Could Bibi Be Right?

Consider this narrative: Bibi Netanyahu is a dangerous, unprincipled, unscrupulous, corrupt, divisive, mendacious and wholly untrustworthy leader. As prime minister, he was the chief architect of Israel’s longstanding policy of coddling and encouraging the funding of Hamas and bears ultimate responsibility for the appalling political, governmental, military and intelligence failures that led to and followed Hamas’ genocidal slaughter of October 7. His refusal to do the honorable and customary thing in Israel – admit and accept blame and resign – is shameful, scandalous.

What’s more, Bibi’s management of the war with Hamas and his obstructive handling of the hostage negotiations are not motivated by Israel’s national interests, but by his selfish personal and political ones: preserving his extremist-dominated coalition, remaining in office, obstructing the criminal charges against him, and saving what little is left of his stained and tattered reputation. He is poisoning Israel’s indispensable relationship with the U.S., alienating growing numbers of Jews everywhere, especially younger ones, and turning Israel into an international pariah. He’s got to go. Now.

This damning portrayal is widely held in Israel and beyond, with good reason. Nonetheless, I wonder. Even if it’s accurate, does that prove Bibi is wrong in his prosecution of the war and the hostage negotiations? Can’t even a profoundly flawed leader sometimes be right? Is his stubborn insistence that Israel retain control of Gaza’s Philadelpi Corridor an unambiguous effort to torpedo a deal’s prospects, as many claim? Does it reflect callous indifference to the fate and unimaginable suffering of the hostages and their loved ones? Or might he be right that failure to hold the Corridor would allow Hamas to rearm, return to power in Gaza, and attack Israel once again, causing injury and death to civilians and soldiers alike? lsraeli military and intelligence chiefs reportedly believe that Israel could withdraw safely from the border between Egypt and Gaza, at least temporarily, in order to secure a hostage deal, and they contend the IDF could always seize it again if need be. That may be true. After all, all previous Israeli withdrawals from Gaza since 1967 have ultimately led to a resurgence of cross-border terrorism with ever more lethal weapons, compelling Israel’s return. But is that a viable strategy or a recurring nightmare?

These leaders must be taken seriously, but they, too, share responsibility for the colossal failures of Oct. 7. Our every compassionate impulse urges us to accept their advice, given our urgent longing to redeem the captives, a foremost Jewish value, and giving up on the hostages is unthinkable. But are their opinions self-evidently correct? And if we follow them and withdraw, what happens then? Bibi argues that compromising on Philadelphi would allow Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’ fanatical leader, to escape to Iran, taking with him the living hostages who are his human shields. Recent, but as yet unsubstantiated news articles, allegedly based on captured Hamas documents, report he intends to do exactly that, something that continued Israeli control would be far likelier to prevent.

October 7 caused inestimable grief and trauma and, ever since, Israel has faced exclusively bad choices, each posing unpredictable, potentially disastrous and heartbreaking consequences. “Black Shabbat” undermined Israel’s deterrence against its adversaries and shook, if not shattered, the foundational belief that Israel can and will always keep it citizens safe, a promise intrinsic to the Jewish State’s raison d’etre. Is it not possible that Hamas is playing the negotiations for time while it engages in psychological warfare and conducts its demonic, perverse, and increasingly successful PR campaign to turn world opinion against Israel? That, in fact, it doesn’t want a deal, at least one that Israel could make without taking unacceptable, perhaps existential risks to its future? So much is uncertain and impossibly complicated.

And what of Bibi? Whatever else he may be, could he be right in his approach to the war and the protracted negotiations that have followed? I don’t claim he is, but I’m not certain he’s wrong. Whatever the answer, it is a pivotal question.