In Depth Study and Blind Faith Bava Basra 129-131

129

In Depth Study, by Any Means

Our Gemara on amud beis discusses a conceptual difference between something that is gifted versus bequeathed:

If a person on his deathbed said: My property is given to you, and after you to so-and-so, and the first recipient was fit to inherit from him, the second gets nothing in place of the first. That is, he does not receive the property after the first one dies, as this formulation employed by the owner was not one of a gift, but a formulation of inheritance, and inheritance has no end, i.e., it cannot be stopped. Therefore, since the first recipient acquired it as inheritance, his heirs inherit it from him, and it cannot be taken by the second one.

This Talmudic principle that “inheritance has no end” is expressed in the original Hebrew as, “Yerusha ein lo Hefsek,” which can also be translated as, “inheritance has no interruption.” The Mei HaShiloach (Volume II, Devarim, Shoftim) applies this via a play on words to a verse in Devarim (16:20):

Justice, justice shall you pursue, that you may thrive and occupy the land that Hashem, your God, is giving you.

What does the pursuit of justice have to do with inheriting the land of Israel? The Mei HaShiloach explains that the true inheritance here is the Torah (as stated in Devarim 33:4). The Hebrew word for justice, tzedek, can also be translated as “correct,” “proper,” or even “justified,” as in understanding the justification behind something. Therefore, he reads the verse as follows: “[If you do not understand a part of the Torah], pursue and pursue relentlessly until you understand it, and then you will come to the inheritance.” This is not a gift that can be interrupted, but an inheritance that will eventually lead to a full grasp of the subject matter.

In yeshiva, the idea of studying Torah be-iyun—in-depth—is highly emphasized. This is certainly important, as seen, for example, in what the Baal HaTanya says in Tanya, Part IV, Iggeres HaKodesh 26:24. Yet, the idea of be-iyun taught in yeshiva is not limited to the analysis of Rabbenu Chaim and the like. While the yeshivishe lomdus (analytical methodology) is often breathtaking in its depth and sharpness, it does not monopolize the definition of studying be-iyun.

The true definition of be-iyun aligns more closely with Mei HaShiloach’s description. It is a simple and sincere effort to understand what you are learning with as much depth as possible. A good acharon can indeed help you understand a Gemara, Rashi, or Tosafos better, but you can also continue pondering it until you feel that you grasp it. In fact, pondering a pasuk in the Torah to uncover its depth is arguably just as valuable, though it’s important to stay grounded in the Gemara and traditional commentaries to avoid being led astray with ideas that are too fanciful to represent Torah ethos and creed.

Brisker analysis and other schools of lomdus are just one way to understand Torah in depth. Ultimately, the method is less important than the pursuit and the discovery, however they are accomplished.

130

Blind Faith?

Our Gemara on amud beis provides principles for deriving halachic rulings from precedent and observed behaviors of authoritative sources and rabbis:

One may derive the halakha neither from a statement nor from an incident where one saw a ruling issued in a certain manner, unless the Sages explicitly tell him that it is the practical halacha. If he asked the Sages and they told him the practical halakha, he may go and act upon the ruling in those circumstances…

Rashbam (ibid) elaborates that two situations fulfill the criterion of relying on a sage for practical halacha. Either when a theoretical teaching is studied and the rabbi affirms that a particular opinion may be relied upon in actual practice, or when a real-life question is asked and ruled upon contemporaneously with full permission to act in accordance with the decision.

In Devarim (17:8–11), the Torah instructs:

If a case is too baffling for you to decide, be it a controversy over homicide, civil law, or assault—matters of dispute in your courts—you shall promptly travel to the place that Hashem, your God, will have chosen, and appear before the Levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that Hashem chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions taught to you that you shall do, and you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left.

The Sefer Daf Al Daf quotes the Sefer Beis Yitzchok (Shoftim), which notes the seemingly excessive verbosity in these verses. It says (1) you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you; (2) following scrupulously all the Torah taught to you; (3) you shall act in accordance with the instructions taught to you that you shall do; and (4) you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left.

Clauses one and four are understandable, as they emphasize the importance of initially seeking instruction and then accepting the authority of the ruling. However, clauses two and three seem redundant. The Beis Yitzchok explains (quoting his son), in light of our Gemara, that these clauses correspond to the two precedents discussed by Rashbam. Clause two—following scrupulously all the Torah taught to you—refers to theoretical teachings affirmed by a rabbi for practical application, while clause three—you shall act in accordance with the instructions taught to you that you shall do—refers to the practical ruling on an actual situation.

While discussing this famous selection from the Torah, it’s important to address a common misapplication of this verse that has led to a form of religious bullying. The verse (ibid 11) seems to instruct blind faith, which is sometimes used to tell anyone without the status of a venerated sage that their very act of disagreement is heretical. After all, the verse states: “You shall act in accordance with the instructions given to you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left.”

On this verse, Rashi famously quotes the Sifri:

Even if [the judge] tells you that what appears to you to be right is left, or that what appears to you to be left is right, you must obey him; how much more so if he tells you that what is right is right and what is left is left.

This is sometimes used to intimidate people into denying their own common sense: “You see, one must even believe that their right hand is their left if their rabbi says so.”

However, this is a misinterpretation. This verse and derasha refer to the Sanhedrin, not to a local orthodox rav or even possibly a local rosh yeshiva. There is an argument that it may extend to the Godol Hador, as he may function in place of the Sanhedrin. But even if this is the case, the Sanhedrin itself was only empowered to compel the rebellious elder to refrain from publicly preaching his halachic opinion if they contradicted the ruling of the Sanhedrin, not his peshatim or ideas, (see Rambam, Mamrim chapter 3). The obligation to follow the Sanhedrin was a legal necessity to avoid anarchy, as stated in Sanhedrin (88b): “so that discord would not proliferate in Israel.” This does not imply that disagreement, when done in good faith, is heresy. While in heated controversies, such as those between religious Zionists and anti-Zionists or between Chassidim and Misnagdim, accusations of heresy may have flown, it is hard to argue that either side’s position, however misguided, was truly heretical.

Chovos HaLevavos offers an even more fascinating idea. In his introduction, he points out that the verses we quoted about bringing difficult cases to the Sanhedrin all refer to monetary, halachic, and legal matters. They do not refer to questions of faith, or to how one should pray, or how to overcome jealousy or anger in one’s heart. Why not? Shouldn’t these matters be of utmost importance to clarify before the highest authority? Chovos HaLevavos answers that when it comes to matters of the heart, you are responsible to delve inward and find the answers yourself. Of course, this doesn’t mean, “Don’t ask rabbis for guidance.” We must all be humble and learn Torah and hashkafa from great people and talmidei chachamim. Chovos HaLevavos says that you should reflect on such matters in your heart and apply your intellect after first accepting them from Tradition. Still, he emphasizes that each person has an intellectual responsibility, as well as the right, to determine inner truths.

131

The Heavy Burden of Judicial Discernment

Our Gemara on amud aleph discusses the idea that a judge must use his common sense and logic to determine the truth as best he can, knowing that it is impossible for any mortal to be absolutely certain:

A judge has only what his eyes see as the basis for his ruling. One must rule according to his own understanding.

This idea, however, not only frees a judge from responsibility for matters beyond his perception, but as is often the case when examining verses homiletically, the opposite is also being stated. Namely, that a judge cannot deny what his eyes “see,” even if the evidence technically indicates otherwise. In other words, if his intuition—his inner vision—perceives or feels that something is amiss, he may not ignore it.

Ohr HaChaim (Devarim 1:17 and Vayikra 19:15) sees this concept hinted at in these two verses:

“Hear out your fellow Israelites, and decide justly between one party and the other—be it a fellow Israelite or a stranger.” 

“Hear out” here means to listen closely and read between the lines.

“Do not commit wrongdoing in legal decisions.”

This can be read as a directive to avoid supporting wrongdoing, even when rendering a technically correct legal judgment if something feels suspicious.

This is not merely a derash but is also codified in Shulchan Aruch (CM 15:3):

The judge before whom a lawsuit is presented, which he knows to be fraudulent, should not say, ‘I will decide it [in accordance with the testimony of the witnesses] and the collar [of responsibility], i.e., the chain of guilt, will hang around the neck of the witnesses.’ How should he act? He should investigate and inquire into the matter closely by means of cross-examination and investigation, as in capital cases…

If it appears to him [the judge] according to his understanding that there is fraud involved, or if his common sense directs him not to rely on the statements of the witnesses, even though he cannot disqualify them, or if his judgment inclines him to believe that this litigant is a deceiver and misled the witnesses, though they are eligible and gave their evidence in ignorance of its legal bearing, and this party led them astray; or if it appears to the judge that the general content of the statements conceals other matters that are not being revealed—then, in all such cases and similar ones, the judge is forbidden to render a legal decision. Rather, he should withdraw from the case, and one whose heart and intelligence are perfect for examining such cases should judge it. These are matters entrusted to the heart and intelligence.

This is an important halachic principle in Torah ethics: judges are not merely arbitrators of the law but also guardians of its integrity. They serve as a failsafe, using human judgment and intuition when necessary, even if the letter of the law might suggest a different outcome.