The Only Way the Gaza War Can End Quickly

And the war goes on. The current Hamas-Israel conflict began with an unprovoked attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023. After 591 days, the war continues with no clear resolution in sight. Additionally, the Houthis from Yemen continue to fire ballistic missiles on Israel over 2,000 kilometers, seemingly with impunity despite repeated attacks by the IDF Air force.

Gaza is being pummeled. Most of their military and political leadership, including former leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, have been eliminated and there is speculation that Muhammad Sinwar, Yahya Sinwar’s brother and successor, has either been killed or seriously injured. Despite this, they continue to wage war against Israel and refuse to release the Israeli hostages. Is there a better way to shorten the war?

Hamas’s refusal to stop trying to destroy Israel, despite Gaza’s devastation, is not surprising. Since 2005, they have focused on building a vast underground tunnel network, prioritizing military buildup over civilian welfare. This pattern reflects their ideological disdain for their own people and parallels other extremist groups like ISIS, Houthis, and Hezbollah, which neglect their populations to attack Israel. For example, Hezbollah’s aggression in Lebanon has caused chaos and $14 billion in damages, while the Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen face severe hardship, with millions displaced and in urgent need of aid. Why should Hamas’s behavior be any different? In looking at the Houthis and Hamas versus Hezbollah situation today, the first two regimes are still active while the other is no longer a major player. Because Hezbollah has been defeated, the border between Lebanon and Israel is quiet. While Israel no longer has to face daily Hezbollah rockets, the main beneficiary of the ceasefire is Lebanon, which has finally begun to thrive again.

What caused the turnabout? While the IDF had previously attacked Hezbollah aggressively—similar to operations against Hamas—the shift likely occurred after the combination of the collapse of the Syrian regime, and the direct threat to Iran.  After its collapse, the Syrian territory could no longer be used as a venue to transfer Iranian weapons to Hezbollah.  After the Israeli attack on Iran Oct 24, 2024, Iran, for the first time, found itself directly threatened. Until then it could allow its proxies, – Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis to wage war against Israel without any direct threat to them. However, after being directly threatened, they decided to stop most of their financial support for Hezbollah.  With the flow of arms via Syria blocked for their fighters, and the flow money from Iran diminished, it did not take long for Hezbollah to collapse.

Iran is also a major supporter of Hamas. According to the State Department, “Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran providing up to $100 million annually in support to Palestinian militants.” Despite their denials, there is evidence that they also support the Houthis, including supplying them with ballistic missiles. After all, Yemen is too poor and technologically backward to be able to independently develop such a sophisticated missile system.

Qatar is also a major Hamas supporter. financially, politically and through the influence that its oil revenue allows it to invest in. Here are some salient examples: It has, transferred an estimated 1.8 billion dollars to Hamas, some of it having been utilized to sponsor the tunnels now holding the remaining hostages. It uses its Al Jazeera network to promote pro Hamas Ideology. It has contributed vast sums to the Ivy League universities. It is not far-fetched to speculate that the lenient stance of those same recipient administrations of Qatari contributions regarding pro-Hamas activities on campus—including the harassment of Jewish students by pro-Hamas groups and the lack of effective action against anti-Semitic incidents—may have been influenced by the $4.7 billion Qatar has donated to U.S. institutions—an enormous sum that could potentially impact university policies.

Qatar’s involvement is more complex, as—alongside its pro-Hamas stance—they have also played a constructive role in the conflict by serving as a key mediator in securing some of the hostage release agreements. With all due respect to Qatar’s positive contributions toward hostage negotiations, as long as they continue to back their proxies—Hamas and the Houthis—it is likely that the war will persist.

While the prolongation of the war and the captivity of hostages torments Israel, unlike Gaza, Israeli society is not at a standstill. The recent achievement of Yuval Refael, who secured second place in the Eurovision and is a survivor of the Hamas Nova music festival massacre, exemplifies Israel’s resilience and desire to move forward despite the war. In contrast, the current situation of the Gaza population is one of ongoing suffering and basic survival.

Since the fundamentalist regimes of Hamas and the Houthis care little about the welfare of their residents—as long as Iran and Qatar continue to fund and arm these proxies—it will be extremely difficult to defeat them using only military force, even if substantial.

Since Israel has no intention of allowing itself to be destroyed, and since Hamas has no intention of voluntarily ending their war, releasing hostages, or pursuing peace, a solution will only be possible once Hamas is incapacitated in a manner similar to what happened with Hezbollah whereby it no longer receives financial, military, or political support. This will leave them with no choice but to lay down their arms and release the hostages.

Along with Iran and Qatar, the moderate Arab states and pro-Palestinian groups must decide whether they are more committed to undermining Israel or prioritizing the well-being of the people in Gaza and Yemen. If they genuinely care about the Gaza and Yemen populations, they should all urge Hamas to lay down their arms and release the hostages, and Yemen to stop firing on Israel. Concerned Western leaders should be pressuring Iran and Qatar to cease their support for Hamas, rather than urging Israel to attenuate its efforts in Gaza. One only has to observe the positive developments in Lebanon following Hezbollah’s defeat to elucidate the potential benefits and efficacy of this approach regarding the Hamas Israel war.  Otherwise, we can expect that the war will go on with its continued devastation in Gaza and Yemen.