The Russian Latvians Issue

In the early 1990s, the Soviet Union was a dying state. Russian bureaucrats had no real capacity to respond to the needs of “the people” they talked about so much to legitimize the policies of a communist system that has killed more than 120 million people worldwide.

However, in the face of such adversity, the Latvian people were enthusiastic. They wanted Latvia back, a free Latvia. Thus, after the “Singing Revolution”, they achieved it. A human chain crossed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania demanding elections, and in 1991, Latvia regained its independence after five decades of communist military occupation.

The newly-found democracy, however, showed a dark side by excluding more than 700,000 people of Russian origin in a country that then had 2.5 million inhabitants. In other words, almost 30% of the population lost their social and political rights.

This mass of stateless people is thus called “non-citizens”; basically, these individuals are mostly children of Russian immigrants who came to Latvia during the Soviet era. Today, Riga only recognizes as citizens those Russians who lived in the country before June 17, 1940, and their descendants.

Although “non-citizens” are the fastest-growing ethnic group in Latvia, the country treats them as second-class citizens and denies them political rights. Under this scenario, these stateless group (although many of them hold Russian nationality) cannot vote or run for political office. They cannot hold public office, nor engage in certain liberal professions. Such is the situation of tension that up to 70 “real differences” between the political rights of citizens and “non-citizens” can be identified between this group of stateless people and the rest of the population.

Meanwhile, the Latvian government is defending itself by explaining that the promoter of this “biased and exaggerated” document is a Latvian-Jewish communist MEP of Russian origin, Tatjana Zdanoka, who supported the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and who was recently identified as a Russian FSB spy.

Curiously, all of this is happening under the complacent gaze of the European Union, which seems to consider this situation a “failure of the system”.

Today, policies in Latvia are particularly multifaceted and cannot be interpreted as right-wing and left-wing: they must be looked at from other angles; above all, in terms of Russians and Latvians, distinguishing nationalities, citizenships, and ethnicities.

Therefore, this cocktail – in such a complex and tense geopolitical context, with a clear minority on the rise– may be enough for both Latvia and Russia to confront each other militarily in the not-too-distant future. Latvia, in defensive mode, would seek to protect its borders and contain an interstate conflict in which Russia would appeal to the protection of “its citizens” to occupy more territory of the former Russian Empire.

In my opinion, here lies the crux of the matter in a scenario in which the Russian minority in Latvia continues to grow, while Russophobia and the fear of being occupied again by an authoritarian foreign force only create more tension and risks that endanger the lives of innocent people.

Certainly, Latvia is a country jealous of its identity, perhaps because it is a young nation or because of what they suffered under the communist dictatorship. However, the integration of the “non-citizens” is necessary. To do so, there is a naturalization process consisting of a Latvian language exam and another on national history, in which applicants must expressly acknowledge that Latvia suffered under the Soviet invasion. Although the Latvian state wants a gradual change that favors integration, everything will always be under very strict conditions.

As aforementioned, from the 700,000 people from 1991, according to the latest official register, around 25% of Russian Latvians remain in Latvia. Hence, for Riga this figure shows that the naturalization system works; for others, however, it means surrender. In fact, pro-Russian politicians argue that this practice encourages real discrimination against people of Russian origin.

Since the start of the Ukrainian War on February 24, 2022, new laws have been introduced in Latvia which, among other things, restrict and sometimes ban the Russian language in public life and schools to improve the integration of people whose mother tongue is Russian. On the other hand, post-Soviet palaces and monuments are also at risk of being demolished or rebuilt. A new law also forces the Latvian Orthodox Church to cut ties with the Russian Orthodox Church…

In other words, the war in Ukraine became a golden opportunity for the Baltic country’s politicians to begin dismantling the Soviet legacy (something they have long wanted to do). Anything connected with Moscow or Russia has become somewhat threatening!

That said, what may also explain why the Latvian rulers chose to cut ties with Russia has to do with a survey from Spring 2022 showing that 20% of Russian speakers in the country have a positive attitude towards Russia’s Authoritative President Vladimir Putin.

Like the other countries bordering Russia, Riga has also made a strong effort to increase its military budget. Latvia’s budget for 2024 will increase its expenditure by more than 700 million euros, half of which will be allocated to its military and internal security budget. Thus, it is clear that the relationship between planned purchases of missiles and coastal defense systems and the improvement of police, fire, and rescue services and high value-added exports has risen on the scale of national importance as the war in Ukraine changed budgetary and national security priorities about the development of the country’s economy.

In conclusion, it is more than evident that the permanent growth of the Russian population in Latvia – despite the socio-economic pressure they experience under Riga’s political system- and the interstate tensions between Latvia and Russia given Moscow’s voracious appetite to rebuild the Russian Empire on the foundations of what once belonged to it.