What the Israeli military establishment must do to restore deterrence

Avoiding strategic defeatism and returning to deterrence principles will enhance Israel’s ability to credibly threaten violent non-state actors’ vital interests in the future.

The Israeli military establishment is engaged in efforts to establish escalation dominance vis a vis Iran, defeat Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, and decisively dispatch Hamas in Gaza. All the while, barrages of rockets and missiles are incessantly launched against Israeli cities. However, while the fighting continues, serious strategic issues persist. Namely, how will Israel restore general deterrence in the region, more than a year after the sadistic October 7 Hamas attacks shattered the illusion of Israeli impenetrability? Israeli deterrence extends beyond kinetic means, but what Israeli strategists must now consider is how better to hold what its enemies value at risk.

The debate over whether the devastating events of October 7 were a result of intelligence or deterrence failure rages on. Certainly, a considerable body of opinion, including senior officers in the Israeli security establishment, have primarily viewed October 7 as an intelligence failure. IDF military intelligence chief Maj.-Gen. Aharon Haliva, who resigned in April 2024, was among the first senior commanders to accept responsibility for the failure of intelligence. However, we have only recently begun to see similar levels of thought expended on the notion that what took place was due to a failure of deterrence. Six months ago, I met with a serving member of the Knesset at an event in London and asked whether she thought the events of October 7 were the result of a failure of deterrence. The response was that it is unwise to assume that Hamas is deterrable.

Besides being able to credibly impose costs on the enemy that would outweigh any potential gains made, part of what makes deterrence effective is the ability to hold what the enemy values at risk, and to threaten unacceptable levels of damage against those interests, in response to acts of aggression. The strategic objective being to alter the decision-making calculus in the enemy’s mind, to uphold the status quo. Regrettably, as the world knows, the Israeli military establishment did not successfully preserve the status quo of ante October 7.

It is therefore logical to assess that the October 7 attacks took place because the Israeli military establishment failed to identify precisely what Hamas values, and to subsequently hold those vital interests at risk. Hence, one cannot dismiss the fact that the events of October 7 were the result of a failure of deterrence.

Nevertheless, ideologically motivated violent non-state actors like Hamas are harder to deter than state actors, because the breadth and scope of their interests does not reflect those of a state. Violent non-state actors’ conceptualisation of protecting citizens, for example, does not cohere with those of a democratic state like Israel. Having limited resources and being over-reliant on a much greater patron state, in this context Iran, indicates that the stakes are considerably lower if violent non-state actors’ attacks fail to yield desired objectives.

What, besides loss of life, do violent non-state actors actually have to lose? And one must be cautious to assume that life is equally valuable to violent non-state actors than to democratically elected leaders and the referent objects they are accountable for, such as territorial integrity, the wellbeing of the electorate, national security, and to critical economic and political interests. In fact, the evidence clearly shows that violent non-state actors, particularly those of the Islamist variety, do not value life. They value death and promote it at every stage of their operations.

Since the war began, about three-quarters of the roughly 30,000 to 40,000 Hamas combatants that comprised their ground forces at the beginning of the conflict have been terminated. Crucial Hamas leadership figures have also been taken out, notably Mohammed Deif, Ismail Haniyeh, and Yahya Sinwar. Yet, Hamas’ campaign of terror persists, despite the severe degradation of its military capabilities by the IDF’s operational manoeuvres in Gaza and elsewhere regionally.

Indeed, the Israeli military establishment must ask itself how to deter those who value death more than they value life, no matter how troubling and perhaps even seemingly absurd this proposition appears. While there are no conclusive answers to this question, it certainly deserves a considerable degree of imaginative thinking. What is clear, however, is that deterrence also requires an understanding of strategic culture, ideological precepts, and a cognisance of what to hold at risk, and the means to target those interests effectively, and to demonstrate all those capabilities with either the threat of punishment, the threat of denial, or both simultaneously.

Some have argued that Hamas’ barbarism and ideological fanaticism renders it unamenable to humanity or reason. But even the ideologically militant hold certain interests in high esteem. The nature of those interests may be immaterial, or they may be earthly. However, simply to dismiss the notion that Hamas is bereft of vital interests, and therefore undeterrable, as my Israeli parliamentary acquaintance in London stated, is strategically defeatist. Additionally, failing to identify and grasp precisely what it is that Hamas values, or what constitute Hamas’ vital interests, bodes poorly for deterrence effectiveness going forward.

Further degrading Hamas’ operational capabilities and eventually annihilating the terror group are both necessary tactical endeavours. But if the objective is to prevent similar attacks to October 7 from taking place again in the long-term, simply destroying Hamas in its current incarnation does not preclude the possibility of future analogous ideological incarnations to emerge.

Nevertheless, in the near-term, Hamas will continue to take its operational cues from Iran. Therefore, to maximise deterrence effectiveness, being able to simultaneously hold what Iranian leaders value at risk is crucial to ascertain which joint or separate assets and interests to target. Hamas, as the junior partner in the axis with Iran, will be tactically and politically impacted by decisive strikes against the Islamic Republic.

While Israel, with the help of the United States, has managed to exploit ruptures within the axis between Iran and its regional proxies, it required a failure of deterrence to engender a newfound operational focus. After all, restoring deterrence happens only once deterrence has initially failed. While divisions between Iran and its proxies are being exposed, it remains to be seen which kinetic and non-kinetic means will enable Israel to restore strategic deterrence.

As things stand, Iran and its proxies continue relentlessly to conduct sub-conventional attacks against Israeli interests. The direct attempts to assassinate Prime Minister Netanyahu are indicative of this. Coupled with striking Iran’s nuclear facilities, intensifying the targeting of Iran’s highly valued financial and communal networks operating in Europe, regionally, and elsewhere globally, as well as targeting the highest echelons of its political and military leadership, would bolster Israel’s efforts to establish escalation dominance truly and decisively. Then and only then can deterrence be restored.

Ultimately, understanding what has worked and failed in deterrence postures in the past can aid in determining what could enhance Israeli deterrence in the present and in the future. Hence, losing sight of the salience of historical patterns in deterrence practices in past military planning can come at a devastating cost to the deterrer.

Detractors of this argument might say ‘just because it has worked in the past does not mean that it will work in the future,’ or that ‘it is impossible to know when deterrence succeeds, only when it fails.’ These are valid points. But no serious military establishment simply relies on what appears to have worked in the past, and I am certainly not advocating for the rigid adherence to past operational plans simply because they were once effective. Strategic and tactical successes should serve as a bedrock upon which to strengthen strategic thinking and include the integration of novel and innovative ideas and technologies into operational planning.

While it is difficult to establish what factors determine an adversary’s decision not to conduct an act of aggression, a relatively reliable indicator of when deterrence has not failed is when the status quo holds up. What the regional status quo will look like in the future remains to be seen. However, failing to identify which violent-non state actors’ vital interests to target and to hold at risk will inevitably lead to a recurrence of deterrence failure.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.