The two visions competing for Israel’s security 

Will we follow the historical precedent of Sparta or Europe?

Two distinct visions – two grand strategies – for Israel’s security have emerged since October 7. The first, championed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his supporters, is the vision of Sparta. While there are more extreme and less extreme versions of this Spartan vision, the implications are the same: a militarized Israel, winning its security through the application of force against its enemies. The alternative vision, championed by opposition voices, is similar to that of post-World War II Europe. The basic premise of the European vision is that Israel and its neighbors, like France and Germany or the Catholics and Protestants, can only live in security if a regional alliance is built to create mutual stability and face down common threats.

Understanding the political and social implications of these two security paradigms is critical for those seeking to influence Israel’s future as a State. Since it is exactly during times of crisis that new paradigms are adopted, it cannot be overemphasized how important it is for all who love Israel and want it to succeed to weigh in on the paradigm they support.

Here are, as I see them, the implications of the two models:

First, Sparta. The Spartan Grand Strategy is to rule through strength. The presumption here is that our enemies will always hate us, always want to uproot us, and they will only come to accept our presence once they realize that we are willing to fight and kill and die more than they are. By vanquishing their will to defeat us we will achieve total victory, after which we can build a new relationship based on respect for our power.

The implications on Israel’s domestic politics are significant. First, pursuing such a strategy means a higher annual defense budget, which generally means higher taxes. Second, it will require the enlistment of more soldiers, which either means the enlistment of the ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) or the non-Jewish citizens of the State, since asking the (shrinking) secular and traditionally religious populations to shoulder the burden is simply unrealistic. Third, it will require the development of new international relationships to support the sustained militarization of the State and ongoing conflict with its enemies. This is because, as we have seen from this past year, our current allies will not supply us much longer if we continue down this path.

Second, Europe. The European Grand Strategy is to establish mutual security through mutual interest. The presumption here is that even centuries of warfare and mutual distrust can be overcome once all parties realize they are not going anywhere. That even former sworn enemies have more to gain by working together than working against one another. By building alliances based on mutual recognition and common interests all parties can move on from a period of strife by telling a new story of interdependence and hope.

In many ways, this is what Netanyahu pitched the UN General Assembly just one year ago. It is the vision that animated the Abraham Accords, inspiring Israeli tourists and business travelers in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. The implications on Israel’s domestic politics include a long term moderation of defense spending, a restructuring of our armed forces towards mutual defense to take advantage of the capabilities of the alliance that quashed the Iranian attack. It will enable a doubling-down on our position within the liberal democratic world, and unlock additional investment and administrative integration into Euro-Mediterranean institutions.

The choice of security paradigm will also have significant implications on Israel’s own governing structure. The path of Sparta can take Israel down one of two routes: either it will follow the path of authoritarian and militarized states such as Iran, creating a highly centralized government able to coerce its citizens into service and neutralize internal opposition. Or it could force Israel onto the path of America, a country that requires its minorities to fight its wars for it – since its elites have long abandoned the armed forces – and in return becomes a multiethnic democracy.

On the other hand, given the demands of our regional and global partners, the path of Europe will require Israel to recognize the right of self-determination of the Palestinians. Like Denmark or Greece, however, such a model will not require Israel to become any less Jewish or reflective of the Jewish commitment to nationhood. Just as there are Catholic or Lutheran members of the European Union (countries with a state religion codified in their constitution), Israel too can maintain a national religious identity and enjoy having such a national democracy integrated into the economy of the liberal world.

The choice of which model to follow is ours to make. Since our political leadership seems unable to generate a respectful and thoughtful conversation about our future, I hope we as citizens and lovers of Israel will rise to the occasion to make the right choice.