China’s Phagocytosis of the South China Sea
At the beginning of the 15th century, the Chinese admiral Zheng He explored a large part of the coasts of the Indian Ocean in seven expeditions ordered by Yongle Emperor (Head of the Ming Dynasty). These voyages combined commercial interests –such as finding new markets– with mere cartographic curiosity, asserting the power of the Middle Kingdom over the territories surrounding it and even the emperor’s desires for greatness.
Regardless of imperial motivations, during the first decades of the century, the admiral and eunuch Zheng reached places as far away from China as the island of Ceylon, the coasts of India, and even the coastline of present-day Somalia, Kenya, and Mozambique. In addition, the fleets used for this mission were far from comparable to the European ones that in those same years were navigating the South Atlantic and the west coast of Africa. The Chinese ships used in the various expeditions had seven, eight, and even nine masts, and the size of the ships is estimated to be up to eight times larger than the Santa María, the ship with which Columbus would arrive in America in 1492. These fleets, which had dozens of ships, also transported thousands of soldiers, and naval technology, both applied to the ships and navigation, far surpassed that of Europe at the time. This is why there has been some speculation about the possibility that Zheng might have reached the shores of America seven decades before Columbus. Although from the Chinese perspective, it was entirely plausible, historically there is no evidence that points in this direction.
Unfortunately for Chinese navigators, with the death of the Yongle Emperor, this exploratory policy disappeared, and the Confucians of the Ming court turned the country in on itself, beginning centuries of isolationism that made China a backward country at a time when it was economically and technologically a leader in the world.
Almost six centuries later, today’s China, this time under the Communist Party dynasty, seeks to emulate Zheng He’s policy. It has strived to find new regional and global markets, while financially it is beginning to extend its influence on the international arena; doubtlessly, it has returned, like the admiral did, to Africa, with eminently political and economic purposes, while at the same time wishing to emphasize its position as an undisputed power in Asia-Pacific, even by intimidating its neighbors.
For Beijing, maritime domination of the space close to the Middle Kingdom has become a priority, but also complex and unstable. In the South China Sea, China wants to bet the most heavily, specifically in the Spratly archipelago, but it is also where it is encountering the most bitter resistance from its regional neighbors. No one is unaware of the intentions of the People’s Republic towards its neighborhood; that is why, even though all the cards are on the table, no one resigns themselves to losing.
Within all the problems and tensions that can be found today in the South China Sea, the aforementioned Spratly archipelago is probably the most important geostrategic issue for practically all the countries that, directly or indirectly, are immersed in this struggle in the Far East. Geographically, there is nothing more than a considerable number – more than 150 – of islands, islets, atolls, reefs, sandbanks, and various formations that are temporarily or permanently above water level. The important thing here is that of all of them, forty are considered, geographically and legally, islands, even though many of them are tiny in size.
Geostrategically, this archipelago is located in the center of the South China Sea, embraced by four Southeast Asian states and watched from the north by mainland China and insular China – Taiwan. Over the centuries, many of the Spratlys’ emerging territories have been used by fishermen from the surrounding countries, with some islands being occupied and vacated intermittently. Thus, at present, Vietnam occupies almost fifty enclaves in this archipelago, China and the Philippines eight of them, Malaysia five, and Taiwan one. However, all this would be very simple if there were not another issue in the way: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
This international treaty, which was opened for signature in 1982, stipulates a whole series of norms and rules for good coexistence and the maintenance of a certain order in marine spaces. In the matter we are dealing with here, States have the right to claim an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), one in which they can monopolize their exploitation, up to 200 nautical miles beyond the coastline that limits the country on land. This, of course, if it does not collide with the waters of another country, having to reach a fair and equitable solution regarding the aforementioned EEZs. The problem with the Spratlys is that, as islands, an EEZ can be drawn around them in favor of the country that controls them and which is supposed to be sovereign over them. Due to the geographical location of the archipelago, the maritime claims of the Philippines, Malaysia, or Brunei from their “indisputable” territories also cover part of the Spratlys, “swallowing up” islands that are not controlled by them. On the contrary, Vietnam would gain a significant amount of maritime space if it could impose the Law of the Sea on its neighbors. Unfortunately for them and the rest of the Southeast Asian countries, the already high complexity of the issue is reduced to child’s play with China’s entry into the dispute.
Unlike Vietnam, the majority ruler of the archipelago, the Philippines and Malaysia, whose claims to it are partial, the Middle Kingdom claims the entire Spratlys. To support its claim, it argues, among other things, the traditional, almost millennia-old, Chinese sovereignty of these islands throughout all the dynasties of the Chinese Empire – dating back even before the year 0 – as well as the fishing practices that fishermen from southern China have carried out in the area for centuries. However, basing claims on a “who came first” as the only pillar of legitimacy, in addition to being a futile effort due to the complexity of the problem and the background it contains, only leads to an entrenchment of the positions of those aggrieved in this issue.
The South Asian neighborhood, aware of the position in which it finds itself, better positioned to start with but with more to lose in the long term, counterattacks the Chinese theses with a position that even Beijing itself has indirectly admitted by naturalizing the issue: China needs that archipelago and it is a priority in its national security strategy.
The so-called “Nine-Dash Line” is a line that appears on numerous Chinese maps, encompassing a series of tiny island territories spread throughout the South China Sea. In total, there are several million square kilometers of EEZ that Beijing claims for itself, effectively cornering the territorial waters of the rest of the coastal states. Within this ambitious maritime zone, the Spratlys are the core of the claims. A victory – diplomatic or military – for the People’s Republic could be the beginning of the end to the dispute in this area since it is understood that the rest of the claimed territories would fall under Chinese protection sooner or later.
Although the historical claims to the archipelago have some basis, Beijing is perfectly aware of how weak they are and how little impact and legitimacy they have for the other interested parties. That is why in recent years the diplomatic line has been abandoned to give way to a more political and militaristic one. The Spratlys are, within Chinese strategic planning, a vital part, and the Middle Kingdom is increasingly less patient with the time it is taking to advance on the issue of the archipelago.
A Chinese victory in the Spratly issue would largely complete the intended EEZ in the form of the “Nine-Dash Line”. This, in addition to expelling the neighbors from the economic activities that could be carried out in these waters, would open up to China the possibility of exploiting alone the abundant deposits of natural gas and oil that are in this region. If China can extract hydrocarbons from the islands, it would undoubtedly achieve energy security, since a large part of crude oil and gas is currently imported from Russia, the Persian Gulf, and the African continent.
Similarly, uniting the islands and banks that emerge in this archipelago under Beijing’s control would mean, in addition to a good dose of national moral -another ego element in the increasingly inflated Chinese nationalism-, over Taiwan about who is the true China.
At the same time, Taipei also claims the entire Spratlys, citing the same arguments as the People’s Republic. That said, let us not forget that on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, they consider themselves the only and true heirs of what China represents. Thus, the passage of the islands under the protection of one or the other would mean an implicit recognition of who is the true heir of the Middle Kingdom.
However, we must not forget the geostrategic variable, since it is undoubtedly the one that has the most weight in Beijing’s ambitions. Today, with the sovereignty of the archipelago in question, the thousands of merchant ships and oil tankers that transit the waters of the South China Sea, departing from or destined for Hong Kong or any other of the many busy ports located in Chinese territory, pass through various territorial waters or, to be more precise, through international waters, since no one’s sovereignty is recognized in the Spratlys. In a certain sense, this situation “neutralizes” the sea in this area of Asia, which, while it is an acceptable status quo for the coastal countries, is not for China, which has to wait for its ships to approach the island of Hainan to control their transit.
With absolute control over the Spratlys, Beijing would advance its supremacy to the eastern edge of the Strait of Malacca, one of the largest chokepoints in the world and through which a considerable proportion of global trade passes. In this scenario, China’s geopolitical weight in the region would undoubtedly gain, relegating the rest of the countries to a secondary position and increasing Beijing’s power in an area of overlapping influences that for the moment is resisting the Middle Kingdom, both due to the lack of sufficient resources to impose its position and the absence of allies among the southern neighborhood. If China has achieved anything, it is to form a common front against its blatant maritime expansionism; in fact, several countries that were believed to be antagonistic to the Americans, such as Vietnam, are now looking for Washington’s military protection.
However, China’s interest in the mosaic of islands does not end here. As a geostrategic point for the undoubted air-naval and commercial dominance of Southeast Asia, the Spratlys are configured as the first station of what China has called the “string of pearls”, its geopolitical positioning along the Indian Ocean to ensure trade in the area, especially hydrocarbon imports, and to keep at bay a future naval expansion of India in its surrounding sea.
Due to the pressing need to make progress in its claims, as well as the importance of generating infrastructure in anticipation of any scenario, the Middle Kingdom has set to work on the few islands it controls in the Spratlys. If a decade ago its control was limited to a few atolls and reefs without potential or apparent importance, China has known how to recycle its possessions and squeeze out all its capacity. Thus, in 2013 and 2014, permanent low-profile naval activity began to be observed around the Chinese islands of the archipelago.
Without knowing exactly what China was doing there – at least for the general public – at the end of 2014 and beginning of 2015, satellite images revealed the conscientious engineering work ordered by Beijing for that southern scenario. Nothing more and nothing less than China was reshaping the sandbanks, reefs, and tiny islands into island surfaces of considerable extension. The show was simple: all the naval activity detected were dredging vessels that, taking advantage of the low depth of the waters in that area, had extracted enormous quantities of sand from the seabed to build and enlarge the islands. Thus, what had previously been simple surveillance posts on an island no larger than the tower itself had become land of some importance, with docks and space for warehouses, heliports, and some other accommodations. In short, a whole compendium of stable bases with potential logistical and military uses.
The work is progressing at a good pace due to Beijing’s interest in having these facilities ready as soon as possible. On some islands, the logistical profile of these can be seen, especially on the smaller ones; on the other hand, on the larger reefs, such as Fiery Cross, China is betting heavily on the construction of a landing strip of just over 3km, which would allow the take-off and landing of all types of aircraft, including heavy bombers. The Fiery Cross runway was completed in September 2015, although all the auxiliary infrastructure is still missing for the future airfield to be operational.
After the facilities were completed in 2017, China achieved a stronger position and is now forcing a negotiation or a cession of the islands from other litigating States. Although, the People’s Republic does not have much naval means – it is probably its weakest wing within the Armed Forces – it far exceeds the capabilities of other neighboring states, whose means to defend the Spratlys in the future are insufficient.
As a result, it is in this increasingly favorable scenario for China that the United States has decided to get involved. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and of course, Taiwan are strategically aligned with the North American power, more out of necessity than by choice. Increasingly cornered, a gesture from the United States indicating to Beijing that Washington has not forgotten the claims in the archipelago would be ideal. It is true that in the dispute over the Senkakus between China and Japan, the White House has firmly aligned itself with its Asian ally, but in the Spratlys, its role was still up in the air. In late October 2015, an American destroyer, the USS Lassen, sailed through the archipelago near the islands that China has built in the area. Of course, Beijing’s protests were immediate and loud. The United States responded to Chinese complaints by arguing that it considers the Spratlys to be international waters, with the consequent freedom of passage that such status is supposed to protect. And in a way, Washington was consistent, but it was also showing part of the deck it was going to play with. The United States is one of the few countries –and the only globally relevant player– that has not signed or ratified the Law of the Sea. Thus, it is dangerously balanced between customary law and the international norms by which the issue should be resolved. In this sense, the United States is completely delegitimized to sponsor or induce a negotiation protected by the Law of the Sea, leaving it with military deterrence as its only option, which is precisely what the navigation of its destroyer through the waters of the archipelago was intended to show.
The question everyone is asking now is what will happen in the Spratlys. Some analysts suggest that this could be the point where a war in the Asia-Pacific could break out, while others maintain that the scenario will remain as static as in recent years. The truth is that this problem has a good deal of uncertainty. The countries in the fight, as well as the United States, constantly play the provocation game, always trying to load seemingly irrelevant actions with symbolism.
Therefore, there is a high probability that at any given moment, a gesture, a poorly given – or misunderstood – order will trigger an unstoppable reaction that is not convenient for everyone. Likewise, it is also striking that the judicial route has not yet been explored. Both the United Nations and the International Court of Justice have the power to settle the border limits and sovereignty of the archipelago. However, the complexity of the matter is such that it would probably take many years to resolve the mess. An option, therefore, that although ideal from a legal and political point of view, is unviable due to the time it requires, something that neither of the contenders is willing to invest.
Nevertheless, China will continue to press to see its ambitions fulfilled. It could opt for the military route or try to obtain some island in exchange for commercial or political advantages. Beijing’s diplomatic versatility has already been demonstrated, and a significant portion of its eco-geostrategic capacity depends on the Spratlys. For this reason, it is not advisable to lose sight of the events that will occur in this archipelago. A good part of the future of Asia-Pacific will be decided there.
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