Giving Netanyahu the benefit of the doubt

An adult human being is a pretty complicated creature. He or she might perform certain actions, or refrain from performing certain actions, out of an almost limitless variety of possible motives. Some of those motives might be meritorious, some might be unworthy, and some might have no particular moral weight or value at all.  And, because the operations of any person’s mind are typically hidden from all other persons—and, sometimes, hidden even from the person whose own mind it is—we’re frequently unsure about why people act as they do.

Enter the concept of giving people “the benefit of the doubt.” John Doe does X.  From my perspective, it seems that Mr. Doe might have been motivated by M1 (which I think is praiseworthy), or he might have been motivated by M2 (which in my view is unworthy). But, because I’m not in a position to say which motive was operative, I decide to give him the benefit of the doubt and assume that M1, the praiseworthy motive, was the decisive factor.

I give Mr. Doe the benefit of the doubt because, if I had done X just like Mr. Doe, I would certainly hope that observers would assume that I had acted from a proper motive rather than an improper one. It seems only fair that I should treat Mr. Doe as I myself would wish to be treated in a similar situation, and that’s why I give him the benefit of the doubt.

I submit that, for precisely the same reasons, Prime Minister Netanyahu should be given the benefit of the doubt.

Every day one reads news reports and op-eds that disclose someone’s firm, even unshakeable conviction that the PM is refusing to agree to a deal that will release at least some of the hostages in exchange for a ceasefire because he wants the conflict to continue indefinitely. And we are told that he wants the conflict to continue indefinitely because, if and when it ends, the PM will be confronted with renewed criminal prosecutions, or with political upheavals that will undermine his hold on power, or both.

But none of us can get inside PM Netanyahu’s head, and surely we can all agree that there are possible motives for an unwillingness to accept the kind of deal now on the table that would have nothing to do with the PM’s legal difficulties or the prospects of his continuing in office.

It is impossible to deny the agony that the families of the hostages—both living and dead—are suffering as they wait for a seemingly endless period of time to be reunited with their loved ones, or to give mortal remains a proper burial. But it is also impossible to deny that the head of government of a nation with almost ten million citizens has a duty to consider what course is on balance best for all those citizens, and not merely what is best for some one hundred remaining hostages and their families.

The Hamas terrorists are reportedly demanding that any hostage deal be conditioned on the withdrawal of IDF troops from Gaza, and in particular from the Philadelphi Corridor running along Gaza’s border with Egypt. It is now indisputable that the Corridor was riddled with tunnels connecting Gaza to Egypt, and that the Egyptian government either deliberately ignored or actually assisted Hamas terrorists as they used those tunnels to transport munitions and weapons into Gaza. No reasonable person can doubt that, if the IDF withdraws from the Corridor, terrorists will rebuild tunnels and once again use them to smuggle arms into Gaza—arms that would certainly be used to attack Israelis at some time in the future.

Any Israeli prime minister, whether Netanyahu or any other person, would have to seriously consider the negative consequences of agreeing to a hostage/ceasefire deal that necessitated IDF withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor. I respectfully submit that, notwithstanding the agonizing heartbreak of the hostage families, any prime minister could reasonably decide that, in light of the negative implications for the future of all Israelis if the IDF withdraws from the Corridor, it is best to reject any deal that requires such a withdrawal. Because such a rejection would be reasonable, we ought to give Netanyahu the benefit of the doubt regarding his motives in refusing to agree to abandon the Corridor.

So, one reason to give PM Netanyahu the benefit of the doubt is the same reason we give that benefit to anyone: When someone—me, you, or a head of government—acts with motives that might or might not be admirable, we willingly assume they are admirable, because that is the assumption we would wish others to apply to our motives and actions in comparable situations.

But, in addition, there is a second reason that applies particularly and specifically to the prime minister. Israel is at war. In a time of war, it is especially important that the nation be as unified as it can possibly be, because enemies will certainly perceive any obvious lack of unity as a sign of weakness that will only strengthen enemy morale. It is hard to imagine that attacks by Israelis on Israel’s prime minister—whoever that prime minister might be and whatever might be the grounds for those attacks—would not be interpreted by terrorists as an encouraging sign of Israeli weakness and disunity. In such circumstances, it seems clear that every reasonable effort should be made to present a unified front to Israel’s enemies; that reasonable effort includes giving Netanyahu the benefit of the doubt.