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Alan Silverstein

Addressing the core of Arab-Israel conflict

“If the core of the Arab-Israeli dispute is the Palestinian refugee problem, once the Palestinian issue is solved, would not everything else fall into place?”

The core of the Arab-Israeli dispute is neither the “Palestinian problem” nor the issue of an “independent Palestinian state.” Arab hostility to a sovereign Jewish state predated the flight of “Palestinians” in 1947-49. Moreover, during the 1949-67 era of Jordanian control over the West Bank and Gaza, when a “Palestinian state” could have been established, such a solution was never sought. Unrelenting hatred of the Jewish state and a callous disregard for the “Palestinians’” plight by their fellow Arabs have created a regional environment in which the “Palestinian issue” has predominated over far more fundamental concerns.

What then is the real core issue? It is the nature of Islam and its view of non-Muslims residing in the Middle East. Islam was created by Mohammed, a military and political leader. Mohammed and his successors, the “caliphs,” embarked upon a march of invasions of the vast range of territories extending from the Arabian peninsula through current-day Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel, plus Egypt and much of North Africa. This huge terrain came to be viewed as “Dar al-Islam,” land that must forever remain under Muslim sovereignty. Muslim empires (caliphates) subsequently safeguarded this hallowed turf for centuries to come — the Umayyads (based in Damascus), the Abbasids (Baghdad), the Fatimids (Cairo), the Mamluks, and the Turks — until World War I.

Non-Muslims living within Dar al-Islam were placed into two categories: “dhimmi” and “infidel.” “Dhimmi” implied “protected people,” such as Jews and Christians, whose sacred scriptures Mohammed regarded as valid but surpassed by the Koran. Dhimmi could be accorded peaceful existence under Muslim sway as long as they acknowledged their secondary role. For example, a “haraj” (land tax) was levied upon each acre of land worked by the non-Muslim, since all land belonged to Islam and Allah. Similarly, a “jizya” (poll tax) was collected each year for every dhimmi individual privileged to live within Dar al-Islam. Dhimmi and their leaders were to behave in a servile fashion — not building prominent religious institutions, not openly practicing their religion, and not calling undue attention to themselves or their endeavors. Such status continues today, as was evidenced by the fate of the former Jews of Syria and elsewhere, as well as by the restrictions imposed upon US troops in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm, even when they were serving in defense of Arab regimes.

If a dhimmi or group of dhimmi transgresses edicts of subservience — in particular, if they seek sovereignty — their status is changed from “dhimmi” to “infidel,” from “protected people” to “enemies who must be killed in ‘jihad’ (holy war).” Moreover, if a Muslim dies in “jihad,” he is guaranteed physical rewards in a heaven-like eternity as an acknowledgment of Allah’s gratitude. This ideology was the basis for the Muslim response to the 1099 seizure of Jerusalem by the Christian Crusaders. Infidel sovereignty over Jerusalem was never accepted. An unending war, a continuous jihad followed, until in 1187 Saladin gained Islamic immortality by repelling the alien Christian presence. Vigilant efforts to eradicate “intruders” within the divinely ordained domain of Islam became codified — not only in law, but in the Muslim collective memory. This inspired the relentless suppression of the national aspirations of Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Kurds, and other minorities within this vast territory.

The rise of aspirations for Jewish sovereignty in Palestine and Christian self-determination in Lebanon in the aftermath of World War I aroused the belligerency of Middle Eastern Muslims against the infidels. While Muslims acquiesced to the British/French creation of Muslim states in Jordan, Syria, modern-day Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and ultimately Kuwait, Islamic leaders and their followers determined to battle against the rebellious Jewish and Christian “dhimmi” who were pursuing nationhood. During the three decades between the conclusion of World War I and the proclamation of Jewish statehood in 1948, an era with no “Palestinian refugees,” relentless violence was directed against Jews as a means to abort the emerging “new Crusader state.”

Following the miraculous 15 months of endurance by Israel’s fledgling army against the combined forces of the Arab League, Israel’s War of Independence ended in 1949 with a cease-fire, but with no peace treaties. Israel had avoided destruction for the moment but remained an unwanted and foreign presence, a thorn that had to be extricated at any cost. As Knesset member Ze’ev B. Begin pondered, following the 1991 Gulf War:

“[I]t is worth asking why, during a war in which Israel was not involved and which took place over 1,000 kilometers away, Iraqi missiles hit Tel Aviv. Why did Saddam Hussein think that Tel Aviv was a legitimate target for his SCUDs? The answer is simple: He knew that for tens of millions of Arabs and other Muslims, Tel Aviv is a legitimate target because it is an illegitimate entity on sacred Arab land.” (“Jerusalem Report,” June 20, 1991).

For an Arab leader to recognize a non-Muslim sovereignty within Dar al-Islam would betray fundamental Islamic dogma. The perpetrator of such a sacrilege could not be permitted to live, as exemplified by the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Direct negotiations for peace with Israel were unacceptable to other Arab states.

Moreover, as a political strategy to demonstrate Israel’s aberrant “temporary” existence, hundreds of thousands of Arabs who fled the battlefield were placed in sub-standard “refugee camps.” Cynically, they were excluded from entry into the other 21 Arab countries. The “Palestinians” became pawns whose Arab-enforced refugee status was consciously exploited to perpetuate the non-recognition of Israel and the conviction that any former Arab residents of Palestine would never accommodate themselves to resettlement within the larger Arab world. This manipulation of Arab refugee status occurred at precisely the point at which Israel was absorbing more than 600,000 Jews from Arab lands, the post-World War II era in which a worldwide process of integrating millions of refugees was ongoing.

  • From India and Pakistan — 15 million refugees
  • From Finland (1945) — 400,000 refugees
  • From Czechoslovakia — 1.5 million refugees
  • From Poland (1944-45) — 2.8 million refugees
  • From East Germany (1945) — 7.5 million refugees
  • From Rumania (1945) — 1.2 million refugees

The core of the Arab-Israeli problem is not refugees; it is rather Islam’s refusal to accept non-Muslim sovereignties within “Dar al-Islam.” When Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel at Camp David, even Anwar Sadat scrupulously insisted on paper that all lands taken from Egypt in 1967 be returned. He also insisted that all other lands — the West Bank and Gaza, as well as all of pre-1967 Israel — be part of future negotiations for the settlement of the “Palestinian problem.”

In the post-1967 era, rationales for the non-recognition of Israel were no longer stated in terms of solving the “Palestinian refugee” problem, but rather by demands for “Palestinian sovereignty,” a demand for self-determination. The underlying commitment to total control of all parts of Dar al-Islam remained intact. In English-language speeches, “moderate” Arab leaders spoke of a “two-state solution,” a Jewish state and a Palestinian state side by side. However, in Arabic broadcasts, it was made clear that the establishment of a “Palestinian state” was only the first stage in a “two-stage” process. The second stage involved the “return” of the “Palestinians” displaced in the 1917-49 era to pre-1967 Israel. This would yield the destabilization of the Jewish state and the ultimate destruction of its Jewish identity. In this scenario, Jews would be reduced to the status of “dhimmi.”

This Arab dream of Palestinian self-determination draws its power not from concern for the “Palestinians,” but from a fervent hatred of the Jewish “infidels.” Traditional religious rivalries have been intensified by Arab resentment against European imperialism and the indignation of having lost so many wars to former “dhimmi.”

Israel’s deep understanding of the Arab worldview generates its unwillingness to deal first with the “refugee” issue. Instead, Israel insists first upon direct face-to-face negotiations between Israel and each Arab state, trading “peace for peace.” If such actual peace treaties were signed, then the Arab leaders would at last demonstrate a tacit willingness to abandon 13 centuries of Islamic tradition. They would be accepting a permanent Jewish sovereignty in their midst. This would create a context in which the “Palestinian problem” could be solved. The humanitarian aspects of the conflict would be severed from the intent to eradicate Israel’s presence in the Middle East. Until then, however, Dar al-Islam remains the core of the dispute.

About the Author
Rabbi Alan Silverstein, PhD, was religious leader of Congregation Agudath Israel in Caldwell, NJ, for more than four decades, retiring in 2021. He served as president of the Rabbinical Assembly, the international association of Conservative rabbis (1993-95); as president of the World Council of Conservative/Masorti Synagogues (2000-05); and as chair of the Foundation for Masorti Judaism in Israel (2010-14). He currently serves as president of Mercaz Olami, representing the world Masorti/Conservative movement. He is the author of “It All Begins with a Date: Jewish Concerns about Interdating,” “Preserving Jewishness in Your Family: After Intermarriage Has Occurred,” and “Alternatives to Assimilation: The Response of Reform Judaism to American Culture, 1840-1930.”
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