Impugning Motives: A Game Everyone Can Play!

The question on many minds these days is: “Why is Bibi doing it?”

That is, why is Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refusing to enter into a ceasefire deal with Hamas that would provide for the release of some but not all of the remaining hostages in a swap for many more terrorists imprisoned in Israel, and would also compel IDF troops to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor—the narrow strip of land in Gaza that runs along its border with Egypt?

Many of those who are asking that question believe they know full well the answer: Netanyahu is refusing because, if he were to accept the deal, the brittle coalition that keeps him in power would likely shatter, ending his premiership. The thought is that right-wing parties in the governing coalition would rebel if the IDF withdraws, so, if Netanyahu wants to remain in power—and the critics are convinced that that is his highest, and perhaps his only, priority—he must say no.

In contrast, in an extensive news conference on September 2, Netanyahu forcefully argued that retaining control over the Corridor is vital to Israel’s security.

It is now undisputed that Hamas punctured Gaza’s border with Egypt with a plethora of tunnels, some large enough to accommodate trucks, through which war materiel was smuggled into Gaza and then used to attack and kill Israelis. No reasonable person can doubt that, if everything else were equal, it would be to Israel’s advantage to retain control of the Corridor so as to deny Hamas renewed use of such tunnels.

But the critics say that everything else definitely is not equal, and that the hostages’ lives continue to be at risk simply because Netanyahu is more interested in staying in power than in freeing hostages.

Benny Gantz, the leader of the opposition National Unity Party and a former IDF Chief of Staff, and Gadi Eisenkot, a member of that party and another former Chief of Staff, had joined a “war cabinet” formed by Netanyahu after the October 7 invasion. They resigned from those positions in June. The day after Netanyahu spoke on September 2, Gantz and Eisenkot held their own press conference.

Gantz stated: “Throughout our time in the war cabinet, Netanyahu repeatedly stymied efforts to advance hostage deals ….  And I’m not surprised because Netanyahu is preoccupied with political survival[.]” Eisenkot addressed Netanyahu directly: “We saw your coalition partners threatening you, and even when they weren’t in the room, we saw their shadow influencing decision-making.” The clear implication is that Netanyahu is taking decisions motivated solely by his desire to continue as prime minister.

Gantz and Eisenkot are not alone. In an interview on August 22, Yair Lapid, the leader of the Yesh Atid party and Opposition Leader in the Knesset, said this about Netanyahu: “The only thing he cares about is staying in power. He’s been in power for too long. He’s interested in power per se and not the power to do good.” When asked why Netanyahu was refusing to approve a hostage deal, Lapid responded: “Because [National Security Minister Itamar] Ben Gvir and [Finance Minister Bezalel] Smotrich are going to bolt the coalition. They say so, and he’s all about politics. He has to maintain the coalition.”

Even a casual observer of Israeli politics knows that Gantz and Lapid both aspire to replace Netanyahu as prime minister. There is nothing shameful or culpable in those ambitions—what politician does not aspire to higher office? But those who assert that Netanyahu is motivated solely by a desire to cling to power overlook one crucial fact: Their own motives could be impugned in precisely the same way, for precisely the same kind of reason.

If Prime Minister Netanyahu supposedly refuses to accept the hostage deal only because he fears that acceptance would result in his ouster from office, then it is equally plausible—or equally implausible—that critics like Gantz and Lapid want Netanyahu to accept the deal precisely because they want him to be ousted so that they can then take a shot at replacing him as prime minister.

No reasonable person can deny that, broadly speaking, any deal with Hamas implicates two enormously important Israeli interests. One is the fate of the remaining living hostages, whose death is threatened at every moment. (There are approximately one hundred remaining hostages; one-third are believed dead.) The other interest is the much longer-term security of all Israelis, who number 9.9 million citizens.

In making decisions regarding a deal with Hamas, Israeli governmental officials, up to and including the prime minister, are clearly duty-bound to consider seriously both interests. And one would hope that, when Israel is fighting enemies on several fronts, members of the opposition would feel themselves bound by the same duty. It should be obvious that different people who are reasonable and conscientious could reach different conclusions as to the balance between those two interests.

It is impossible for anyone to monitor the motivational impulses of another individual. None of us can get inside the heads of Netanyahu, or Gantz, or Lapid.  But we all should be able to recognize that, when we once start to impugn the motives of others, we implicitly authorize others to impugn our own motives in a similar fashion. It has been said: Judge not, lest ye be judged.