China’s silence brings Israel closer to Taiwan

The Chinese government officially reacted to the attacks on October 8 through a statement by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “China is closely following the escalation of the conflict between Palestine and Israel. We are deeply saddened by the civilian victims, and we oppose and condemn acts that harm civilians.” This is what the Israeli researcher Tuvia Gering describes as the position of “pro-Palestinian neutrality.”

Since the October 7, 2023, massacre, China’s stance against Hamas has signaled a subtle yet significant shift in the Middle East and Asia’s geopolitics. By refusing to condemn Hamas ‘explicitly,’ Beijing wanted to preserve its image as a ‘balanced’ power. But this silence had an unexpected effect: it contributed to bringing, slowly, Tel Aviv closer to Taipei. Taiwan has stood by Israel and shown big support for the state of Israel. Between Israel and Taiwan, a bond of democratic and technological solidarity has been strengthened.

For Jerusalem, which carefully scrutinizes the language of the powers, this silence is not neutral. It reflects a moral—even ideological—distancing between Israel and China at a time when bilateral relations, already weakened by US pressure on Chinese investments in Israel, seemed to be entering a phase of disillusionment. The Chinese choice is explained by a broader logic: the desire to establish oneself as the leader of the ‘global South’ in the face of the West. With this in mind, Beijing is seeking to reconcile the Muslim and Arab worlds on which it depends for its energy supply. Supporting, even tacitly, the Palestinian cause allows China to strengthen its image as a postcolonial power, critical of the West and its allies.

But this strategy has a flaw: it neglects the diplomatic cost with technological and democratic powers that Beijing still claims to seduce. By siding with moral relativism, China has confirmed in the eyes of Israel—as of many Western states—that it does not reason in terms of values, but only interests

Faced with this disillusionment, Israel has undertaken a discreet but perceptible rebalancing towards Taiwan.

Israel does not officially recognize Taipei—true to the policy of a single China—but economic, academic, and technological exchanges have intensified. In the field of cybersecurity, medical research, or even semiconductors, cooperation is increasing, often under American sponsorship.

This movement is not anecdotal. Israel, a power of innovation and defense, understands that Taiwan represents a natural partner: two small democracies besieged, surrounded by authoritarian regimes, and dependent on their technological superiority to survive. This similarity of trajectory creates a proximity of values and strategies.

The Chinese stance on Hamas illustrates a paradox: by wanting to please the Arab world, Beijing has alienated Israel without gaining real political influence in the region.

Arab countries, although sensitive to pro-Palestinian rhetoric, continue to view China as a trading power, not as a credible security or mediation actor. Neither Qatar nor Egypt nor even Saudi Arabia turns to Beijing to negotiate peace. China, which dreamed of being a world referee, finds itself a spectator.

This calculation reveals a limit: its difficulty in combining strategy and values. By refusing to condemn Hamas’ Islamist terrorism, Beijing wanted to avoid cutting itself off from its energy partners, but it lost an opportunity to assert its moral stature as a responsible great power.

The result is a slow but profound strategic recomposition: Israel is more anchored in the pro-Western Indo-Pacific network, while China is locked into an ideological alliance with the regimes of the South.

By refusing to explicitly condemn Hamas, Beijing has sent a signal that goes beyond the Gaza war: that of diplomacy, where ambiguity is worth complicity.
And paradoxically, this ambiguity will have brought Israel closer to Taiwan