Hamas’ grip on Gaza is slipping fast

The protests in Gaza are nothing short of remarkable. For years since their election – 2006 for the Palestinian legislative elections, 2007 for their military victory over Fatah – Hamas ruled with a brutal efficiency, and public dissent against the terror group was rare at best. Demonstrators now, in clear contrast, line the streets with chants of ‘Hamas out’ and ‘Hamas terrorists’ – thousands of Gazans in Beit Lahiya, Jabalia and Khan Younis, sick of war, now openly call for an end to Hamas’ reign. Such public anger is in crisp departure from the historical norm: Hamas’ consolidation in 2007 was violent, and when it seized control from Fatah, it left a hundred Palestinians dead. Public protests, when they have occurred, have since then been suppressed with a swiftness that rivals certain authoritarian regimes of the past. The Arab Spring of 2011 barely registered in Gaza, for example.

What is particularly striking, though, is the clarity of the message: ‘Yes to peace, no to the ongoing war.’ What we see here is not a mere frustration of Gazan civilians against Hamas, it is a direct challenge to the entire ideological foundation upon which the terror group built itself. This is especially so given Hamas’ framing itself as the resistance, the defenders of Palestinian dignity in the face of Israel, the supposed suppressor. The message from the streets, outside of American Universities and Hamas propaganda, is that Hamas does little to protect Gaza – instead, it actively works to achieve the opposite. The protests have now expanded beyond the small, isolated gatherings they formerly were, and, while Hamas’ security forces reportedly observe from a distance, they are yet to intervene with their usual violence – that said, security forces in civilian clothing were seen breaking up protests, but peacefully. Perhaps it is because the world watches.

There is an uncomfortable truth to be recognised here, though: not all Gazans are innocent bystanders. Multiple former Israeli hostages have testified that civilians in the Strip directly aided Hamas during the October 7 massacre almost a year and a half ago. They have described being held captive by Gazan families; some being handed over to Hamas later, others not. Such a complicity makes the situation at hand messier than the typical David-and-Goliath narrative; while many Gazans are, undoubtedly, victims of Hamas’ rule, others have actively taken part in its violence, and continue to.

This is not to say that one must excuse the suffering faced by ordinary Gazans – absolutely not; in fact, far from it. But it raises difficult, uncomfortable questions about the influence of the terror group and the depth of its support. To have to blur the lines between who is a victim and who is a participant is, of course, awkward to acknowledge, but a necessary evil. Parts of Gazan society, it must be known, were complicit in Hamas’ terror infrastructure.

The protests in Gaza, then, are representative of the fact that public opinion on the war has changed following a year and a half of war. Some demonstrators, though, expressed a stance that was painfully pragmatic: ‘If Hamas leaving power in Gaza is the solution, why doesn’t Hamas give up power to protect the people?’ Another: ‘We want to stop the killing and displacement, no matter the price.’ And it isn’t hard to understand why: a quick internet search on Google at Gaza shows little more than rubble.

Israel’s response has been to double down on its military campaign. The IDF will soon operate with increased intensity in more areas of Gaza, and the real test will be whether these protests gain momentum or fade under the weight of Hamas’ repression. The fact that these demonstrations have happened at all is truly extraordinary, but anger alone is not enough.

Hamas claim to represent the Gazan people, but such an assertion is crumbling before our eyes. The world must listen, and decide to pursue action, rather than idleness. Whether the anger we have seen will translate into political change remains to be seen, and, should the protests continue, the terror group will likely resort to their familiar tactics of arrests, torture, and executions. For Hamas, the challenge will be to maintain control without further alienating its citizens; for Israel, it will be how best to proceed to end the conflict. Whatever either of the two chooses to do, though, Gazans appear to have just now realised that they are neither monolithic victims of Israel or Hamas; they have political agency, and Hamas’ grip on Gaza is cracking.