Good Intentions Aren’t Good Enough and More Bava Basra 90-92

Good Intentions Aren’t Good Enough

Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses the different efforts of the Amoraim, Shmuel’s father and Shmuel himself to prevent hoarding, price manipulation and gouging in the marketplace. Interestingly, with good intentions, they employed opposite strategies. The Gemara also commented on whose intervention was more effective:

אבוה דשמואל מזבין להו לפירי בתרעא חרפא, כתרעא חרפא. שמואל בריה, משהי לפירי, ומזבין להו בתרעא אפלא – כתרעא חרפא. שלחו מתם: טבא דאבא מדברא. מאי טעמא? תרעא דרווח – רווח.

The Gemara relates: Shmuel’s father would sell produce during the period of the early market price, when produce is cheap, for the early market price. His son Shmuel acted differently, and would keep the produce and sell it during the period of the late market price, when produce is expensive, for the early market price.

They sent a message from there, Eretz Yisrael: The practice of the father is better than that of the son. What is the reason for this? A market price that has been eased and starts out low will remain eased, with little increase over the course of the year. Therefore, one who makes produce available at the beginning of the season, like Shmuel’s father, aids people during the entire year. By contrast, a market price that starts out high, because people are not making their produce available at the market, is not easily lowered.

This Gemara brings to light two ideas. One, is the simple reality of inertia in social and economic dynamics. Once there is inflation, even if the original impetus (scarcity) goes away, it takes longer for the prices to deflate (don’t we know it today!) But this is true for almost everything. In the United States, income taxes were imposed in the 19th Century to fund war efforts and obviously they have not gone away in peace time, and only rarely have been reduced. Government regulations become more complex and intrusive, and rarely scale back. One of the many campaign promises kept by President Trump, was his Executive Order 13771 to cut two regulations for every new government regulation imposed.

Another important idea that emerges from this Gemara is that good intentions alone are not enough; one must also be clever. Shmuel’s strategy of holding a reserve supply of produce seemed like it would work to directly counter scarcity, and therefore reduce prices. In a straightforward logical manner Shmuel’s plan seemed sound, as why would introducing more supply early in the season counter scarcity that might arise later? However, his father’s wisdom allowed him to foresee the advantage of catching the initial market conditions, and set a trend early, even when there was no scarcity at all. His father’s approach was counterintuitive, but nevertheless superior on a practical basis. We might imagine that the elder possessed more life experience, allowing him a more tactical view on the situation.

The Gemara (Berachos 17a) similarly counsels that one should be clever in the manner that he is God fearing. Mesilas Yesharim (19) elaborates: One ought to devise new ways of pleasing his creator in every possible manner.

Ben Yehoyada (ibid) speaks of devising internal tricks to motivate and avoid pitfalls. He quotes a Midrash Rabbah (35) about Dovid Hamelech who would say to himself, “I’m just going to stroll in the garden”, but then end up in the Bais Midrash. There are other ways to interpret this Midrash, such as his learning and good deeds became habitual. However, Ben Yehoyada interpreted it as if Dovid Hamelech was playing a psychological game with himself, not fully acknowledging his plan to go study, so as not to arouse the resistance of the Yetzer Hara.

In any case, we see numerous examples where leadership of self or others is not merely about being God fearing, but also shrewd and creative.

Exit Strategy

Our Gemara on Amud Aleph discusses famine conditions that could allow a person to leave Eretz Yisroel:

תנו רבנן: אין יוצאין מארץ לחוץ לארץ, אלא אם כן עמדו סאתים בסלע. אמר רבי שמעון: אימתי – בזמן שאינו מוצא ליקח, אבל בזמן שמוצא ליקח – אפילו עמדה סאה בסלע, לא יצא.

The Sages taught: One may not leave Eretz Yisrael to live outside of Eretz Yisrael unless the price of two se’a of grain stood at a sela, which is double its usual price. Rabbi Shimon said: When does this exception, permitting one to leave Eretz Yisrael under certain circumstances, apply? It applies when one is unable to find produce to buy, as he has no money. But when one has money and is able to find produce to buy, even if the price of a se’a of grain stood at a sela, he may not leave.

וכן היה רבי שמעון בן יוחאי אומר: אלימלך, מחלון וכליון, גדולי הדור היו, ופרנסי הדור היו; ומפני מה נענשו? מפני שיצאו מארץ לחוצה לארץ, שנאמר: ״ותהם כל העיר עליהן, ותאמרנה הזאת נעמי״. מאי ״הזאת נעמי״? אמר רבי יצחק, אמרו: חזיתם נעמי שיצאת מארץ לחוץ לארץ – מה עלתה לה?

And Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai would likewise say: Elimelech and his sons Mahlon and Chilion were prominent members of their generation and were leaders of their generation. And for what reason were they punished? They were punished because they left Eretz Yisrael to go outside of Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated concerning Naomi and Ruth: “And all the city was astir concerning them, and the women said: Is this Naomi?” (Ruth 1:19).

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: “Is this Naomi”? How does this indicate that her husband and sons were punished for leaving Eretz Yisrael? Rabbi Yitzḥak says that the women said: Have you seen what befell Naomi, who left Eretz Yisrael for outside of Eretz Yisrael? Not only did she not escape tribulations there, but she lost her status entirely.

Our forefather, Avraham, also left Eretz Yisrael to escape a famine. As it states (Bereishis 12:10):

ויהי רעב בארץ וירד אברם מצרימה לגור שם כי־כבד הרעב בארץ

There was a famine in the land, and Abram went down to Egypt to sojourn there, because the famine was severe in the land.

Be’er Mayyim Chaim (ibid) uses our Gemara to explain the superfluous comment in the verse: “Because the famine was severe.” This explanatory clause emphasizes that the famine had to be severe before Avraham would leave Eretz Yisrael.

In opposition to this, Ramban (ibid) famously holds Avraham to a higher standard, in that a person who has such routine providence should have only trusted in God:

ודע כי אברהם אבינו חטא חטא גדול בשגגה שהביא אשתו הצדקת במכשול עון מפני פחדו פן יהרגוהו, והיה לו לבטח בשם שיציל אתו ואת אשתו ואת כל אשר לו, כי יש באלהים כח לעזר ולהציל. גם יציאתו מן הארץ שנצטוה עליה בתחלה מפני הרעב עון אשר חטא, כי האלהים ברעב יפדנו ממות. ועל המעשה הזה נגזר על זרעו הגלות בארץ מצרים ביד פרעה, במקום המשפט שמה הרשע והחטא:

Know that Abraham our father unintentionally committed a great sin by bringing his righteous wife to a stumbling-block of sin on account of his fear for his life. He should have trusted that G-d would save him and his wife and all his belongings for G-d surely has the power to help and to save. His leaving the Land, concerning which he had been commanded from the beginning, on account of the famine, was also a sin he committed, for in famine G-d would redeem him from death. It was because of this deed that the exile in the land of Egypt at the hand of Pharaoh was decreed for his children. In the place of justice, there is wickedness and sin.

We do not usually find commentaries faulting revered Biblical figures beyond whatever is mentioned in Midrash or Gemara, with some notable exceptions. This is a genre of Jewish literature that requires its own separate study. That the Ramban took it upon himself to criticize the patriarch is so difficult to process that Rav Moshe Feinstein Z”TL (Darash Moshe ibid, also see vol II, p. 10, and Kol Ram by Rav A. Fishelis vol II, p. 22) says that this text must not be authentic and it is a mitzvah to erase from the Ramban. Yet, others echo the Ramban’s assertion, see Radak (ibid), and Rav Samson Rafael Hirsch (ibid 12:2) who even references the Ramban as an object lesson: The Torah wants us to see the struggles and errors of even the great people.

Rav Ruderman ZT”L (Sichas Avodas Halevi, Mamar Bitachon V’hishtadlus, 13) also follows the Ramban, but contextualizes it as an error in judgment about his standing relative to God. Rav Ruderman quotes Chovos Halevavos (Gate of Bitachon, 3) who holds that persons of a particular high degree of piety, who are not enslaved to the physical lusts, may totally rely on God. They are not under the usual requirement that humans make reasonable efforts to assure their economic and personal welfare.

ואם הוא מגביר עבודת האלהים ובוחר ביראתו ובוטח בו בעניני תורתו ועולמו וסר מן הדברים המגנים וכוסף למדות הטובות לא יבעט במנוחה ולא יטה אל השלוה ולא ישיאהו היצר ולא יפת בכשפי העולם יסתלק מעליו טרח הגלגול והסבוב בהבאת טרפו מפני הסתלקות שני הפנים הנזכרים מעליו הבחינה והבעיטה בטובה ויבואהו טרפו בלי טרח ובלי יגיעה כפי ספוקו ומזונו כמו שנאמר (משלי י ג) לא ירעיב ה׳ נפש צדיק.

If a man strengthens himself in the service of G-d, resolves to fear Him, trusts in Him for his religious and secular matters, steers away from reprehensible things, strives for the good Middos (character traits), does not rebel in prosperity nor turn towards leisure, is not enticed by the evil inclination, nor seduced by the witchery of this world – the burden of exerting himself in the means to a livelihood will be removed from him, since the two reasons mentioned above no longer apply to him, namely, to test him on his choice and to protect him from rebelling during prosperity. His livelihood will come to him without strain.

Therefore, Rav Ruderman avers that Avraham made an error in self-assessment and judgment. Avraham humbly believed that he still was required to take physical steps to protect himself. The mistaken humility was the real sin. Rav Ruderman is making an object lesson that it can also be a sin to underestimate one’s ability and spiritual stature.

While Rav Ruderman’s thesis stands on its own merit in terms of its nuanced moral refinement and philosophy, in terms of peshat in Chovos Halevavos, I have a major difficulty. Chovos Halevavos may not be discussing how one should behave, but rather what post facto attitude one should take in relation to what occurs. He may just mean to say that for certain people, their sustenance will come without effort. That is different than maintaining an approach that one need not initially try to take steps at self-preservation. According to such an idea, Avraham appropriately took steps to save himself, all the while, still trusting in God.

Money Over Matter

Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses a case in which a buyer and seller are in dispute over if the purchased ox was sold for labor purposes or for slaughter. The difference being, that if it was found to be an unruly ox known to gore, the purchase would be deemed under false pretenses and be refunded. However, the seller maintains that he sold the ox under the presumption that it was for slaughter, thus the ox’s nature is irrelevant, and the purchase should stand. The Gemara then considers if we may use statistical analysis as evidence. In other words, may we reason that since the majority of oxen are sold for labor, we should give more credence to the claim of the buyer. Shmuel holds, though it is a general principle that Torah law follows the majority, such as a smaller amount of non-kosher food becomes nullified if mixed into a larger amount, this does not apply to monetary considerations. We cannot use the presumption of majority to prove a certain status that adjudicates a financial obligation or benefit, and the sale stands. As is classically the case when it comes to financial claims, the burden of proof rests on the claimant.

There have been different lomdishe explanations for this principle that the majority does not nullify the minority in regard to financial evidence. I would like to offer a psychological and spiritual explanation for the function of this principle and what attitude the Torah promotes. When it comes to practical matters, reality is often about consensus. Is the rectangular box in front of you a small table or a footstool? It makes a difference whether you will eat off of it or rest your feet on it. Yet, it is a subjective imposition, and you’ll get along well with others if your subjective reality matches the consensus of others, and you’ll experience much social friction in case you have difficulty making that determination accurately. (“Get your feet off my table”, or “Why are you putting food on my ottoman?”)

A good portion of Torah law and prohibitions are about obedience and adherence to norms that promote societal welfare and personal balance of character (see Moreh Nevuchim III:26 and 27.) Therefore, if a Torah prohibition is nullified, it is no longer an apparent act of violation, as the forbidden action or substance is not manifest. This idea also can be used to explain the Rambam’s distinctive position regarding an ambiguous or undetermined prohibition. According to basic Torah law, it is not prohibited to violate an ambiguous or undetermined prohibition, such as eating a piece of meat that it is unclear if kosher or not. The idea that one must err on the side of caution, and strictly abstain from even possible prohibitions of indefinite status is only rabbinically mandated. (See Laws of the Impurity of a Corpse, 9:12.)

On the other hand, money and assets are the epitome of personal subjective rights. After all, the idea that a person can own anything is built on an assertion of the individual over the general reality. Think about it philosophically. Why does anyone have a right to anything? God made it all. I don’t own my potatoes, more than my tractor or my eyes and lungs. Yet the Torah allows for this thing called ownership, so as to align with human nature and motivations. Possession is already the personal assertion over the general. Keeping that in mind, it is easier to understand morally and metaphysically why the burden of proof is on the claimant who wants to extract money, and he cannot use statistics or majority as evidence. He cannot use a generality to overcome a subjective individual apprehension.