Can Arming Somalia Deliver Security Without Deepening Conflict?
Saudi support for Somalia’s federal forces may strengthen Red Sea security—but without political guardrails, it could sharpen tensions across the Somali peninsula.
Saudi Arabia wants a stronger security partner across the Red Sea. Its reported financing and training of more than 5,000 Somali National Army recruits, including at facilities in Galmudug, appears designed to protect trade, counter regional rivals, and reinforce Somalia’s fight against al-Shabaab as African Union forces draw down.
Yet military aid never lands on a blank political map. In the Republic of Somaliland, a larger force loyal to Mogadishu may look less like counterterrorism support and more like a threat to three decades of de facto independence. Riyadh’s challenge is therefore not only to build capacity, but to prevent that capacity from deepening conflict.
Why Riyadh Is Investing
Geography comes first. The Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Bab al-Mandab strait form a commercial lifeline for Saudi Arabia and global shipping. A capable Somali partner could help curb piracy and arms trafficking while strengthening security across the water from Yemen.
Riyadh is also entering a crowded regional contest. Turkey, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have established military, commercial, and political ties across the Somali peninsula. The UAE’s position at Somaliland’s Port of Berbera gives Saudi Arabia another reason to deepen its relationship with Mogadishu.
Diplomatically, the kingdom aligns with the Arab League and African Union position that Somalia remains sovereign within its 1960 borders—a stance highlighted after Ethiopia and Somaliland signed their controversial 2024 memorandum of understanding. There is also an urgent operational case: Somalia needs forces able to confront al-Shabaab as international troops step back.
Why Somaliland Sees a Threat
From Hargeisa, the picture is different. Mogadishu continues to claim fictional sovereignty over Somaliland, so a stronger federal army is not automatically viewed as neutral. Those troops might fight militants, but they could also pressure political rivals or alter the balance in disputed territory.
History makes that fear difficult to dismiss. The destruction of northern cities under Siad Barre’s centralized military regime in the late 1980s remains part of Somaliland’s political memory. Today, conflict around Las Anod and the rise of SSC-Khaatumo have made Sool more volatile. Even units created for counterterrorism could change local calculations—or be redirected after training ends.
Three Ways the Strategy Could Backfire
The greatest danger is not simple failure. The strategy could deliver stronger forces while causing wider political damage:
Local power struggles may capture the forces. In a system marked by weak institutions and clan competition, trained units, weapons, and logistics can be drawn into political disputes or illicit markets.
Maritime security may deteriorate. If military competition raises tensions along Somaliland’s Gulf of Aden coast, Riyadh could destabilize the reliable shipping corridor it is trying to protect.
Regional rivalries may harden. Stronger Saudi backing for Mogadishu could push Somaliland closer to the UAE, Ethiopia, and other partners, further polarizing the Horn of Africa.
A Warning from Somali Political Wisdom
One Somali proverb captures the strategic risk:
“Booraan hadimo ha qodin, haddii aad qodana ha dheereyn, ku dhici doontaana mooyee.”
Do not dig a pit of ruin; and if you must dig it, do not make it deep, for you may fall into it yourself.
The warning is not that Saudi Arabia seeks conflict. It is that outside powers often overestimate their control after money, training, and weapons enter a divided political system. Military capacity without political reconciliation can widen the cracks it was meant to seal.
How Saudi Arabia Can Avoid the Trap
Saudi Arabia does not need to abandon Somalia, but it does need guardrails. Training and equipment should be tied to clearly defined counterterrorism missions, accountable chains of command, transparent deployment rules, and civilian oversight. Support should also include monitoring after units leave training facilities, with consequences when troops are diverted into domestic political conflicts.
Just as importantly, Saudi diplomacy should engage Somalia’s federal member states and the Republic of Somaliland rather than treating the peninsula as a single, uncontested political space. Quiet dialogue on deployment boundaries, disputed territories, and maritime cooperation could reduce miscalculation without forcing Riyadh to abandon its formal support for Somali unity.
Riyadh’s goal is a safer Red Sea. But lasting security cannot be built by strengthening one actor while ignoring everyone who fears it. It depends on political restraint, local legitimacy, and dialogue across the Gulf of Aden. Otherwise, Saudi Arabia may learn the proverb’s lesson the hard way: the deepest strategic pits are often dug by those who expect someone else to fall into them.