Hamas Cruelty: An Argument for Changing Strategies

Many Israelis have been justifiably outraged at the sights of Hamas cruelty during the handover ceremonies for hostages, and at the tales of the suffering the hostages endured.

However, less understandable is the conclusion reached by many: That this outrage translates into a need to continue the current war.

The war, as it is currently being fought, is unwinnable. It is unwinnable because our government does not have a plan for victory: It has refused to seriously engage in thinking about a plan for who will replace Hamas as the governing power that controls Gaza.

This means that the IDF goes in, does an excellent job of finding and getting rid of terrorists, and terrorists infrastructure, such as rocket launchers and tunnels, and then pulls out of the territory. Once it does so, Hamas comes back in and begins to rebuild. It also has a supply of new recruits, bolstered by those in Gaza who have lost their homes and their families due to the war. Then the IDF goes in and refights the battles that it won only months ago. Afterwards, it leaves, Hamas comes back -and the cycle continues.

The current government was informed by key military personnel in the IDF that there was a feeling that they had done what they could, and destroyed much of Hamas’s fighting power. The army was at a point where they needed to be told of a larger strategy -of what the day-after plan was – in order to know how to proceed. The government’s failure to provide such a plan was reportedly a factor in military support for the current cease-fire deal, since the feeling was that without a larger strategic policy plan, the current war was of limited military value, and therefore, at this point, rescuing the hostages is a higher priority than continuing the war.

Israel’s key ally, whose military aid is vital to its being able to fight the war -America – pushed the government for a day-after plan. It refused. Members of its defense cabinet, Gantz and Eisenkott, pushed it -it refused, even when that meant their resignation. Its defense minister at the time, Gallant, pushed it – same story.

Israel has rejected the plan for a reformed PA, equating the PA with Hamas, even though the PA  in the West Bank actively works with Israeli security forces to protect Israelis from terrorist attacks. Israel has also refused to engage in a long-term, planned military occupation of Gaza. Some of its members talk about occupying and settling Gaza, but as a policy, this government has not instructed the IDF to occupy Gaza -in fact, quite the opposite. In addition, the army itself has expressed a desire not to occupy Gaza, due to the immense resources such an occupation would require, which would take away from its abilities to defend Israel on other fronts, such as the West Bank and the Lebanon border.

Like all Israelis, I view Hamas as a direct threat to me and my family. But Hamas’s power and cruelty displayed during the hostage ceremonies is not an argument for the current war. In fact, quite the opposite. It raises the question: If we have not uprooted Hamas by fighting the current war, in its current format, for over a year, why would we think that a few extra months or years of fighting will do the trick?

If we go back to war with no plan that defines victory in a concrete way (which is  the current situation), victory can never be achieved, in part because we have no way of even measuring if we are close to the goal. If there are no defined goals, you have nothing by which to measure your success -or lack thereof.

This means perpetual war, with no end in sight. Can our economy endure with tens of thousands of reservists called up at any given moment, for months at a time? Offices will be full of people who are there half a year; private businesses will be without bosses for three months a year. Can the families of reservists function when a parent/spouse is absent for a few months a year, for years at a time? What happens our society when people are continually called up, over and over, and what happens to the soldiers themselves -what psychological price do they pay?

This is leaving aside our international image and our diplomatic ties with other countries, which are a strategic asset to Israel, and which continue to be eroded the longer the war goes on.

Of course, one might argue that eradicating Hamas is worth the price paid by our economy and our society, as well as the hit we take in the realms of media image and diplomacy. But in order for such an argument to hold true, the war would have to actually have a plan for eradicating Hamas. At the moment, it does not, because the government refuses to commit to any such plan. Ultimately, this lack of policy informs the army’s strategy, since its official task is to fight the war in line with the government’s instructions and goals.

The images of Hamas cruelty are an argument that we need to change strategies. We need to get our hostages back, so we can begin to heal as a society – even if that means ending the current war, which has clearly failed to achieve its goals and has no plan for achieving those goals in the near future.

We must also have elections, and put in power a government that does have a plan to achieve victory over Hamas. In fact, each party’s plan for what to do in Gaza should be one of the key elements of their party platform, so that Israelis have the chance to vote for the policies they feel would keep them safest.

We also need an official commission of inquiry, so that we can truly understand the failings at all levels -governmental, intelligence, and military -that helped lead to October 7th, and go to the polls armed with this information. Israel had such inquiries in key moments of failure before, such as the Yom Kippur war, and we must uphold this Israeli tradition of being brave enough to investigate our mistakes in order to learn how not to repeat them in the future.

Only when these steps are taken, can we hope that we are on a path to a more secure future.