Iran After Syria: A Strategic Recalibration?

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, driven by the rapid advance of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies, marks a turning point in the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape. For Iran, this event represents one of its most significant strategic defeats in years. It fundamentally disrupts its regional strategy and undermines the viability of the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” a situation likely to prompt revisions to Tehran’s long-winded strategy.

As Tiziano Marino observes in an analysis published by CeSI, an Italian think tank, “The loss of Syria threatens to break the link between Iran, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, where Tehran might find it increasingly challenging to provide military support in the short term.” Syria, a logistical hub for Iran’s network of proxies, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, has long been a cornerstone of Iran’s strategy.

“The regime in Tehran long saw in Assad’s Syria not just a committed partner, but the crucial beachhead for its strategy of forward defense—a staging ground for Iran’s network of proxy groups locked in a sprawling shadow conflict with Israel and other regional rivals,” Ishaan Tharoor underlined in his Washington Post’s daily newsletter, titled on “tectonic shift” for Iran.

Syria’s Fall and Iran’s Strategic Vulnerabilities

The fall of Assad has had a profound impact on Iran’s regional position, not only on Gulf rivals but also in its standing with global powers, including partners like China and Russia and adversaries such as the European Union and the United States.

For decades, Syria enabled Iran to project power through its proxies, most notably Hezbollah, which relied on Syrian territory for the transfer of weapons and personnel. However, the collapse of Assad’s regime has rendered these routes unusable, further weakened by sustained Israeli strikes on Iranian assets in Syria over the past year(s).

Iran’s presence on the ground, including the IRGC and its proxies like Hezbollah, has been largely absent in Assad’s final, desperate defense efforts. This retreat poses significant challenges to the image of security assistance that Iran seeks to convey, even within its African initiatives. Consequently, it undermines its credibility.

Speaking at the Middle East-focused Doha Forum last week, Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East program at Chatham House, pointed out, “Iran has seen Hamas and Hezbollah dealt devastating blows, its ally Assad toppled, and its vulnerabilities to Israeli long-range strikes and covert espionage laid bare.” This series of setbacks calls into question Tehran’s ability to maintain its influence in key theaters like Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

Iran’s regional proxies are also grappling with diminishing resources and operational constraints. Hezbollah, which once played a decisive role in securing Assad’s victories during Syria’s civil war, now faces its crisis of sustainability. Similarly, Iraqi Shiite militias aligned with Tehran are under pressure both from domestic political dynamics and external actors such as Israel and the United States.

Iran’s Response: Fragmentation and Ineffectiveness

Iran’s military strategies in Syria have faltered. Efforts to deploy additional forces, including Afghan and Pakistani militias under the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun brigades, were insufficient to alter the course of events. Meanwhile, logistical and political constraints have limited Hezbollah’s involvement, as it focuses on defending its positions in Lebanon amid growing challenges from Israel.

The combination of various challenges has led to Iran’s immediate response to the crisis in Syria being characterized by delays and a lack of organization. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi admitted in a recent interview that “What was surprising was, first, the Syrian army’s inability to confront the situation, and second, the rapid pace of developments.” This statement underscores the extent to which Iran was caught off guard by the speed of Assad’s collapse.

When Araghchi visited Damascus in the days after Syria’s second-largest city of Aleppo fell to the rebels, the Syrian President claimed that “his retreat from Aleppo was tactical and that he remained in control,” said an insider in Tehran’s government, speaking unanimously with Financial Times, “Araghchi responded that Iran was no longer in a position to send forces to support him anyway. But we did not expect the collapse to come so quickly or expose such hollowness in his regime. This came as a shock to us, too.”

Iran had lost faith in now-deposed Syrian president Bashar al-Assad before his fall from power, and a weakened Tehran could no longer send more forces to support the regime. Tehran may have even distanced itself from Assad in recent months, viewing his regime as incapable of safeguarding Iranian interests.

Assad was pushing to restore his status among US Arab allies, as suggested by Amwaj Media. So, Tehran appears to have abandoned its support for a weakened Assad regime, which is ill-equipped to safeguard Iranian interests in Syria and seems more intent on reconciling with former Iranian rivals like Saudi Arabia and UAE.

Attempts to stabilize the situation through diplomacy have also failed for Iran. Due to diverging interests, coordination with Russia and Turkey—the other two key players in the Syrian theatre—has been ineffective.

A New Path for Iran? 

In light of these challenges, Iran is confronted with a pivotal decision. Holly Dagres, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, told WaPo, “The Islamic Republic is having to take a hard look in the mirror and decide which path it wants to take Iran. It now needs to decide whether it wants to be North Korea, isolate itself by building a nuclear weapon, or China, engage with the West, as [Iran] once did when it signed the 2015 nuclear deal.”

This choice reflects broader tensions within Iran’s political establishment, where factions are divided over whether to pursue confrontation or engagement. Iran’s nuclear program remains a central point of contention. Rafael Mariano Grossi, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, recently warned that “The Iran of 2015 has nothing to do with Iran of 2025. Iran is starting production of 60 per cent [uranium] at a much higher level of production, which means they will have the amounts necessary—if they so choose—to have a nuclear device in a much faster way.”

Adding to this perspective, Hongda Fan, a professor of Middle East Studies in China, offers an alternative path for Iran: “The Axis of Resistance can be said to have disintegrated, but this is not necessarily a disaster for Iran. Iran should have a new path to development. Tehran must improve its relations with the US as soon as possible. Iran also needs to adjust its attitude towards regional actors.”

Fan’s view highlights the possibility of Iran redefining its role in the region by prioritizing economic and diplomatic engagement over its traditional reliance on proxies and military power. This shift would require overcoming deep-seated mistrust and addressing Iran’s internal vulnerabilities, including its economic struggles and the erosion of public trust in its leadership. However, this path could either align with or challenge the financial and diplomatic strategies of regional powers like KSA, UAE, and Qatar, which have increasingly positioned themselves as hubs for regional stability and economic growth.

The Road Ahead: Risks and Opportunities

Iran’s path forward is fraught with risks. The question remains whether Tehran can act swiftly enough to adapt its approach as internal and external pressures mount during the 2025 sanctions crisis when the total amount of sanctions returns under the 2015 nuclear deal expires. This could push Tehran toward further escalation. Vakil has warned of a “short timeline to manage the Iran crisis,” noting that snapback sanctions could compel Iran to take drastic measures, including exiting international agreements on nuclear nonproliferation.

At the same time, opportunities exist for Iran to recalibrate its regional strategy. Marino notes Iran’s current phase of weakness, exacerbated by the Syrian crisis, could lead to shifts in its regional security strategy. In this context, Iran will likely continue diplomatic efforts to engage Arab neighbors and break its isolation.

Concurrently, Iran is expected to double down on partnerships with Russia and China, which are crucial for financial and especially military support. The severe blows Iran has recently suffered force it to focus in the short term on defending its territory against potential new attacks.

Iran’s more pragmatic factions may continue their diplomatic outreach to the United States and the European Union. However, significant progress seems unlikely in the short term due to apparent disinterest from these counterparts. If such efforts fail to yield results, Iran’s pragmatism could lose ground to the country’s more hardline factions, which are already calling for an acceleration of the nuclear program as the only viable defense against external threats.

However, what is unfolding within the Islamic Republic increasingly resembles a struggle between weak or significantly weakened internal factions. The Syrian disaster may further deplete the interior consensus. An example: Carnegie’s expert Karim Sadjadpour shared on X a video where a school principal in Iran tries to lead chants of “Down with Israel” and America. Instead, students chant, “Down with Palestine”. “The Islamic Republic’s four decades of indoctrination have produced the opposite outcome of what they intended,” commented Sadjadpour.

Exploiting a situation of vulnerability to modify international positioning strategically may provide direct advantages for citizens, thereby affecting their support or opposition to the decisions made by the theocracy.