance of power between the parties nor achieved major strategic objectives. If any strategic reflection has taken place, it has been limited to short-term considerations.

By contrast, armed militias pursue a long-term strategic objective: to weaken Israel militarily, economically, and morally while scoring propaganda victories on the international media stage. In most cases, however, Israel has failed to effectively counter the enemy’s propaganda machine. As a result, a portion of its population has lost confidence in its leaders, and voices have emerged questioning the moral legitimacy of airstrikes that result in a high number of civilian casualties. This raises a fundamental question: has this security policy truly strengthened Israel, or has it, on the contrary, undermined its long-term stability?

In the United States, the situation bears striking similarities. Since the 1950s, every war waged by this superpower has ended in failure, with a human cost reaching into the millions. Five major conflicts have marked this period, and rather than demonstrating American power, they have exposed its limitations: the Korean War (1950–1953), the Vietnam War (1964–1975), the Gulf War (1991), the War in Afghanistan (2001–2014), and the Iraq War (2003–2011). Not only did these conflicts fail to consolidate U.S. supremacy, but they also inflicted heavy human losses and eroded its moral authority.

The intervention in Afghanistan, in particular, illustrates this failure. Launched in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, it aimed at ideologically motivated terrorist cells that had struck, among other targets, the symbol of American security—the Pentagon. Yet, faced with a diffuse threat and an enemy without a clearly defined identity, the American response turned into a strategic quagmire: a war that became an end in itself, a battlefield where Washington excelled but with no tangible objectives in sight. Instead of targeting countries like Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, whose involvement might have seemed more apparent, the U.S. made Afghanistan its primary focus. Aware of this deadlock, both Barack Obama and Donald Trump avoided any new large-scale military engagements after 2009. Similarly, Vladimir Putin only ordered the annexation of Crimea after ensuring that Ukrainian resistance would not escalate into an armed conflict.

Following U.S. setbacks and the weakening of its global image, other powers seized the opportunity to expand their influence. China and Russia accelerated their rise, while Iran and Turkey pursued a similar strategy, avoiding direct confrontations. Thus, despite threatening rhetoric against Iran and the associated diplomatic risks, Netanyahu and Barak refrained from pushing Tehran into a direct confrontation with Israel. However, this posture contributed to the rise of Hezbollah. Concerned about the unpredictable consequences of all-out war, Netanyahu avoided exploiting Syria’s weakness for an invasion while also forgoing any major regional diplomatic initiatives. His approach primarily relied on the Air Force as a tool for internal demonstrations of power, while Iran and Hamas opted to bypass direct confrontation to avoid large-scale destruction on their own soil.

Historically, Europe has been a theater of relentless wars. But today, a major shift has occurred: a collective instinct has emerged, systematically rejecting military options as a means of resolving conflicts. It is therefore not surprising that France, facing Nazi Germany, chose capitulation in 1940 rather than engaging in a hopeless war destined for mass carnage. Since then, wars initiated by European powers have, in the vast majority of cases, resulted in failures for their instigators.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are often considered one of the most powerful armies in the Middle East, and possibly the world. Its personnel include approximately 621,500 active and reserve soldiers, and its annual budget exceeds 74 billion shekels, representing about 5% of the national GDP. Beyond its direct military functions, the IDF assumes several civilian roles, including in education, religion, justice, the evacuation of localities, the management of protests, and even epidemic control.

However, when comparing this military strength to the results achieved since the Yom Kippur War, a striking gap emerges between expectations and reality. The enormous investment in the military has not translated into clear successes. This leads to an essential question: does the IDF’s power directly reflect the effectiveness of its actions? The conclusion seems inescapable: this is a fundamental failure. The very instrument designed to guarantee Israel’s national security has proven ineffective. And, as paradoxical as it may seem, the IDF’s sheer power could be one of its Achilles’ heels. Its considerable weight can backfire, sometimes creating only an illusion of security.

Many experts argue that the IDF should be transformed into a professional army, abandoning its role as a “people’s army.” But beyond this debate, a more radical reflection is necessary: that of questioning the very necessity of its existence. At first glance, challenging the need for an army may seem absurd. This does not mean, however, that Israel would be exempt from security threats. Questioning the existence of a military force does not equate to abandoning security. It is crucial to emphasize that this issue extends beyond the IDF and concerns many armed forces worldwide. The core argument is that the current military apparatus is revealing its limitations and that its mere presence hinders the exploration of alternative defense solutions. In an era where Israel maintains peaceful relations with its neighbors and faces asymmetric threats such as terrorism and militias, the relevance of a conventional army deserves to be reconsidered.

Over the past decades, scientific and technological advancements have reshaped the world at a dizzying pace, surpassing our ability to adapt. This transformation is so rapid that our awareness struggles to keep up. For military commanders, who operate within a rigid hierarchical structure, this transition is even more challenging: accepting that we have entered a new era—the era of ‘post-war’ or ‘non-war’—poses a significant challenge. This shift was not decreed by the UN, yet it has imposed itself. Certainly, exceptions remain, but the overall trend is undeniable.

The idea of abandoning a standing army remains complex and highly debated. How would a state defend itself in the event of an attack without armed forces? In the past, this question was unthinkable, but today, the world is moving toward a paradigm where victory is no longer achieved by eliminating soldiers and civilians. This is not merely a humanitarian consideration but a profound evolution in military strategy: success is no longer measured by human losses but by other criteria.

Why not undertake a fundamental reform of the IDF? Theoretically, this seems feasible, but in practice, a massive and powerful army struggles to transform itself. Admittedly, since the 1970s, its size and budget have been reduced, yet its core essence remains unchanged. When a security issue arises, the mere existence of the military tends to dictate a military response, even when other solutions might be more appropriate. In other words, it is not the threat that dictates military intervention but the army itself that conditions its use. Moreover, the strength of the IDF profoundly shapes the thinking of decision-makers regarding national security.

How can one explain that one of the most advanced armies in the world has repeatedly failed against militias like Hamas and Hezbollah? The conclusion is self-evident: the IDF is no longer the optimal tool for ensuring Israel’s security. As long as this army dominates the security approach, military and political leaders will struggle to consider alternatives better suited to contemporary challenges.

The digital revolution of the 1980s transformed numerous sectors, forcing traditional organizations to reinvent themselves. Some professions disappeared, while institutions and businesses were dismantled. Our daily lives have evolved to such an extent that it is difficult to imagine the world as it once was. Although the IDF has integrated new technologies, its adaptation has remained purely technical. However, while its former enemies have disappeared and new threats have emerged, the army’s fundamental nature has remained unchanged. It is often said that the military learns from its failures and improves its management of past conflicts. However, it struggles to grasp that its soldiers and weaponry are no longer suited to a world where war is no longer the primary tool of security.

I will now address a frequently asked, often demagogic question: “What if we are attacked by artillery?” Or the populist inquiry: “What do you propose instead of the IDF?” My response is firm: “I have no answer.” Why? Because the real question to ask is: “Is the army truly the right tool for combating militias and terrorism in a world where the era of conventional wars is coming to an end?” If a panel of experts or the country’s leadership begins to doubt the effectiveness of this tool, then it will become possible to explore solutions suited to our existence in a rapidly evolving globalized world.

To illustrate this reflection, let us consider seemingly trivial visual phenomena. Anyone walking around Tel Aviv and its surroundings, as I have, cannot fail to notice the abundance of barbed wire and fences surrounding military bases—often nothing more than offices where employees work on computers. These visible barriers draw attention and signal to all that sensitive information lies behind these walls. But are these fences, barbed wires, armed guards, uniforms, military salutes, and hierarchical symbols truly the most effective means of protecting classified information? Does the ostentatious display of various military branches and units, with their geographic locations openly visible, enhance their efficiency or, on the contrary, compromise it? Must military secrecy necessarily be safeguarded through highly visible bases? Are uniforms a sine qua non for our security, or could they, in fact, jeopardize it? Is the display of military ranks, emphasizing hierarchy, essential for conducting covert operations? In the fight against terrorism and militias, does the system of insignias, command structures, training centers, and military air bases facilitate the discretion required—or does it undermine it? Should what is meant to be secret be so openly exhibited? Should it not instead be managed out of public sight, entirely concealed from foreign observers? This is not about transforming the IDF into an entity resembling Shin Bet or Mossad but rather about adopting a paradigm shift—a conceptual transformation that these institutions themselves will also need to undertake.

Imagine a scenario where military barracks and headquarters are sold to civilian entities while their personnel discreetly relocate to unidentifiable offices and facilities protected by cyber means. The era of walls and electrified barbed wire is over. The era of uniforms identifying combatants is over. The era of ranks revealing identities is over. The world has changed, the enemy has changed, and the needs have changed—hence, it is crucial to abandon these outdated tools as soon as possible. Imagine an Israel without an army, without military bases, and without uniformed soldiers. The fight against militias and terrorist organizations will not be won with tanks, artillery, fighter jets, submarines, or aircraft carriers. The entire current military architecture is ill-suited to this type of conflict.

Should we not reconsider the effectiveness of the Iron Dome and other missile defense systems that are supposed to protect us? Operating a single Iron Dome battery costs $100 million. By contrast, each rocket or mortar shell launched by the enemy costs virtually nothing, forcing us to expend missiles whose effectiveness is questionable yet whose economic cost is staggering. A populist argument suggests that if we had invested the cost of each missile into building a villa for a resident of Gaza, we might have solved the terrorism problem long ago.

I am not the first to observe that we are living in a post-war era, both globally and regionally. As early as 2011, Yuval Noah Harari highlighted this shift in his book Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, a work that profoundly reshaped the consciousness of its readers. This is not some futuristic utopia but rather the reality we live in. Harari already argued at the time that humanity had not yet fully grasped that it had entered an era beyond major wars. Theoretically, a destructive world war remains possible, but the sporadic military upheavals we witness today do not alter this overall trend.

Some even idealize the past, disregarding the cruelty and violence that have shaped human history. History is filled with irrational events; if it followed a clear logic, we would be able to predict its course. Fortunately, reality is not so deterministic. However, the trend is evident: terrorism is not conventional warfare, and addressing it requires tools vastly different from those currently available to modern armies. Haim Assa and Joseph Agassi elaborate on this idea in their work. Unfortunately, states continue to rely on their military forces simply because it remains the most accessible option. The Israel Defense Forces exist, so they are used.

Since the United States possesses the most powerful military in the world, it has deployed it destructively, leading to the deaths of thousands of Koreans, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and Afghans. But has this reduced terrorism? No. On the contrary, terrorism has intensified: after Al-Qaeda came ISIS, perpetuating the cycle of violence and chaos. Can the United States afford not to use its military might? Probably not. But will this situation persist indefinitely? In my view, no. The U.S.’s military failures have exposed its weaknesses and diminished its deterrence power. The Obama and Trump administrations recognized this, as did Netanyahu, who understood that wars do not strengthen Israel’s security but rather weaken it.

Despite this, states continue to engage in conflict, but through non-traditional means. The number of casualties on the opposing side is no longer a metric for victory. The wars of the future will not be fought on battlefields. The Soviet Union did not collapse due to a U.S. military attack but because of its scientific, economic, and ideological inferiority. Today, conflicts unfold on different fronts: economic, scientific, technological, media, cyber, intelligence, and, most importantly, social and ideological spheres.

China has risen as a global power not through military conquests but through strategic investments in science and the economy, which form the foundation of its strength. Germany and Japan, both devastated in World War II, not only recovered but emerged as economic powerhouses through a non-military strategy focused on industry, education, and progress.

In the future, competition between states will center on scientific and social supremacy. There is no need to kill to win these wars. This was also true in antiquity. Empires did not wage wars merely for the sake of killing or for vengeance. Ancient wars were primarily economic; they aimed to expand territorial control to collect more taxes and exploit the wealth of conquered lands.

In the past, the natural resources and wealth coveted by empires were tangible and visible on the earth’s surface. Today, they are intangible, residing in the virtual world. The treasures of knowledge and human progress are now stored on digital servers. A nation seeking to acquire these riches cannot seize them through military conquest or aerial bombings. Moreover, even technological superiority is fleeting, as scientific advancements disseminate almost instantly worldwide thanks to the democratization of knowledge.

The propaganda wars between Israel and militias such as Hamas and Hezbollah will not be resolved on the battlefield. The wars of the future will be determined by nations’ ability to build extensive scientific and social infrastructures to advance humanity. The idea that an ignorant majority could dominate developed populations is an unfounded scare tactic. In every society, it is the scientific and intellectual elite that drives overall progress. Ultimately, a global trend is emerging: investment in science and quality of life is a far more effective alternative than investment in military weaponry.

Whether we like it or not, Israel is located in West Asia. Whether we like it or not, it belongs to an Afro-Asian geopolitical sphere. It is misguided to ignore this reality and persist in viewing itself as an outsider in the region. Israel can forge alliances with states and populations and adopt a regional and global policy. No developed nation today advocates isolationism or a national policy based on ethnicity or religion. Whether we like it or not, our world is built on civic identities. Clinging to the preservation of an alleged racial purity will only lead to demographic exhaustion. Family, community, sectoral, and gender identities belong to the private sphere. Israel will continue to prosper only if it dismantles the ethnic, religious, and communal barriers that hinder its development.

Published in Hebrew on September 19, 2020.

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