A Third Way to End the War in Gaza

Following the current events of the Israel-Iran war that started on June 13, 2025, with the extraordinary preemptive Israeli attack, we tend to forget the lingering war in the Gaza Strip and the 53 hostages left behind. I wish that the dexterity shown by the IDF and the Mossad against Iran’s military upper echelon and nuclear infrastructure could be paired by a similar political-strategic effort on the part of the Israeli government regarding fateful decisions in the near future.  After all, the fate of the Iranian nuclear plan, as well as the future of the Gaza Strip, will not be determined only by military actions, but rather by diplomatic efforts, involving first and foremost the United States and other actors within the international community.

For obvious reasons, although our attention nowadays is centered on the dramatic, historic events in the Israel-Iran war, we still have to focus our intellectual efforts on helping to end the war in Gaza now. If and when Hamas receives stern guarantees from the United States, there are chances that a Gaza ceasefire will take place after all.  The “Framework for Negotiating an Agreement to a Permanent Ceasefire” will then lead to the release of about half of the hostages (live and deceased) within seven days.  In this way, a “third way” will be put in motion, which rules out two very bad options: On the one hand, the continuation of the devastating war and the whole Israeli military occupation of the entire Gaza Strip, and on the other hand, the permanent presence of Hamas as a governing body, after the war.

Since the Israeli government has not planned any strategy for an exit from the Gaza Strip or for “The Day After” (except for its military occupation), there is no other option but to rely on a partial agreement of sixty days. This will activate a gradual diplomatic process that will definitively end the war through negotiations with the release of all the hostages, the withdrawal of the Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip, and the replacement of Hamas as a governing body, within the framework of two months since the initial ceasefire.

The challenges that confront the United States, Egypt, and Qatar, as the mediator parties, with the assistance of countries from the Arab League, other members of the “Middle East Quartet” (the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia), as well as members of the Regional Quartet (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates) are daunting, but not impossible to resolve: they have to bargain in the best possible way in order to accommodate the minimal demands (red lines) of both Israel and Hamas in order to end the war and to bring about a political-diplomatic process that will instrument the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and the jump-starting of a future political process involving Israel and the PLO, alongside a normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as the rest of the Arab League countries.

The minimal demands of the Israeli government, which benefit from widespread support among the Israeli public opinion as well as in terms of international legitimacy are the following: 1) the return of all the hostages; (2) the end of Hamas’ rule in the Gaza strip; (3) the expulsion of the Hamas’ military leadership from the Gaza Strip; 4) the disarmament of Hamas; 5) the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip.  Yet, there is no legitimacy for the maximum demands of ethnic cleansing and forced (or even “voluntary”) evacuation of the Palestinian population from the Strip, or for any Israeli permanent military presence in Gaza after the war.

The minimal demands of Hamas, which enjoy a large degree of international support, include: 1) The release of Palestinian security prisoners, in exchange for the hostages; 2) a full withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip; 3) an end to the war; 4) the influx of massive humanitarian aid; 5) the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.  Yet, there is no international support for Hamas’ demand to keep itself armed, and there is an international consensus that there will be no reconstruction of the Gaza Strip as long as Israel or Hamas rule the territory.  Moreover, without finding a third way, there will be a governance vacuum that will bring chaos and will be detrimental to both Palestinians and Israelis.

Hence, during the two months of the ceasefire, the relevant international actors, led by the US Administration, should draw an operational program alongside the following components:

1. A civilian management of the Gaza Strip through a technocratic government (non-political), which will include Palestinians and members from Arab countries, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority and the Arab League, for a period of three years, possibly under a mandate of the United Nations.
2. The deployment of an international peacekeeping force, which will supervise the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, including contingents from the Arab League, NATO, and other countries such as Indonesia, in coordination with the gradual withdrawal of the IDF to the international border (the Armistice Line of 1949).
3. The ordered expulsion of the Hamas military leadership from the Gaza Strip.
4. The establishment of an agreed mechanism to reconstruct the Gaza Strip, under the management of the technocratic government, in coordination with the international community.

This plan has to be agreed with Israel and Hamas in the best case, and imposed upon them, as necessary, through a decision of the United Nations Security Council (under Chapter 7).   On the basis of this outline, perhaps Steve Witkoff and his dedicated team can bring the recalcitrant parties, Israel and Hamas, to enter into a cease-fire, now.