A glimpse into Ali Khamenei’s dystopia
January 8th and 9th have been some of the bloodiest days in modern Iranian history and the history of the Iranian theocracy’s rule in particular. Thousands of Iranian protesters have been killed by the regime’s forces and proxies. The Iranian diaspora has made itself heard and has been joined by groups of Jews and Israelis in solidarity. Western governments have voiced criticism and provided the protest movement with hope, though intervention has not occurred. Iran’s neighbors have remained ambiguous and the Gulf is largely silent. The theocracy, however, remains defiant, combative, and threatening. Indeed, for them, this is the “resistance” that defines them. And it is a “resistance” that is willing to consume its own people.
The estimates
Much remains uncertain about the actual death toll, as well as the identification of the victims. Members of the regime’s forces have been killed, mostly in al-Ahvaz, Sistan-Baluchistan, and its Kurdish northwest. In those regions, some protesters came armed. But the vast majority of the victims were unarmed protesters, civilians who had taken to the streets in Tehran and hundreds of other locations spread throughout the country from December 2025 onwards.
Protests had reached into every corner of the country, as calls for the removal of the regime were expressed repeatedly. Protests in Iran have become endemic, with a wave occurring on an almost annual basis in the last five years. From protests in 2009 based on the allegations of election fraud, to the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. In turn, the regime has shown its readiness to kill and maim protesters as these protests increased and the earlier call for reform was slowly replaced with a desire for regime change. The message from the theocracy has been clear every time: it will use lethal force, once it decides that protests need to end.
Everything was put into place: an Internet and communications blackout, media censorship, and the regime turning inward to crack down on the unrest. When you read the testimonies shared by Iranians, for instance on the opposition-aligned website Iran International, you get a glimpse of a country where poverty has become the norm. Rapid inflation has taken its toll on young Iranians especially, with people showering less and turning the lights out early, just to save some money.
Inflation and the economic malaise that continues to grip a country of more than 92,000,000 souls is an important reason for people to take to the streets. However, the denial of basic freedom, such as the option for women to choose if they would like to wear a hijab or not came to the fore as well. Those who are insisting that the reasons are exclusively economic are missing the point – or worse, they are trying to provide cover for the regime, by blaming the Western sanctions that have been imposed. Indeed, if sanctions are the main culprit, then why is the economic malaise not shared by all?
Why do we sporadically see evidence of regime figures and their families enjoying luxuries and freedoms that remain out of reach for the majority of Iranians? Why does a regime that suffers from these sanctions still manage to fund Hezbollah in Lebanon and provide support for its proxies, such as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq or aid the Houthis in Yemen or Hamas in Gaza? How can sanctions be used as an explanation for the regime’s persecution of the Baha’i or its discrimination of Mandaeans, Sunni Muslims, Zoroastrians or Jews? An end to the ideological rigidity and the oppression that flows from it; an end to the economic malaise and the corruption that has allowed regime insiders to enrich themselves, despite the sanctions; a demand for a better future. These are the reasons that drove masses of Iranians to take to the streets.
The theocracy’s knee-jerk reaction, unfortunately, was to be expected: its own peculiar brand of “resistance.” It did what was expected, by blaming the protests on foreign actors, which are always the United States and Israel, of course. Then, the demonization of the protesters followed. While initially referring to them as “protesters” or “rioters,” yet already warning about dire consequences, it quickly devolved into describing protesters as “saboteurs,” “foreign agents,” or “terrorists.” An analyst warned that this is a familiar pattern of labeling. Technically, Iran does not execute protesters, but by labeling them as “saboteurs” they become a legal category where such punishment becomes possible. In other words, the decision to not execute hundreds of protesters does not seem final and could be carried out in the future.
The death toll itself will remain a subject of debate for decades to come, with scholars poring over information trying to piece together the most accurate estimate. This will be a complex endeavor, as government archives will probably remain sealed, meaning that a painstaking analysis will have to be made based on countless witness testimonies, statements made by health officials, anonymous regime insiders, diplomats and human rights organizations. Of course, it is in the interest of the theocracy to give the lowest estimate, while critics will argue that it serves the opposition to provide the highest estimate. To this day we do not know how many people were killed in 1989 on Tiananmen Square in Beijing by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Estimates range from a few hundred deaths to thousands.
The regime’s official figures are more than 3,000 deaths, including a number of its own forces. Even this estimate is the highest death toll in the history of the theocracy’s crackdowns on public protests. But considering the numerous testimonies that have emerged this figure cannot be taken seriously. Early on, Israel considered a number exceeding 5,000; the US-based Human Rights Activist News Agency (HRANA) has verified a number close to 6,000 deaths; Iran International was the first to argue that at least 12,000 people had been killed, a much higher death toll than anyone else had presented; the UN rapporteur Mai Sato argued that the death toll could even reach 20,000; and by now health officials both in Iran and abroad have given an estimate of at least 30,000 deaths.
Even if one would apply a conservative measure by arguing that an average seems plausible at this point, that would still mean that more than 16,000 people have been killed. And the testimonies and clips that have emerged from Iran, despite the regime’s attempts to turn the country into an Internet black hole, are shocking enough. Information has been shared of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij traveling on motorbikes and firing into crowds; security forces on pickup trucks used machine guns; snipers have taken aim at people’s faces; numerous reports of sexual assault and rape of protesters are being published; and, not surprisingly, Iran called on its proxies for aid, such as the PMF, as well as its Afghani Fatemiyoun Brigade and Pakistani Zainebiyoun Brigade.
In addition, evidence has emerged of regime forces denying protesters treatment in hospitals. Moreover, it is not known how many injured protesters, including those who might have succumbed to their wounds, have not been taken into account, as fear of going to hospitals could be a factor. Despite the discussion about estimates, one thing seems clear: the theocracy has applied brutal force in the space of two days, a crackdown that was unprecedented and showed that it was willing to consume its own people in large numbers.
The international community
Much of the support for the protesters came from the Iranian diaspora and statements issued by Western governments. President Donald Trump encouraged protesters to take to the streets and promised assistance, while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed support. But the reactions differed widely.
Iran’s neighbors, such as Türkiye and Pakistan, stated that they were “observing” the situation, while promoting dialogue. Pakistan’s envoy spoke of the “brotherly” Iranian people and expressed hope for the wisdom of its people and leadership to resolve matters peacefully. Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called his counterpart President Masoud Pezeshkian and expressed the hope for dialogue and reiterated that Türkiye was firmly opposed to foreign intervention – Pakistan voiced its opposition to this as well. And Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan expressed the desire for Iran to solve its own “authentic” problems and continued by warning that foreign actors – i.e., Israel – would try to exploit the situation. These countries had nothing to say about the theocracy’s lethal crackdown. And Gulf states remained silent.
There are plenty of examples of failed foreign interventions. And neighboring countries such as Türkiye and Pakistan probably fear a potential civil war, which could lead to large waves of refugees spilling across their borders. By now it is reported that Türkiye is even planning on establishing a buffer zone in Iran, should the theocracy fall – the reason would not be stemming the wave of refugees alone, but probably be concerned with preventing Kurdish autonomy or separatism as well. But they also have trade relations with Iran that cannot be ignored – roughly 60 percent of Türkiye’s trade with Iran consists of natural gas imports. And, finally, Fidan can once again accuse Israel but he seems to be unaware that a senior American official stated that Netanyahu requested Trump not to strike immediately, just as Gulf countries had.
Also, Western countries did not cause the civil war in Syria. That conflict erupted because Bashar al-Assad violently oppressed the initially peaceful demonstrations that called for reforms. And, finally, did Türkiye not intervene in Syria by training its proxy the Syrian National Army and offering support for Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which swept south towards Damascus in December 2024? But in the case of Iran, apparently, foreign intervention is a problem for Ankara. Also, Turkish authorities use an interesting standard. So, on January 11, 2026, Iranians were denied the right to protest outside the Iranian Consulate in Istanbul. But on January 18, 2026, quite a large crowd could stage a pro-regime protest in Istanbul outside the Iranian Consulate, while calling for Israel’s demise and standing on and burning American and Israeli flags – that, apparently, is never a problem for Turkish authorities.
The risks and potential success of regime change
The Iranian theocracy has reached a point of no return. Once a regime turns its guns on its own people so brutally, even bringing in its foreign proxies to take part in the killing, its legitimacy erodes tremendously. Its first and foremost task is not to care for and protect the Iranian people; no, its main task is to protect the regime, at all costs. Thus, it used unprecedented lethal force against its own citizens. It has since repeated that it will use unfettered violence against foreign intervention, promising to strike American positions in the Gulf, Türkiye, and launch an attack on Israel. In the case of the Jewish state, some officials even argued that they would end the conflict “once and for all.” Considering its stance, there is a possibility that Iran might strike Israel first, if it believes an intervention is coming.
Its threats should not be underestimated and the fears are understandable, considering that an intervention that could cause this much havoc throughout the region, with Iran probably activating all of its proxies as well, means that a heavy price will be paid. Israel still bears the physical scars of the June War. Thus, if an intervention is undertaken, it must mean that it will lead to the regime’s collapse. Moreover, there is no guarantee that an Iranian opposition can effectively take the reins, nor is there a guarantee that Iran could not become another Iraq, Syria or Libya.
However, most Western critics who oppose the idea of regime change seem to forget that regime change already took place in 1979 – as explained by Iranian scholar Touraj Atabaki, already then did Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s representatives lead committees that were charged with intimidating, coercing, and threatening opponents of the revolution. Indeed, foreign powers had a hand in that event. For example, France provided Khomeini with political asylum – which was discreetly approved by the Shah – in 1978, who then proceeded to influence the course of the revolution from French soil.
Then, in 1979 at the Guadeloupe Conference, the US, France, and West Germany decided to back Ayatollah Khomeini, according to Pierre Razoux, fueling protests in Iran and eventually Paris allowed Khomeini to return to Iran. He proceeded to hijack the revolution and then purged Iran’s opposition. And did not Germany allow Vladimir Lenin to pass through its territory on board a train to Russia in 1917, who proceeded to hijack the Russian Revolution? In other words, even the so-called internal regime changes received aid from abroad, even if these actors had not foreseen its consequences.
You can point to failed foreign interventions, but pretending that the Iranian theocracy was a completely national affair is erroneous. And it certainly cannot be called a success. Finally, the Iranian diaspora, including large numbers of Iranians in Iran seem to support the idea of Reza Pahlavi returning to power. Some polls show that within Iran only 30 percent support the return of the monarchy. But what if Reza Pahlavi could oversee a transition and become a ceremonial monarch? In such a scenario, his power would be limited and a new regime in Iran could gradually become democratic. It could keep the country together as well and through dialogue prevent the prospect of secession or civil war.
Certainly, there are many dangers in the case of foreign intervention. While many Iranians seem to hope for a campaign of airstrikes that could topple the regime, the lives of American and Israeli forces, as well as the damage Iran and its proxies could inflict on populations in the region, cannot be ignored. Moreover, at least a substantial part of the theocracy’s military apparatus would have to defect to ensure success. Simultaneously, one could argue that if Iran can use these threats to instill fear, one can imagine how powerful its threats would become if it had access to nuclear arms. Based on the fact that North Korea is untouchable because it has these weapons – each time it hints that it could fire its missiles at South Korea or Japan – it would seem plausible that the theocracy will double down on its development of this weaponry.
For now, an intervention remains a possibility, as Trump has signaled a willingness for diplomacy but has ordered a US fleet to the region as well. If an intervention does occur, it would mean that Israel would be attacked by Tehran; the theocracy’s promises are unnerving. But if it does not occur, then the hope of Iranians who kept taking to the streets, as they were encouraged by leaders in Washington, Jerusalem, and Berlin to do so, will be shattered. In other words, both options carry significant risk.
Trying times ahead
The coming weeks will be fraught with uncertainty and fear, but the price Iranians themselves have paid is already shocking. The theocracy has shown that it cares about its own survival, first and foremost, and is willing to sacrifice all to achieve this, whether they are minorities or young Shia Muslims. Despite the massive lethal use of force and cutting of communications, Iranians continue to show courage, even standing on balconies at night calling for an end to the regime. Their stories must be shared and those who perished not forgotten.
Finally, it is not surprising that Hamas figures immediately offered support and even demanded that Iran would attack Israel. After all, Hamas is willing to kill Palestinians who criticize them, too. Because this is the true nature of the Iranian theocracy’s brand of “resistance”: the regime’s own survival trumps everything.