Is Trump Deliberately Avoiding Netanyahu?

Since taking office in January 2025, Donald Trump has not made any state visits until last week, when Air Force One touched down in Saudi Arabia as part of his first Middle Eastern trip. Rather unusually, the US president has prioritised his GCC partners over America’s traditional Western allies, such as Canada and the UK. Although the tour has been widely covered and included meetings with figures like Elon Musk and the newly instated Syrian president Ahmed Al Sharaa, Benjamin Netanyahu was conspicuously absent from Trump’s itinerary.
As the only liberal democracy in the Middle East, Israel has long regarded the US as one of its principal political allies. Consequently, Trump’s decision to omit Israel from his first presidential tour of the region has prompted concern over Israel’s foreign and security policy. This article employs discourse analysis and a realist international‑relations framework to argue that Trump’s current distancing from Netanyahu is strategic, deliberate and — notwithstanding present tensions — only temporary.
Although he skipped the Levant, the president signalled a potential takeover of the Gaza Strip during his stop in Qatar — itself an American ally accused of harbouring groups such as Hamas and the Taliban. He went on to express support for Palestinians after an Israeli operation in Gaza left at least 250 dead, emphasising the urgent need for humanitarian aid. Trump said he hoped “good things” would occur for Palestinians by late June, a remark that implicitly pressed Netanyahu to negotiate, even as Israel insists on pressing its military campaign against Hamas without concessions.
The White House clearly recognises the dire humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and it is telling that Trump publicly acknowledged Palestinian starvation. Having previously negotiated directly with Hamas for the release of an Israeli‑American hostage, his focus on civilian suffering arguably undermines Israel’s international standing and signals clear frustration with the government in Jerusalem. As Trump concludes his official visit to the three Gulf states — securing numerous commercial and defence agreements — Israel has scarcely featured among his priorities.
After Al Assad fled to Moscow, Ahmed Al Sharaa assumed leadership roles in Syria. Despite his past links to Al Qaeda and an active US bounty on him, the Trump administration publicly welcomed him in Saudi Arabia by lifting sanctions on Syria without first consulting Israel. The president even invited Al Sharaa to normalise ties with Israel, claiming the Syrian leader had said ‘yes’ to join the Abraham Accords once matters were ‘straightened out’, though no details of Syria’s conditions were disclosed.
Since Al Sharaa rose to prominence, the Israeli military has continued to strike Al Assad‑linked targets from the Golan Heights, even as Turkish, Qatari and Emirati mediators engage the new Syrian regime in dialogue. Netanyahu’s cabinet, however, has warned against recognising Al Sharaa’s government, given his past associations with terrorist organisations. Meanwhile, the US president has not met Prime Minister Netanyahu directly of late, affording Netanyahu space to formulate a response to Washington’s initiatives as the White House presses Israel to align itself with US policy.
Netanyahu and Trump’s friendship is personal on top of the long-standing US-Israel alliance since the inception of the Zionist state, yet there appears to be an American deliberate distancing from the Israeli leader in recent months. As mentioned before, the Trump administration has gone behind Netanyahu’s back to engage in various critical Israeli interests and expressed tacit dismay at Israel’s military actions. Moreover, the US president did not hold back from saying that Washington had “no stronger partner” than Saudi Arabia, a position that was previously held by Israel in the Middle East. Nevertheless, such an exclamation is likely to be a bandwagon effort for more investments.
Beyond their personal rapport and the longstanding US–Israel alliance, there has been a marked distancing of late between Trump and Netanyahu. The administration has quietly pursued critical Israeli concerns without informing Jerusalem and has signalled disapproval of Israel’s military operations. Trump even declared that Washington has ‘no stronger partner’ than Saudi Arabia — a mantle traditionally borne by Israel — an assertion likely intended as a bid to attract further Gulf investment.
Israel must brace for uncomfortable talks with Washington, especially as Syria draws closer to the GCC after Saudi Arabia settled Syrian debts with the World Bank. Mohammed bin Salman has openly backed Al Sharaa and insisted that any Israel–Saudi normalisation be contingent upon Palestinian statehood. Yet the Trump administration has chosen to press Israel — rather than Riyadh — to make concessions, surprising Jerusalem by foregrounding Gulf concerns. Netanyahu should thus prepare for tough negotiations with Trump in the coming month.
Finally, Trump’s primary aims on this trip appear to have been to attract additional funding and investment for US government and business interests, so it is unsurprising that the White House would align itself with Gulf investors’ priorities. Despite Trump’s rhetoric on Syria, Israel and Palestine, he has not altered US policy towards the ‘Jewish state’. Nonetheless, his recent avoidance of Netanyahu sends a clear signal that Washington currently views Israel as less central to its Middle Eastern strategy.
Despite any current reservations in the White House, Trump’s estrangement from Netanyahu is likely temporary: no viable peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians could proceed without Israeli participation. Israel remains a vital US ally, and since the 1980s their intelligence services have cooperated so closely that covert operations against one another have all but ceased. Only last month did Netanyahu meet the CIA director, though details remain undisclosed. Thus, while Trump’s recent avoidance may not serve Israel’s interests, it is unlikely to endure.