Beyond Electoral Arithmetic: The Opposition’s Arab Dilemma
If Arab parties are legitimate enough to participate in elections, they are legitimate enough to participate in government.
In an earlier essay for The Times of Israel, “The Opposition Must Be Prepared to Form a Coalition with Arab Parties After 2026,” I argued that the opposition’s path to power may require cooperation with Arab parties. That argument remains valid. Yet as another election approaches, the issue is no longer simply whether Arab parties might help form a coalition. The more pressing question concerns the opposition’s willingness to confront the political implications of that possibility.
The opposition’s problem is not primarily ideological. It is mathematical.
Israel’s fragmented political system makes coalition building more difficult than ever. Unless the opposition secures a decisive electoral breakthrough, it is difficult to see how it reaches the critical threshold of 61 Knesset seats without support from Arab parties. Yet many opposition leaders continue to behave as though they can simultaneously replace Benjamin Netanyahu and maintain a political quarantine around Arab participation in government.
This is not a strategy. It is wishful thinking.
No serious political actor can ignore the importance of Arab citizens within Israel’s electorate. Their votes matter, their representation matters, and their role inevitably figures in discussions of coalition arithmetic. Yet when the conversation shifts from electoral participation to governmental participation, Arab parties continue to encounter significant political resistance.
That distinction is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Israel’s legal system already distinguishes between parties that may participate in democratic politics and those that may not. Parties that are permitted to contest elections, win seats, and serve in the Knesset have already been recognized as legitimate participants in the political process. Once that threshold has been crossed, treating them as presumptively unsuitable coalition partners requires a justification that is not always clearly articulated.
The experience of Ra’am and Mansour Abbas demonstrated this reality more clearly than any theoretical debate. In 2021, Ra’am became the first independent Arab party to join an Israeli governing coalition as part of the Bennett-Lapid government. Whatever one thinks of Abbas or his policies, the significance of that decision extended beyond the immediate political circumstances. It demonstrated that an Arab party could participate in coalition negotiations, assume governmental responsibility, and pursue policy objectives through engagement rather than permanent opposition.
The significance of that precedent is not historical but contemporary. If the opposition fails to secure 61 seats on its own, Ra’am may once again become indispensable to the formation of an alternative government. The question is therefore no longer whether Arab participation in government is possible. That question has already been answered. The question is whether the opposition is prepared to acknowledge openly what political reality increasingly suggests.
Many opposition leaders appear trapped between electoral caution and political necessity. They seek Arab votes but hesitate to embrace Arab partnership. They call for political change while remaining reluctant to discuss one of the most plausible paths through which that change could occur. Such ambiguity may be useful during an election campaign, but it becomes increasingly difficult to sustain when governments must actually be formed.
There is also a broader question of political consistency. The opposition frequently presents itself as the defender of democratic inclusion and equal citizenship. Yet equal citizenship cannot mean participation only up to the ballot box. If Arab citizens are legitimate participants in Israel’s democracy, then the parties they lawfully elect cannot be treated as permanent outsiders to the governing process.
Public recognition of Arab parties as legitimate coalition partners could also have broader political consequences. When voters believe that participation can translate into genuine influence over government formation and public policy, incentives for political engagement are strengthened. Inclusion does not determine electoral outcomes, but it may broaden the range of political choices that citizens regard as meaningful and effective.
This does not mean that every Arab party should automatically be included in every coalition. Nor does it require agreement with the policies of Mansour Abbas or any other Arab leader. The same standards should apply to Arab and Jewish parties alike: commitment to democratic politics, acceptance of the constitutional framework of the state, and willingness to assume governmental responsibility. Parties that satisfy those standards should be judged according to their policies and conduct, not excluded because of the communities they represent.
The opposition cannot continue demanding political change while refusing to acknowledge the political realities that may make such change possible. If it hopes to replace Netanyahu, it must stop treating cooperation with Ra’am as a taboo and start treating it as a legitimate option.
Political reality increasingly suggests that the path to an alternative government may run through Mansour Abbas and Ra’am. Whether the opposition welcomes that prospect or not, it is a possibility that can no longer be dismissed. The sooner it is acknowledged, the more credible the opposition’s claim to offer a governing alternative will become.
