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Bringing Peace to Gaza (II) – How the US can facilitate a new and creative Peace Process through Regional Integration
This blogpost builds on two recent posts – one on the building blocks for a durable peace in Gaza; the other on a different creative way of doing peace which overcomes the fundamental problems associated with the Oslo-style ‘classic two state solution’.
This blogpost now brings these two ideas together.
Previously, we argued Israel’s red lines in the ongoing ceasefire negotiations are essential to build a durable peace in Gaza. However we also observed, citing recent polling data, despite everything that has happened, Hamas’ popularity remains high. Its attempts to restore its governance, tunnels and arms manufacturing capacity take place within a permissive environment. The discourse of ‘resistance’ will remain the dominant paradigm until and unless something replaces it.
Therefore, while apparent US pressure for compromise on Israel’s red lines may be short-sighted, the Americans are right on two counts – there needs to be a political horizon, and regional integration plays a role.
But whereas the US sees regional integration as merely an incentive for Israeli acceptance of an Oslo-style two-state solution, it is here argued that regional integration may provide the contours of a new and better peace framework altogether.
Also previously, we drew on the writings of the world-respected business guru, Jim Collins, and his co-author Jerry Poras. They write:
“Highly visionary companies do not oppress themselves with what we call the ‘Tyranny of the OR‘… The ‘Tyranny of the OR‘ pushes people to believe that things must be either A OR B, but not both… Highly visionary companies liberate themselves with the ‘Genius of the AND‘ .. Instead of choosing between A OR B, they figure out a way to have both A AND B..
“[This] is not talking about mere balance. “Balance” implies going to the midpoint, fifty-fifty, half and half. A visionary company doesn’t seek balance between short-term and long-term, for example. It seeks to do very well in the short-term and very well in the long-term. A visionary company doesn’t simply balance between idealism and profitability; it seeks to be highly idealistic and highly profitable.”
Applying the Collins-Poras framework to the Israeli-Palestinian peace framework, the Oslo-style two-state approach represents the ‘Tyranny of the OR’.
Here is an absurd Western reductionist framework that doesn’t care for the religious and national sensibilities of Jews or Arabs. Rather it says, you can have peace, or you can have your religious and national sensibilities, but you can’t have both: “the Land is sacred to you? Who cares! For the sake of ‘peace’, you must split it in two!”
The ‘Genius of the AND’, when applied to Arab-Israeli peace, says, you can have peace and you can also have your religious and national sensibilities. In fact, done well, the ‘Genius of the AND’ would mean that each sides’ religious and national imperatives are best advanced through peace.
This Jim Collins-inspired methodology is straightforward:
- Firstly define what it is that Jews and Arabs, authentically as Jews and Arabs, each want?
- Secondly, figure out the creative way to make both happen at once.
So what authentically do Jews and Arabs want? It’s actually more or less the same thing. Let’s simplify somewhat:
- The Self-Determination Imperative: Each side wants self-determination and security – in other words, a state they can call their own.
- The Connectedness Imperative – Each side also sees themselves connected to the whole Land, not just a part of it. (Here, secularists – including (especially) Jewish secularists – tend to get lost, usually dismissing the connectedness imperative as ‘messianic extremism’, rather than normative mitzvah-linked Rabbinic Judaism coupled with the yearnings of an exiled people that has always wanted to come home.)
- The Sovereignty Imperative – Each side insists on a sovereignty claim over the whole Land, rooted for the most part in religious concepts. (Here, secularists again get lost, misrepresenting the sovereignty imperative as rooted in extremist nationalism on either side, even though it is a clear religious precept, albeit in slightly different form, respectively in both Judaism and Islam).
Looking across these three imperatives, ‘tyranny of the OR’-style thinking frames them as an impossible contradiction.
The Oslo supporters say, you cannot have (1) self-determination with (2) connectedness and (3) sovereignty. You must choose. Therefore, cut the Land in half, give each side a country, and each side will suffice with (1) self-determination.
Except experience has shown that clearly they won’t.
During the Oslo process, through their actions both sides signaled their dissatisfaction with (1) self-determination alone. Because a majority on either side would remain deeply dissatisfied, even if an Oslo outcome could be negotiated, and even if it could be implemented, it could never create the stability for which world leaders hope. Rather it will likely become a source of ever greater instability and violence.
Supporters of the one-state solution – i.e. a binational state across the whole Land in which Arabs and Jews would have equal citizenship and equal rights – have it a different way round. They say you can have (2) connectedness, but you cannot also have (1) self-determination and (3) sovereignty. One-state will give you connectedness to the whole land, but you can’t also then expect self-determination or sovereignty.
The first problem with the One-State solution is that, after their respective histories of oppression and trauma, neither Jew nor Arab will accept an outcome that does not bring self-determination. The other problem is, each side – dissatisfied with the one-state outcome – will invariably sabotage that one-state with the intent it becomes a vehicle to bring the eventual achievement of (1) self-determination and (3) sovereignty, either through demography, or through violence.
Then you have the confederation-based approach of ‘Eretz l’Culam‘ , an organisation I was proud to engage with for some time.
Eretz l’Culam shatters the shallowness of the Oslo thinking. They admit, actually you can have both (1) self-determination and (2) connectedness.
You can add (2) connectedness to (1) self-determination by complementing two states with an Israel-Palestine confederation. The two states give each side (1) self-determination. The confederation provides the enabling framework for (2) connectedness – a framework which means all Jews and all Arabs can live, travel, work, pray and do business across the entire Land that both parties hold as sacred.
So far so good.
But, unfortunately, Eretz l’Culam still say, while you can have (1) self-determination and (2) connectedness, it’s impossible to also have (3) sovereignty. Both parties can’t be sovereign over the confederation at the same time, and neither side would accept the sole sovereignty of the other, so the confederation will require some form of power-sharing.
This is a lesser form of the ‘tyranny of the OR’ but it’s still a tyranny.
So our challenge becomes clear. We must figure out a way to have (3) sovereignty as well as (1) self-determination and (2) connectedness for each side.
This is where regional integration comes in.
The basic idea is that while one party (Israel) obtains its sovereignty claim through an Israel-Palestine Confederation, the other party (Palestine, and the wider Arab-Islamic world) obtains its sovereignty claim through a new regional organisation. Here, think the European Union for the Arab-Islamic Middle East, or in short, an ‘Arab Union’, albeit with powers and structure customised to context, not merely copied and pasted.
In fact, if one goes back to the conflict’s 1910-1920 origins, this vision aligns with what each parties hoped to achieve at the time: a homeland for the Jewish people west of the river on the one hand, and an integrated self-determining pan-Arab polity liberated from Ottoman imperial control on the other.
A few broad contours of how this could look:
- For avoidance of doubt, the Confederation and the Union would sit alongside two states. It is still a two-state solution, but it is also more than just a two-state solution.
- The scope and role of the ‘sovereignty function’ within the Confederation and the Union would be limited to spiritual matters. An imperfect analogy could be the Vatican. De jure sovereignty may be allocated to some kind of a religious-oriented ‘presidency structure’ within each body. However, de facto functional roles would be managed by equitable and democratic representation from the participating parties. This approach may help ease Jewish secular-religious tensions. Religious Jews could choose to recognise the sovereignty and take their citizenship with the Confederation, which, halakhically in Jewish law terms only (not in secular law), would be recognised as a Jewish state covering the entire Land, leaving the State of Israel – stripped of functions currently performed by the Rabbinate – as a fully civic state.
- Aside from the sovereignty component, both the Confederation and the Union would serve meaningful real-world purpose. The Confederation could be an accelerant developing the Palestinian and Israeli economies alike by administering a single market, a common currency, shared infrastructure and services, and joint use and benefit from natural resources across what would be two micro-states. (The entire Land is similar in size to Wales, and over 70% of it is desert). Within the Confederation, all Jews and all Arabs would be permitted to live, travel, work, pray and do business across the entire Land that both parties hold as sacred. For its part, the Arab Union could be structured as a free trade area, customs union, infrastructure integration framework, and defense alliance. Intriguingly, Israel’s membership of an Arab Union (20% of Israel’s citizens are Arab while another 50% have family background in Arab countries) could provide the institutional framework for wider Islamic-Jewish reconciliation.
- The oft-articulated conundrum of reconciling democracy, self-determination and demography would be resolved. Within the Confederation, the same formula that applies within the European Union could be used. Jews and Arabs could live anywhere in the Land. Jews would always vote within the State of Israel. Palestinian Arabs would always vote within the State of Palestine. This would assure perpetual democratic self-determination for each, irrespective of future demographics.
- The big questions under Oslo – borders, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem – would be defanged by this approach.
- Finally, it cannot be over-stated enough, achieving peace will be determined not only by the final vision for peace, but also the pathway towards it. Few would dispute there is a huge trust deficit between the parties. This links to hard choices each party will need to make along the way. (It is inevitable – if anyone reads this blogpost – that someone will mock this proposal for its ‘naivety’, i.e.: ‘the author wrongly assumes that Israelis/Palestinians [delete as applicable] are interested in peace, when we all know that [insert arguments]’.) Therefore creating that pathway – with relevant confidence-building measures and concrete verifiable intermediate outcomes along the way – is fundamental to achieving the final vision. In addition, it is hard to see how any peace outcome can be viable without similarly concrete and verifiable acceptance by the Iranian axis, which hangs as a shadow across peacemaking efforts in Gaza and more broadly. This would include incremental measures toward de-escalation and de-militarisation of its proxies and full normalisation of ties.
I will write about this pathway in a subsequent post.
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