Military Power Is No Guarantee of Security

An army does not provide an absolute guarantee of protection for a state. It would be wise to consider a form of cold war that integrates moral, social, and scientific dimensions, as well as ideological motivation. Israel’s security now depends on the quality of the relationships we are capable of establishing with the Palestinians, and on ending our exclusive reliance on military power.

Two key elements characterize the worldview of the President of the United States, regardless of the degree to which they are implemented: a principled opposition to the use of military force, and a preference for bold and unconventional solutions to the conflicts in our region. In my view, these two orientations deserve Israel’s full attention.

It is essential to recall that since the 1950s, every war undertaken by the United States has ended in failure, resulting in the deaths of millions of civilians. Five bloody conflicts have revealed to all the weakness of a dominant global power: the Korean War (1950–1953), the Vietnam War (1964–1975), the First Gulf War (January 1991), the war in Afghanistan (2001–2014), and the Second Iraq War (2003–2011). None of these wars contributed to the strengthening of US power; all inflicted immense suffering on civilian populations.

Following the analyses of Yuval Noah Harari and the book by Haim Asa and Yossef Agassi, many have recognized a significant trend: conventional warfare is undergoing radical transformations that are changing its nature. Future victories will not go to those who kill the most soldiers or conquer the most territory. The United States and Europe appear to have drawn lessons from this shift. Conflicts between nations will now be settled primarily by non-military means. Victorious states will be those endowed with vast knowledge, advanced scientific infrastructure, a high level of economic and cultural development, and a persuasive ideological and moral narrative that legitimizes their cause. Such was the model of the Cold War, in which the United States defeated the Soviet Union without firing a single shot. This is also the nature of the current conflict between the United States and China, or even with Europe.

Hamas, a terrorist organization without an army or a state, nevertheless achieved a fourfold victory in a very short time: it carried out the deadly October 7th attack, drew the IDF into a war in Gaza for which it was unprepared, survived against one of the world’s most powerful military forces, and brought Israel before the International Criminal Court in The Hague on suspicion of genocide. Most significantly, Hamas succeeded in placing the Palestinian issue at the heart of the global agenda and, in certain intellectual circles, turned Israelis into pariahs.

Prior to the October 7th massacre, no Arab state posed a threat to Israel; most were seeking rapprochement. Like Israel, the majority of states fear terrorist acts and independent militias capable of provoking disorder and global conflict. In many respects, Israel’s political situation at that time was ideal. The country possessed one of the most prestigious armies in the world and renowned intelligence services such as the Mossad and the Shin Bet. Yet, after this bitter failure, it became evident that the army was not the appropriate tool for protecting civilians or preventing murderous militias from forcing the evacuation of populations from border areas. What, then, led to the collapse of our assets precisely when Israel needed them most?

The security mechanisms at our disposal failed. The strength of the IDF gave us the illusion of security: “We have a powerful army, and we will use it—whether necessary or not.” Electrified fences and dozens of kilometers of walls, which cost billions, led us to believe we could overcome any conceivable scenario. The air force was unprepared for a massive infiltration of murderers. The intelligence services, overwhelmed by the sheer volume of data, collapsed. It became clear that the much-vaunted power of “big data” is far from a guarantee of effectiveness.

Was the immediate entry into Gaza the best strategy for confronting Hamas? Were there pre-established plans for locating and destroying the tunnels? In such a situation, reason yields to vengeance. Israel reacted like a wounded animal: “We have an army—let’s use it immediately, even if it’s not ready.” The impression was that there was no alternative. As in the past, the IDF would undoubtedly ensure our security. This is precisely how the Americans reacted after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, by invading Afghanistan. In reality, Hamas dragged us into a war it had hoped for.

The IDF suffers from its own prestige. Its spectacular victories have now become a liability. The illusion of security exempts us from thinking. Yet an army, by definition, is not a forum for thought. A prestigious, wealthy, and powerful structure is incapable of reforming itself. Certainly, reflection and intelligence usually fall within the realm of civil institutions. However, the IDF’s power is such that its generals now decide matters that belong to the civil domain. Their military expertise largely relieves political authorities of the obligation to think about non-military solutions. As long as this arrangement functioned, no one questioned it. But the situation has changed. Military power is now detrimental to our ability to pursue more suitable paths to security. We still do not understand what caused the collective blindness of all those responsible for Israel’s security.

It would be advisable for the country’s political leadership to reexamine the concept of security by dissociating it fundamentally from the military sphere. This may seem simple, but that is precisely where the difficulty lies. It is not easy to challenge assumptions deeply embedded in our minds. No institution as powerful as the IDF will willingly relinquish its prerogatives. We must assess whether the disproportionate resources allocated to the army have not eroded its capacity for critical thinking. It is hard to imagine a chief of staff willing to transfer strategic tasks to more competent civilian bodies. And yet, fighting terrorism and militias does not necessarily require uniforms, visible ranks, or the centralization of sensitive information in military bases surrounded by walls, electrified barbed wire, and signs that read “No photography — military installation.” The examples are numerous. Will the lesson of our failure lead to an arms buildup or to the search for unconventional solutions? Hamas militias had neither air power, tanks, nor advanced technology; instead, they relied on cunning and ingenuity. And thus, they achieved their objectives with disconcerting ease against a vastly superior army.

One conclusion is unavoidable: the army alone does not guarantee a state’s protection. It would be wise to adopt an approach similar to a cold war, integrating scientific, social, moral, and ideological dimensions. Israel’s security will henceforth depend on the quality of the relationships we are capable of forging with the Palestinians, and on ending the exclusive reliance on military strength. What stands in our way? Paradoxically, it is the illusion of our own power. Intuitively, the human mind equates security with the death of enemy soldiers or the occupation of territory.

In many areas, Israeli society ranks among the most dynamic and advanced in the world. Yet it has failed in the domain most vital to its existence. For too long, we have accepted as a fatality the notion that our survival depends solely on our military might. In the absence of a solution, we let the army do its job, convinced it would protect us. We even came to accept the sacrifice of young lives—both soldiers and civilians—in every conflict. Such resignation is harmful. We must not submit to fatalism. Our sole objective should be the construction of harmonious coexistence with our neighbors. We cannot escape this conclusion by placing the entire blame on the other side. We, too, are participants in the current disaster.

For a long time, the developed world has shown leniency toward us. This has not served us well. We have often acted instinctively, guided by the adage: “If someone comes to kill you, rise early and kill him first.” Too often, fear has led us to kill, mistreat, and humiliate innocents who posed no threat. A wiser approach could have transformed many inhabitants of this land into Israeli patriots. In fact, we have partially succeeded in doing so. Today, we must abandon military responses as our default framework of thought and, with optimism, envision a dynamic of positive relations with the populations of the region. Ultimately, the solution must be civil and humanitarian in nature.