Securing the Philadelphi Corridor

The brutal murder of Hersh Goldberg-Polin, Carmel Gat, Ori Danino, Alex Lubanov, Eden Yerushalmi, and Almog Sarusi by their Hamas captors in the Gaza Strip has increased the sense of urgency in Israel to sign a hostage deal to get the remaining Israeli hostages home safely. However, one point of contention that has served as an impediment for a ceasefire-hostage deal is the status of the Philadelphi Corridor.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and many in his camp have insisted that the corridor serves as a lifeline for Hamas and thus Israel needs to maintain a military presence there to prevent the terror organization from rehabilitating itself. However, Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant and many high-ranking Israeli security officials have argued that Israel can remain secure without the Philadelphi Corridor for at least the first phase of the hostage deal, and it may be the only way to get Hamas to agree to safely release the rest of the living hostages.

Of course, Hamas is not an honest actor and there is good reason to believe that they will still reject a deal, even if it includes Israel leaving the Philadelphi Corridor. Nevertheless, Israel needs to do everything in its power to get its citizens home safely, even if that means negotiating with a terrorist organization like Hamas and leaving the corridor. It is also true that Israel needs to do everything in its power to keep its citizens safe by preventing Hamas from rehabilitating itself and committing another murderous attack like it did on October 7, 2023.

It then begs the question: Is there a way to secure the Philadelphi Corridor without a visible Israeli presence there?

About five years ago, I wrote an article on how to secure the Jordan Valley in the West Bank without a physical Israeli presence in the event of a two-state solution with the Palestinians. It included several ideas and arrangements that were proposed by American security experts and former Israeli military generals, and many of their ideas may be compatible with securing the Philadelphi Corridor without a visible Israeli presence there either.

For example, in their report, “A Security System for a Two-State Solution”, the Center for a New American Security and Commanders for Israel’s Security (an organization of about 300 retired Israeli military generals) proposed a framework that includes creating an aerostat-borne monitoring system above the crossing point of the Jordan Valley, which would be able to detect a threat from miles away. It also includes border control stations that would be shared by Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian Authority (PA) forces to provide Israel access to video footage, biometric data, and other relevant information, enabling Israel to monitor who and what is going in and out of the Jordan Valley without Israeli boots on the ground.

A similar framework could be used to safeguard the Philadelphi route. Indeed, Israel could agree to creating a similar aerostat-borne monitoring system above the crossing point and border control stations along the Philadelphi Corridor that would be shared by Israeli, Egyptian, and – presumably – PA forces to detect and monitor who and what is going in and out of it even if Israel withdraws from there. Some analysts have also proposed establishing ground sensors that can be used to prevent Hamas from rebuilding tunnels by the border.

To be sure, such security arrangements and cooperation would mean that not all the responsibilities and burdens would fall on Israel. Indeed, just as the security framework over the Jordan Valley will require the PA and Jordan to agree to cooperating and improving their competence, such an arrangement over the Philadelphi Corridor will need the PA and Egypt to keep their end of the bargain in a hypothetical deal as well.

While the Palestinian Authority (PA) is likely the most viable option to replace Hamas in Gaza and place Palestinian forces along the Philadelphi Corridor, it can only do so if it undergoes a set of necessary and significant reforms. For instance, in their report, “Starting From the Ground Up: US Policy Options for Post-Hamas Gaza”, the Israel Policy Forum proposes a 3-5 year post-interim phase where the PA would only be permitted to re-enter Gaza after it ends its prisoner and martyr payment system, increases financial transparency, implements democratic reforms, eliminates incitement, and reorganizes and enhances the competence of its security forces.

Additionally, Egypt will need to take a step up in securing the Philadelphi Corridor on its side of the border. Unfortunately, the Egyptian government seems to have done a relatively poor job in this endeavor over the past few years. As Jonathan Schanzer and Mariam Wahba from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) argue, while Egypt may have begun to crack down on Hamas tunnels starting in 2014, the tunnels linking Gaza to the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula seemed to rise again in 2018. Indeed, Israel reported it discovered at least 20 tunnels by the Philadelphi Corridor when the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) captured the route in August, indicating incompetence and or a lack of political will in Egypt to prevent smuggling between the Sinai and Gaza. This will need to change if Egypt does not want to see a physical Israeli presence by the Philadelphi crossing point as part of a post-war regional arrangement.

Given that such an arrangement will likely need to be implemented gradually through a multi-year interim period, it will fall on the incoming US Administration to hold the above parties accountable. Whether it is the Harris Administration or the Trump Administration, Washington must take the lead in promoting a post-war plan where it will support Israel in preparing for its withdrawal from Gaza, provide sufficient resources for technological defense mechanisms, and push the PA and Egyptian government to make the necessary changes as part of a regional arrangement to secure the Philadelphi Corridor without a physical Israeli presence there. Through cooperation and creative ideas between Middle Eastern alliances, we may be able to see the safe return of the Israeli hostages without jeopardizing regional security.