China’s Gamble in Syria

On Monday, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that Beijing “supports Syria’s efforts to maintain national security and stability” following a shock offensive by armed opposition forces that saw the Syrian government lose control of Aleppo. Lin emphasised that China is “willing to make positive efforts to prevent further deterioration of the situation in Syria.”

A notable silence accompanied this seemingly routine comment. Four days earlier, China’s ambassador to Syria, Shi Hongwei, tweeted: “I am pleased to meet Dr Ahmed Damiriyeh, Syria’s Minister of Health. China is ready to strengthen cooperation with Syria to improve healthcare and human resource training, facilitating the continuous development of the Sino-Syrian strategic partnership.” Since that post, there has been no further communication.

This quietness raises questions: was Beijing caught off guard by the shocking developments in Aleppo? It is possible that China, while planning initiatives focused on reconstruction and cooperation with Assad’s government, did not anticipate the need to shield the regime from a renewed rebel offensive actively. This may reflect a gap between China’s strategic priorities and the fast-changing realities, complicating its regional calculus.

The Strategic Calculus and China’s Dual Narrative

Chinese state media, including Xinhua, have adopted a dual approach to Syria’s unfolding crisis. On one hand, they praise the Syrian government’s counteroffensive efforts, aligning with Beijing’s support for its partners, including Russia and Iran. On the other, they underline the concerns of regional actors about the resurgence of conflict. This twofold narrative allows China to balance its support for Assad’s regime with its desire to present itself as a responsible power capable of addressing regional anxieties, all while avoiding direct involvement.

China’s engagement in Syria reflects its ambition to shape global norms and exert influence without becoming entangled in protracted conflicts. As researchers Wang Bo and Mu Chunhuan highlight in a study cited by Atlantic Council’s Tuya Gehring, China’s “coordination diplomacy” aims to create favourable conditions for peace by engaging warring factions and major powers while avoiding direct military involvement.

Yet, this approach faces limitations. In this case, China’s alignment with Assad, despite his regime’s record of breaches of international law, risks tarnishing its reputation as a responsible global actor. Moreover, the apparent weakening of Russia and Iran in Syria could force Beijing to reconsider the depth of its commitment to this alignment.

The Need for Action

The escalating crisis in Syria poses a critical test for Beijing’s foreign policy. As rebel forces regain ground and regional tensions rise, China must decide whether to actively bolster its axis—including Russia, Iran, and Syria—or face the consequences of growing instability.

China’s response to Syria will also be closely watched by global actors, particularly the United States, as it seeks to position itself as a counterweight to Western influence while maintaining its preference for indirect engagement. The crisis is a microcosm of Beijing’s broader dilemma: upholding its co-aligned states and strategic interests without becoming embroiled in direct conflicts that could undermine its long-term ambitions.

China’s careful positioning in Syria demonstrates its strategic acumen but also exposes the limits of its approach. To preserve its influence and maintain the credibility of its alignment, Beijing must navigate this crisis with a delicate balance of pragmatism and proactive engagement. However, Beijing is significantly concerned about the growing risk that Russia and Iran could lose ground—and with it, their image of strength—in Syria. This growing risk not only jeopardises Beijing’s geopolitical alignment but also challenges its narrative as a leader capable of sustaining solid partnerships amid geopolitical turmoil.

Much like Russia’s war in Ukraine, China seems prepared to tacitly support the military actions of its cooperative actors, recognising that their failures would erode its broader strategic ambitions. While Beijing is likely to remain externally detached from direct conflict, the increasing entanglement of its partners in such wars (Ukraine, Syria, Gaza, Lebanon) poses a long-term risk. Sooner or later, China could find itself compelled to take on a more significant role despite its preference for indirect engagement.