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Nadav Tamir

Israel’s perceptions about Iran might lead to an endless conflict. 

After the limited Israeli strikes in Iran – which were indeed necessary following the direct attacks from Iran on us – it is now critical to zoom out and focus on broader Israeli interests instead of getting dragged into exchanges of blows that could lead to a full-scale war. The self-fulfilling prophecy regarding Iranian intentions could lead Israel into a war in which both countries would lose.

One of the books that most influenced my understanding of statecraft is Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow’s book, Essence of Decision. Professor Graham Allison, a former senior official in the US Department of Defense and my lecturer during my graduate studies, used his book and lectures to share the lessons he learned from President John F. Kennedy’s success in preventing a nuclear war with the Soviet Union following the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Kennedy’s success stemmed from his willingness to ignore the tendency within the American Department of Defense and State to expect the USSR to act necessarily in a hawkish manner and to understand that there are different positions within the Kremlin. Kennedy understood that in order to prevent a terrible war, he had to act in a way that strengthened those in the Soviet government who wanted an agreement and weakened the position of the hawks. Kennedy’s choice led to an agreement that prevented a third world war.

According to Allison’s thesis, one of the failures in foreign policy decision-making stems from the natural difficulty in understanding the complexity of decision-making in rival states. We tend to treat every country as a unified rational actor and adopt policies accordingly, thereby reinforcing the assumptions on the other side about us. This is while states are composed of many players who influence policy, both within the government and outside of it, and this is also true for non-democratic states.

In Israel, there is a prevailing assumption that Iran has a unified doctrine, led by the leader Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards, aimed at bringing about the destruction of Israel (“the little Satan”) and weakening the United States (“the great Satan”). This alongside the export of the Khomeinist revolution to the entire region, while operating a network of proxies for these purposes. The assumption in Israel is that Iran seeks to acquire a military nuclear capability to eliminate Israel.

Contrary to this perception, recent history has shown us that the Rouhani administration worked to reach an agreement aimed at prioritizing the salvation of the Iranian economy by accepting international oversight, even if the price was avoiding the attainment of military nuclear capabilities.

Before Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear agreement – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) all intelligence agencies testified that Iran had not violated the terms. Supreme Leader Khamenei supported the agreement contrary to the position of the Revolutionary Guards. The election of the hardliner Raisi was largely due to the failure of the approach that aimed to reach agreements with the P5 + 1 super powers following Trump’s withdrawal from the deal.

Khamenei allowed Pezeshkian to run and even win the elections, despite it being clear that he was heading towards renewing the diplomatic path. The selection of Zarif as Vice President and Araqchi as Foreign Minister indicates the new government’s intention to return to the a diplomatic path, even though it is clear that it will be a different agreement from the JCPOA, as some of its provisions have already expired and Iran is much closer to military nuclear capabilities than it was in 2017 when Trump pulled the United States out of the deal.

Even today, the Revolutionary Guards believe that one cannot trust the Americans and that all efforts should be directed against Israel, but Khamenei has allowed Pezeshkian to openly express the Iranian aspiration for an agreement since his election and his visit to the UN General Assembly.

Today, there is no doubt among those who understand the issue – with the exception of a few Netanyahu “mouthpieces” – that the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, encouraged by Netanyahu’s hysteria and Israeli pressure exerted on the US to abandon the deal, was a serious mistake with a cascade of disastrous results that have brought Iran closer to nuclear capabilities.

The American abandonment shattered the international coalition against Iran that the Obama administration had painstakingly built, eliminated the more moderate faction within the Iranian leadership, and created a situation where the US position in negotiations was significantly weakened.

We saw the results of the elections in Iran that brought Raisi to power, and we saw the agreement signed by the Chinese with Iran, and of course the pace of enrichment and accumulation of enriched uranium to alarming levels. The result of the withdrawal from the nuclear agreement also allowed Russia to become a full ally of Iran, which is assisting in the war in Ukraine.

There is no doubt that the Supreme Leader has the authority to decide on all matters, especially on national security issues. But Pezeshkian is part of the Ayatollahs’ regime, and within the establishment, there are nuances that are important to pay attention to.

I am not addressing here the fact that the Iranian public, for the most part, is hostile to the regime and is the most liberal and pro-Western in the entire Middle East. I’m talking about the nuances in the Iranian administration, since unfortunately the public currently does not influence these issues.

The claim that Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons only to eliminate Israel is baseless. First, it seems that Iran is trying to achieve the status of a threshold state, not necessarily military nuclear capabilities.

Secondly, Iran knows that Israel (according to foreign sources) has nuclear capabilities far beyond what Iran could achieve in the foreseeable future, if at all. They know that Israeli capabilities include launching systems and effective second-strike capability (submarines, did we mention?). And the Iranians are not suicidal, but rational players.

Secondly, our perception as Israelis that we are a country surrounded by enemies who want to annihilate us, the reason Israel has made tremendous efforts to achieve military nuclear capabilities, is also true for the Iranians. The Iranians see themselves as a Persian minority in an area dominated by an Arab and Turkish majority that hates them. They also see themselves as a Shiite minority in an area with a Sunni majority that hates them. The trauma from the war with Iraq, in which hundreds of thousands of Iranians were killed while the West supported the Iraqis, greatly influences Iran’s perception of existential threat.

The Iranian nuclear project is much more complex, dispersed, and protected than the one we attacked in Iraq and, according to foreign reports, also in Syria. Additionally – the scientific and technological knowledge has already been accumulated in Iran over the past decades, and there is no way to undo it. The implication is that Israel alone can probably delay the Iranian nuclear program, but not eliminate it, and this comes at a terrible cost to our home front.

There is one country in the world that can act effectively in Iran, and that is the USA. But the American government and public do not want to get bogged down in the Middle Eastern quagmire again after the many years they were stuck in Iraq and Afghanistan, investing resources and blood there without any achievements. The Americans understand that there is no way to eliminate the Iranian nuclear program with a surgical airstrike, and they are not interested in a prolonged occupation. Israel must be careful not to be perceived as wanting to drag the United States into a war it does not want.

If VP Kamala Harris is elected on November 5th, she will certainly try to initiate a diplomatic track with Iran. Although impossible to predict, a second Trump administration may even opt to correct the egregious mistake of the first by pursuing a new agreement that prevents an Iranian nuclear breakout.

The clear conclusion is that Israel needs to learn from the past and not act in a way that would harm an American-Iranian agreement. We should learn from the Sunni countries in the Gulf, which are also very concerned about an Iranian nuclear program and the operation of proxies in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria, but are trying to improve relations with Iran.

We must ensure that the next time negotiations take place between Iran and the US, Israel will cooperate with the Americans to influence the outcome of the negotiations instead of sabotaging them. We must coordinate with the Americans on any action in Iran, so as to not jeopardize the possibility of an agreement that could improve our situation both in the nuclear context and in the regional Iranian influence on its proxies.

About the Author
Nadav Tamir is the executive director of J Street Israel, a member of the board of the Mitvim think-tank, adviser for international affairs at the Peres Center for Peace and Innovation, and member of the steering committee of the Geneva Initiative. He was an adviser of President Shimon Peres and served in the Israel embassy in Washington and as consul general to New England.
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