Ending the Gaza War Now: Israel’s Both Moral and Rational Choice

The public discourse in Israel has trapped us in a misleading dichotomy: between rescuing hostages and achieving “total victory.” However, a deeper strategic examination reveals a contrary truth: it is precisely a hostage deal and ending the war that would create the strongest position for Israel, not the weakest. This is not merely a moral argument, but a cold strategic analysis of the cost-benefit balance.

After over 500 days of fighting, the current military doctrine has failed to achieve its declared objectives. Hamas still holds hostages, and while its rocket-launching capabilities have been significantly damaged, the security threat has not been completely eliminated. With each passing day, the cost of the mobilized economy intensifies with a cumulative cost of billions, tourism, agriculture, and export sectors in the south are collapsing, and unemployment disguised as reserve duty erodes economic resilience. Meanwhile, Israel’s diplomatic standing is deteriorating, and international isolation is becoming a concerning reality.

Persisting with a failing strategy is not evidence of strength. It is expensive stubbornness that weakens Israel. The demand for “total victory” over Hamas has created a rhetorical trap that undermines any pragmatic solution. Setting an unattainable goal leads to missing effective solutions. Is there any basis to assume that two or three more months of fighting will lead to absolute victory?

International history provides a clear insight: modern asymmetric wars do not end with “total victories” but with pragmatic resolutions. The United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia in Chechnya, Britain against the IRA, and Colombia against the FARC – all came to understand that a complete military defeat of an organization embedded within a civilian population is not possible.

In light of the promise to eliminate Hamas, disconnected from cold rationality, any agreement to a deal that does not include the complete dismantling of Hamas is perceived as defeat. The absurdity is glaring. The promised future benefit is speculative, while the damages are certain and concrete – to the hostages suffering in captivity, to soldiers risking their lives in Gaza, to evacuated citizens who cannot return to their homes, to the bleeding economy, and to Israel’s deteriorating international standing.

After more than a year and a half of fighting, Gaza is completely destroyed – neighborhoods have been erased, infrastructure has collapsed, and hundreds of thousands have become refugees. Amidst this destruction, Hamas continues to operate among the civilian population. Even the Israeli public, much of which is not exposed to the true extent of the destruction in Gaza, is beginning to understand that there is no justification for continued fighting without clear and achievable objectives.

The public protesting in the streets rightly sees the return of the hostages as a supreme mission – not only morally superior but strategically as well, and certainly more important than achieving a “total victory” – a concept that has lost its practical meaning.

In fact, examining the actions Israel has taken during the war shows that the strategy repeatedly employed by the political echelon is archaic and one-dimensional. It relies on an outdated concept of deterrence through military means alone and ignores the complexity of the modern arena. When this failing strategy combines with the narrow political motives of a Prime Minister concerned about his coalition’s survival, an intolerable situation emerges – fateful decisions about human lives, state security, and its strategic future are made from considerations of political survival, not long-term strategic thinking.

In the complex reality of the Middle East, true power is not measured by the ability to destroy, but by the ability to achieve complex strategic objectives. The advanced strategic paradigm sees flexibility, sophistication, and multidimensional vision as the source of true strength. The ability to end a conflict under conditions that allow achieving the most important goals and redirecting resources to more significant threats is an expression of power.

The conclusion derived from reading reality through a rational prism is completely contrary to the discourse the political echelon is trying to promote. The return of the hostages and ending the fighting through an agreement will constitute the smartest strategic move at this time – enabling the exploitation of diplomatic opportunities to build a more stable regional framework; redirecting resources to other security threats; rapid economic and social rehabilitation; and rebuilding international legitimacy that will allow determined action in other necessary arenas.

To those who argue that without eliminating Hamas another “October 7th” will occur, the answer is: the idea that Israel can completely “eliminate” an ideological movement is simplistic and disconnected from historical reality. Security is achieved not only through military force but also and primarily through political arrangements that create stability.

We must adopt complex strategic thinking and understand – precisely those who insist on continuing the fighting without a deal are promoting the true strategic surrender: surrender to fixated thinking and missing the last opportunity to end the campaign under conditions that would still allow Israel a strong starting position for the next existential challenges.

The failure of October 7th will not be corrected through the total destruction of Gaza, but through fundamental reform in political and security systems and with a willingness to enable growth not only for Israel but also for Palestinians. Sacrificing the hostages on the altar of blatant irrationality disguised as “total victory” must be removed from the political agenda and the public discourse all the same.