Debating the redemption of Israeli hostages

Israel is in an all-out war against the genocidal actions of Hamas. Hamas’s foundational covenant asserts that its goal is to eliminate the State of Israel and all its inhabitants. On October 7, 3,000 Hamas demonstrated its vile methods, penetrating Israel’s border communities and killing everyone they encountered. They also issued promises to repeat the atrocities its terrorists committed again and again.

Israel has a moral obligation to respond in a war of self-defense. Israel is obliged to defeat Hamas and to dislodge this Nazi-like organization from governance of the Gaza Strip.

Israel’s task has been compromised by Hamas’s taking of 250 hostages. Nearly four months into the war, an estimated 100 hostages remain alive in captivity. Their families are demanding that the Israeli government do “whatever it takes” to free their relatives. Arguments abound in favor of and against making concessions to Hamas in order to ransom the captives.

Rabbinic literature is familiar with this painful challenge. The sages consider pidyon shvuyim, redemption of captives, as a positive “great” mitzvah. As noted by Rabbi Shlomo Brody, doing such a mitzvah “is superior even to charity, because it liberates a person from the emotional [and sometimes physical] pain of captivity.” With all its anguish and uncertainty, captivity is seen as being at times even worse than death.

The Rambam warned that ignoring the opportunity to ransom captives violates such biblical precepts as “You shall not harden your heart,” “You shall not stand idly by the blood of your brother,” and “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” People who delay pidyon shvuyim are placed in the category of “murderers.”

Pidyon shvuyim would appear to be obligatory “at all costs.” Yet the sages also took note of exceptions in deference to “tikkun olam” (the wellbeing of society at large). Ransoming captives “for more than their value” might place a severe financial and/or security burden upon the community. In the journal “Sources,” Mikhael Manekin observes that rabbinic discussions attempt “to balance between the values of solidarity and security. ‘Solidarity’ refers to caring for those who are held in captivity. ‘Security’ expresses the fear that exchanging hostages for [terrorist] prisoners will ultimately endanger the entire community,” by incentivizing future hostage taking.

Rationales for tikkun olam require elaboration within a contemporary context. Regrettably, the dilemma of pidyon shvuyim has occurred again and again for the State of Israel. The following on-line post by the Jewish Virtual Library lists examples from the past half-century (it refers to Previous Events; Released to Israel; Released by Israel):

Six-Day War: 11 soldiers, 4 bodies; 6,000 Egyptian/Syrian soldiers

War of Attrition: 3 soldiers; 46 Syrian soldiers

Yom Kippur War: 242 soldiers; 8,400 Egyptian soldiers

April 1975: 39 soldiers’ bodies; 92 Egyptian security prisoners

March 1979: 1 soldier; 76 Lebanese terrorists

November 1983: 6 soldiers; 45 soldiers, 99 security prisoners

June 1984: 3 soldiers, 3 civilians, 5 bodies; 291 soldiers, 13 civilians

May 1985: 3 soldiers; 1,150 Palestinian prisoners

September 1991: 1 soldier’s body; 2 Palestinian terrorists

Of particular note was the 2011 exchange of captive Gilad Shalit for more than 1,000 Palestinian security prisoners. Among those prisoners released was Yahya Sinwar, the mastermind of October 7. Anguish with regard to the Shalit case is reflected in the debate among rabbinic authorities. Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren, for example, cautioned against accepting the terms of this agreement. He pointed to the Mishnah’s objection to “paying” more than the “value” of the hostage[s]. Rav Goren warned that the safety of one or a few Jews held in captivity must not take precedence over the safety of the entire public at large.

Former Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv Rabbi Hayyim David Halevi insisted this concern did not apply, Terrorists will continue to kidnap Jews irrespective of what the government of Israel does; therefore, paying ransom to the terrorists will not increase the threat to the public’s safety.

Debates ensued in the press, on the radio and television, in public gatherings, and in the Knesset. Those supporting the “deal” demanded that the government “do whatever it takes” to redeem Israeli soldiers or civilians. They emphasized the moral “contract” between the medinah and the protection of its citizens, both soldiers and civilians. Advocates also noted that the Red Cross had been unable to confirm the medical condition of Shalit. He might well have been in a dire physical condition. They also insisted that the highest “value” security prisoners — those who had been guilty of mass murder — were not to be released.

Journalist Jonathan Tobin said in the weeks after October 7: “Shalit was seen as representative of every Israeli family’s child sent off to do their mandatory army service…. Families…expect that those in charge [of the soldiers] will protect them and never leave them at the mercy of…cruel terrorist foes. It was in this way that his grief-stricken parents were able to generate widespread support for their cause…. Pressure…from his family and their many sympathizers ratcheted up to insist on paying virtually any price for his freedom.”

Persuasive arguments also were circulated against the exchange. Some feared that Israel would lose its deterrence power against future hostage-taking. Furthermore, the fear was that freeing security prisoners would elevate the prestige of Hamas in the eyes of the Palestinian public. The liberation of convicted murderers would be perceived as a betrayal: both by the families of the Israelis they had killed, and by relatives of soldiers who had died in pursuit of them. Terrorists would be emboldened with the confidence of future freedom even after being apprehended. Plus, those who were freed might well return to terrorism — as did Sinwar.

The current stalemate with Hamas has even more emotional weightiness. It includes an unprecedented number of Israeli hostages, both soldiers and civilians. Individuals of all ages were taken captive: infants, children, teenagers, young adults, and adult men and women. The barbarity of Hamas’s October 7 pogrom, the sexual abuse, the withholding of medical treatment, the obstruction of Red Cross visits, the production of Hamas’s propaganda videos all have intensified Israelis’ anxiety.

Finally, hostage-taking during “all-out” war is complex. This war is a battle for Israel’s existence and secure future. In exchange for Israeli hostages, Hamas is demanding that the IDF end all military action in Gaza and leave Hamas in power. Huge amounts of humanitarian aid are being demanded — and it is highly likely that Hamas would siphon off what is needed for their own needs, thereby hastening recovery from the damage inflicted by the IDF.

If such a deal were struck, Hamas also would gain propaganda advantages. They would be able to proclaim victory. Such a deal could insist that all Palestinian security prisoners be released, including prominent convicted mass murderers like Marwan Barghouti. The release of thousands of terrorists would make Hamas into heroes in the Palestinian “street.” Enhanced popularity would bring Hamas to lay claim to leadership of the Palestinian national movement (Gaza and West Bank, Hamas and Fatah), in time for the 88-year-old Mahmoud Abbas to step aside. With the Biden administration insistent upon creating a pathway to an independent Palestinian state, Hamas’s electability makes the stakes higher than ever.