Commandments or Prerequisites? And More Horiyos 8-10

Horiyos 8 Commandment or Prerequisite

Our Gemara on Amud Beis suggests that idolatry was the first command given to the Jewish people by Moshe from Hashem. This idea is rejected because there is a tradition that other mitzvos were taught earlier at Marah. Regardless, we see that at least in the Aseres Hadibros, the Ten Commandments, the first mitzvos were regarding idolatry.

The verses state (Shemos 20:2–3):

I the LORD am your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt, the house of bondage

You shall have no other gods besides Me.

Interestingly, Rashi on the Gemara identifies both the first verse, “I am the Lord…” and the second verse, “You shall have no other gods,” as one and the same commandment, prohibiting idolatry.

The simple reading of the verses seems different. The first verse is an introduction, not necessarily a command: “I am your God who took you out of Egypt.” The second verse seems as if it should be the command to serve no other Gods. Rashi combines both as part of the prohibition against idolatry.

There is a famous dispute between Rambam and Ramban in Sefer HaMitzvos (1) as to whether belief in God’s existence is a mitzvah. Rambam identifies the verse “I am the Lord…” as this commandment. Ramban (ibid.) rightfully objects to Rambam’s counting this as a mitzvah. To call belief in God a commandment involves a circular process that doesn’t make sense. How can one have a mitzvah from God if he does not believe in God? That is to say, belief in God is a prerequisite to following His commandments, and not a mitzvah in itself.

Rashi on our Gemara explains it as follows: The introductory verse “I am your God…” is not about belief, but about an introduction to why idolatry is forbidden. That is to say: “I am your God who took you out of Egypt and THEREFORE you may have no other gods before Me.” Philosophically, Rashi agrees with Ramban that there is no commandment to believe in God. But exegetically, he interprets both verses as relating to exclusive worship and not belief. (Ramban also must learn similarly, as the Gemara Makkos 23b–24a lists both “I am the Lord…” and “You shall not have other gods” as two separate mitzvos, and part of the 613.)

Rambam, however, understands the first verse as a command, and separates it from idolatry: the command to believe in God’s existence. How do we counter Ramban’s objection that there can be no mitzvah prior to belief? I think Rambam defines the word mitzvah differently. While we refer to mitzvos as commands, as in “the King decreed,” Rambam considers such an idea as no different than other anthropomorphisms in the Torah. God has no reactive emotions or needs in any way, and the Torah uses expressions of anger, regret, mercy, etc. as a vehicle that allows us to relate to something otherwise unrelatable. All of this is clearly stated in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah (1:11–12):

Since it has been clarified that He does not have a body or corporeal form, it is also clear that none of the functions of the body are appropriate to Him…

He does not change, for there is nothing that can cause Him to change. [The concept of] death is not applicable to Him, nor is [that of] life within the context of physical life. [The concept of] foolishness is not applicable to Him, nor is [that of] wisdom in terms of human wisdom. Neither sleep nor waking, neither anger nor laughter, neither joy nor sadness, neither silence nor speech in the human understanding of speech [are appropriate terms with which to describe Him]. …

Since this is so, all such [descriptions] and the like which are related in the Torah and the words of the Prophets—all these are metaphors and imagery. [For example:] “He who sits in the heavens shall laugh” [Psalms 2:4], “They angered Me with their emptiness” [Deuteronomy 32:21], and “As God rejoiced” [ibid. 28:63].

With regard to all such statements, our Sages said: “The Torah speaks in the language of man.” This is borne out by the rhetorical question (Jeremiah 7:19): “Are they enraging Me?” Behold, [Malachi 3:6] states: “I, God, have not changed.”

Now were He to at times be enraged and at times be happy, He would change. … He, blessed be He, is elevated and exalted above all this.

Similarly, I believe Rambam considers a mitzvah, literally a commandment, as also a metaphor. One plus one equals two is not a commandment. So too mitzvos are self-evident and intrinsically imperative AS IF they were commanded. Even in English we refer to the “law of gravity.” This is not a law in the sense that a king commanded it; rather, it is an immutable fact that compels and shapes our behavior. This is a true mitzvah.

And now we can better understand the Moreh Nevuchim’s revolutionary explanation of the following well-known Aggadah (Makkos 23b–24a):

There were 613 mitzvos stated to Moses in the Torah….What is the verse that alludes to this? It is written: “Moses commanded to us the Torah, an inheritance of the congregation of Jacob” (Deuteronomy 33:4). The word Torah, in terms of its numerical value [gimatriyya], is 611, the number of mitzvos that were received and taught by Moses our teacher.

In addition, there are two mitzvos: “I am the Lord your God” and “You shall have no other gods” (Exodus 20:2–3), the first two of the Ten Commandments, that we heard from the mouth of the Almighty, for a total of 613.

The conventional understanding of this Aggadah is that the first two commandments were heard directly by the Jewish people without the aid of Moshe’s prophecy. However, Rambam (Moreh II:33) explains:

The Israelites heard the first and the second commandments from God, i.e., they learnt the truth of the principles contained in these two commandments in the same manner as Moses, and not through Moses.

For these two principles, the existence of God and His Unity, can be arrived at by means of reasoning, and whatever can be established by proof is known by the prophet in the same way as by any other person; he has no advantage in this respect.

These two principles were not known through prophecy alone.

To Rambam, seeing God as real by recognizing the logic and existence of the Creator is just a lesser form of prophecy. Intellectual apprehension and prophecy are all on a continuum because knowledge itself is sourced from God. The Jewish people “heard the first two commandments directly from God” in the sense that God’s existence and presence were self-evident. Just as this is called metaphorically “heard from God,” so too it is metaphorically a commandment, in the vital sense that it was perceived as absolutely imperative. According to Rambam, the Jews at Mount Sinai underwent an intellectual epiphany, realizing that the force who took them out of Egypt was the one and only God and Creator of the universe. After that, they could not take it further and needed Moshe’s prophecy to transmit the rest of the Torah.

The Gemara in Makkos (ibid.) uses an interesting phrase to refer to the way the Jews heard the first two mitzvos directly from God: Mipiy Ha-Gevurah—which roughly translates as “from the mouth of the Almighty.” Perhaps this particular phrase hints at Rambam’s point. The Jews saw the wonders of creation, God’s unlimited power, and intuited the imperative of belief and rejecting idolatry.

Horiyos 9 Status: Default or Owned?

Our Gemara discusses the unique sin offerings brought by a King and a Cohen Godol. The King brings a male goat and the Cohen Godol brings a bull. These sacrifices are unlike that of a private citizen, who brings a female lamb or goat.

The Gemara also discusses what happens when the Cohen Godol and the King commit a sin subsequent to their reign or appointment. The Cohen Godol still must bring his unique offering and not that of a private citizen, while the King brings a sin offering of a private citizen.

The implication of this is that the transformation that the Cohen Godol undergoes is more fundamental. His spiritual status is elevated, and even when no longer actively serving, he remains on that higher level. The King, however, has a mandate and position that is based on office and function. When he functions as head of state, in that state, he incurs different liabilities and must bring a different sacrifice. Once he vacates the office, he is back to his old self.

We can understand this in a deeper way as follows: Since the Cohen Godol occupies a spiritual position, his service in the Temple is only an outward manifestation of a continuing lifestyle. He still serves God on a higher level after he no longer serves in the Temple. In comparison, the King has not undergone an internal transformation. His status is based on his duties and office. In other words, the Cohen Godol’s status comes from what he IS, while the King’s status is based on what he DOES.

Every person who has leadership status—a governor, a parent, a teacher, or an employer—must consider that even the highest official, the King, is only who he is by virtue of what he does. Otherwise he’s not so special. While he is to be respected, it is not for his intrinsic worth, but because of his current responsibilities. On the other hand, a person who undergoes a spiritual elevation and change in status has become someone different. Even when on the outside he may have lost certain functions or status, on the inside he remains on that higher level.

Horiyos 10 Telescopes and Projections

Our Gemara on Amud Aleph recounts a story where Rabban Gamliel, who frequently journeyed on the sea, was informed by Rabbi Yehoshua about “a star that rises once in seventy years and misleads sailors.”

It is fascinating to note that the Rabbis apparently knew about Halley’s Comet. While this is indeed impressive, it is possible that the Babylonians also knew about Halley’s Comet, as they were sophisticated astronomers. Keep in mind, if an astral phenomenon happens once in 70 years, to notice it and its significance probably takes generations of meticulous record-keeping. Regardless of whether the Rabbis observed this phenomenon themselves by their own study and star charts or respected the scientific study and discipline of the Babylonians, it is impressive.

On the topic of science, astronomy, and Rabban Gamliel, there is another interesting story found in Eiruvin 43b:

Rabban Gamliel had a special tube through which he would look and see a distance of two thousand cubits on land, and also determine a corresponding distance of two thousand cubits at sea.

At first glance, this sounds like he had a telescope. However, that would be unlikely, because it is pretty clear that they did not possess that technology. More likely, it was some type of sextant used by sailors for orientation. The Mishna Keilim (30:1) refers to an object called an Ispaklaria (you can see the Greek roots in English words such as spectator or spectacle). Tosafos Yom Tov suggests that it is a telescope, based on his reading of Rambam’s commentary on the Mishna. However, Rambam could be understood more simply as some type of transparent or translucent lens that distorted the image somewhat but one could still see something reflected. Regardless, most commentaries interpret Ispaklaria as a mirror. Yachin (ibid.) has sharp words for anybody who believes this was a telescope. He dismisses it as ludicrous and goes through a history of various optical devices, when they were invented, and who invented them, stating that neither the Gemara nor even the Rambam ever saw a telescope.

This is a story about being careful not to project our current scientific knowledge onto past science without careful analysis, while on the other hand also being open and impressed at the degree of scientific knowledge our sages possessed.