Ancient Churches, Renewed Responsibilities
On November 20, 2026, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow celebrates his eightieth birthday. Ecclesiastical delegations have gathered in the Russian capital to honor the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, whose life has spanned the Soviet period, the collapse of communism, the reconstruction of Russian ecclesiastical institutions, and the profound divisions brought about by the war in Ukraine. Among the guests is Patriarch Theophilos III of Jerusalem, who arrived in Moscow on November 19 for his second visit to Russia in the same month. Earlier, on November 5, he met Patriarch Kirill and President Vladimir Putin. The renewed encounter raises questions extending far beyond the congratulations traditionally exchanged between Orthodox primates.
What does Jerusalem seek in Moscow? What does Moscow expect from Jerusalem? And what becomes of ecclesiastical independence when religious diplomacy increasingly intersects with the foreign policy of states?
These questions are especially timely because Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking on November 19 to the Orthodox television channel Spas, described his regular private meetings with Patriarch Kirill. According to his remarks, they coordinate their approaches to international activities. Lavrov also presented the promotion of traditional values as an increasingly important instrument of Russian foreign policy. His words require precision. He did not simply declare that the entire Church was an instrument of the state. Nevertheless, his description of coordinated international activity makes the relationship between ecclesiastical authority and political diplomacy unusually explicit.
It would be a mistake, however, to examine this relationship without remembering the suffering from which contemporary Russian Orthodoxy emerged. The Russian Church did not arrive at its present position through an uninterrupted history of privilege. Revolution, civil war, persecution, the destruction of monasteries and churches, the execution and deportation of clergy, and decades of restrictions on religious life profoundly damaged its institutions and the transmission of faith. Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and many other peoples experienced these tragedies in different but frequently intertwined ways. Religious identity survived in families, clandestine communities, monasteries, prayers, and memories, often at immense personal cost.
The recovery of ecclesiastical life after the Soviet collapse was therefore more than an administrative reconstruction. It represented the return of something that generations had struggled to preserve. To recognize these historical wounds is not to endorse every political interpretation subsequently attached to them. It is to understand why the restoration of churches, monasteries, seminaries, and public religious authority acquired such significance. A Church that endured persecution understandably seeks security. Yet a question remains: how can it preserve the freedom of its Christian witness when it once again enjoys the protection and cooperation of political power?
During the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire developed an extensive religious, educational, and charitable presence in the Holy Land. Pilgrims traveled from the territories of the Russian Empire to Jerusalem, Bethlehem, the Jordan Valley, and the monasteries associated with biblical history. Churches, hospices, and institutions arose to serve them. The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission and the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society became enduring features of the region’s religious geography. This inheritance survived revolution and exile, although its properties and institutions passed through complicated legal and ecclesiastical circumstances. Russian religious life in Jerusalem was never simply an extension of Moscow’s immediate administrative control.
Today, the Holy Land contains communities and institutions connected with the Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, and the Patriarchate of Jerusalem itself. Their histories overlap without becoming identical. The relationship between Moscow and Jerusalem has included generous assistance, mutual recognition, competition over properties, and differing understandings of ecclesiastical responsibility. Russian support for the Holy Sepulcher and its institutions belongs to that history. So do the longstanding questions surrounding Russian religious properties and the rights of the local patriarchate. Theophilos’s visits to Moscow cannot be understood apart from this inheritance.
Yet Jerusalem is not Moscow, and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem is not an ecclesiastical dependency of the Russian Church. Its institutional history is considerably older and follows a different rhythm. The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, whose monastic community of the Holy Sepulcher has traditionally provided its governing hierarchy and guarded its principal holy places, has navigated centuries of changing political authority. The Ottoman government, British administration, Jordanian rule, and Israeli sovereignty have each imposed different conditions upon its existence.
Through these transformations, the Patriarchate has maintained an extraordinary degree of institutional continuity.
Its survival has depended not merely on diplomatic agreements, but on an understanding of ecclesiastical time that is often unfamiliar to modern political institutions. Governments may expect immediate declarations, alliances, and visible results. Ecclesiastical institutions accustomed to centuries of responsibility may proceed differently. Silence can be a form of prudence. Hospitality need not imply agreement. Accepting assistance does not necessarily mean relinquishing authority. The Patriarchate has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to maintain relations with powerful neighbors without allowing those relationships to determine every aspect of its internal life.
This is not to idealize its history. Its governance has generated tensions with Arab Orthodox faithful and raised difficult questions about participation, language, representation, and pastoral responsibility. These questions deserve serious consideration precisely because the Patriarchate’s historical achievement is substantial. Preserving an institution is one responsibility. Ensuring that its structures serve the living communities entrusted to it is another.
The patriarchal succession of 2001 offers an instructive example of Jerusalem’s complex ecclesiastical diplomacy. Following the death of Patriarch Diodoros, Metropolitan Timotheos of Bostra was among the prominent candidates for the patriarchal throne. He had longstanding connections with Russian ecclesiastical circles, and Moscow’s interest in the succession was considerable. Yet the election did not follow the expectations of every outside observer or ecclesiastical partner. Irenaios became patriarch. The circumstances were complicated, involving the Patriarchate’s internal procedures and the political environment surrounding the patriarchal election. They cannot be reduced to a simple confrontation between Greeks and Russians. Nevertheless, the episode illustrates a persistent reality: influence over Jerusalem is not equivalent to control of Jerusalem.
The subsequent crisis surrounding Patriarch Irenaios, his removal in 2005, and the election of Theophilos further demonstrated how delicate the patriarchate’s institutional arrangements could become. Theophilos himself had served in Moscow (2000-2003).
Theophilos is the canonical head of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. At the same time, the Holy Synod and experienced hierarchs contribute to the continuity of its administration and diplomacy. The Patriarchate should not be confused with the Greek government. Relations with Athens, Israel, Jordan, Palestinian authorities, and other governments form part of its complicated diplomatic environment, but each relationship has its own history and limitations. The question is how Jerusalem preserves sufficient independence to fulfill its responsibilities toward all the communities under its care.
Those communities include Arabic-speaking Orthodox Christians in Israel, Palestine, and Jordan, as well as believers of other linguistic and cultural backgrounds. The Holy Places also receive pilgrims from across the Christian world. Jerusalem cannot be reduced to the diplomatic interests of any one national tradition.
Israel and Jordan are indispensable to this delicate ecclesiastical balance. The Churches depend, in different ways, on their authorities for the protection of holy places, property rights, legal recognition, and the practical conditions of religious life. Russia’s extensive ecclesiastical presence must also be understood within Israeli society, where immigrants from the former Soviet Union and their descendants have become an integral part of public life. For many of these Israelis, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was particularly painful. Ukraine, with its profound Jewish history, is the birthplace or ancestral homeland of numerous Israeli families. Russian and Ukrainian identities, languages, and memories often coexist within the same households. The war has therefore reopened historical wounds that cannot be understood through diplomatic relations alone. Its eventual consequences may also affect Russian ecclesiastical interests in Jerusalem and elsewhere in the region. The Patriarchate of Jerusalem, experienced in navigating successive political upheavals, understands that international influence and local legal authority are not the same thing.
This becomes especially important when the war in Ukraine enters ecclesiastical relations. The war has divided families, displaced millions, and profoundly affected Orthodox Christians who share liturgical traditions while disagreeing over political and ecclesiastical allegiance. For many believers, these divisions are not abstract jurisdictional disputes. They enter homes, parishes, monasteries, and the celebration of the Eucharist.
Theophilos has reportedly expressed an intention to visit Ukraine in connection with efforts toward peace. Such an initiative, if undertaken, would have to address a difficult reality: Orthodox Christians cannot be reconciled merely through ceremonial declarations while the suffering that divides them continues. At the same time, maintaining communication with Moscow should not automatically be interpreted as approval of the Russian government’s conduct of the war. The possibility of dialogue remains important, particularly when ecclesiastical relationships have been damaged. The challenge is to distinguish dialogue from political alignment, canonical communion from diplomatic agreement, and pastoral concern from the promotion of national interests.
Another revealing contrast emerges in Western Europe. Metropolitan John of Dubna, also in his eighties, leads the Archdiocese of Orthodox Churches of Russian Tradition in Western Europe, commonly associated with Rue Daru in Paris. That archdiocese emerged from the upheavals following the Russian Revolution. Under Metropolitan Evlogyi, exile became an opportunity for theological renewal, pastoral creativity, and encounters between Eastern and Western Christianity. Its history differs radically from that of the contemporary Moscow Patriarchate. Yet both inherit the suffering and spiritual resources of Russian Orthodoxy.
The advanced age of their leaders brings a common question into view: what will the next generation receive? Buildings, jurisdictions, and diplomatic relationships are important. But the transmission of faith also requires the capacity to respond to new languages, displaced populations, and unfamiliar historical circumstances. This is where the experiences of Moscow, Paris, and Jerusalem unexpectedly meet. One Church has recovered from devastating persecution and regained extensive public influence. Another preserves the inheritance of exile and theological renewal. A third has survived successive political regimes through the continuity of an ancient patriarchal institution. Each possesses something the others may recognize. Each also faces questions that cannot be resolved through institutional survival alone.
Patriarch Kirill’s birthday celebrations occur at a moment when these questions have become particularly urgent. The presence of Patriarch Theophilos, together with other Orthodox representatives, testifies to relationships that remain significant despite political conflict and ecclesiastical disagreement.
The Church cannot abolish war by ecclesiastical decree. Neither can it allow war to determine the limits of Christian communion, conscience, and pastoral responsibility without serious theological discernment.
Jerusalem’s historical vocation gives this question particular weight. The Patriarchate guards the places associated with the Crucifixion, burial, and Resurrection of Jesus Christ. Its spiritual authority does not arise from military strength, demographic superiority, or diplomatic influence. It arises from a testimony that places suffering, death, reconciliation, and the hope of resurrection at the center of Christian existence. That testimony must remain larger than the interests of any state, including those states whose assistance helps preserve Christian institutions.
The Patriarchate of Jerusalem has learned to survive successive waves of political and ecclesiastical ambition. The Russian Church has survived persecution and reconstructed much of its religious life. Both histories deserve respect and understanding. Yet survival cannot become the final measure of ecclesiastical success. Survival makes the mission possible. It cannot replace it.
As Kirill enters his ninth decade and Theophilos returns once more to Moscow, the essential question is therefore not who has gained influence over whom. It is whether these ancient Churches, with their immense histories of suffering, diplomacy, and endurance… and true faith to begin with, can preserve the freedom to bear witness to peace when the powers of this world ask them to serve other purposes.
