Does Europe want to go to war?
European Union: Towards a State of War?
After Donald Trump’s remarks on Europe and even earlier after J.D. Vance’s speech in the security conference in Münich: The question now haunts public debate: do our leaders truly believe war is coming, or are we witnessing political maneuvers born of a lack of real means? Between alarmist rhetoric, talk of a “state of emergency,” rumors surrounding Article 16 in France, and a growing number of pre-war signals, the continental climate is becoming increasingly electrified.
At a moment when the so-called “coalition of the willing” (France, Germany, the United Kingdom) is stepping up meetings with the Ukrainian president; when the French chief of staff speaks of “sacrificing our children”; when survival kits are being distributed; and when the French president refers to a “wartime situation,” the European Commission has suddenly adopted the same register. Mouthpiece or unwitting relay? The movement appears above all to be aligning itself with the coalition’s line: the continuation of the war as the only possible path.
1. Bypassing the European framework to “save Ukraine”
As Ukraine flirts with bankruptcy, Ursula von der Leyen is working to mobilize Russian central bank assets frozen in Belgium—an initiative that is explosive from a legal, diplomatic, and political standpoint.
1.1 The “state of emergency” as a legal key
The Commission is exploring an unexpected idea: invoking a European state of emergency—despite the fact that such a status exists only… for Ukraine. The EU itself is not facing any financial crisis that would justify a suspension of rules, as the ECB has pointed out. But the objective is clear: to open the door to exceptional mechanisms that are normally out of reach.
1.2 Turning Ukraine into an existential issue
The second move is to frame Ukraine’s survival as vital to the EU. Kyiv is not a member of the Union, Brussels is not at war with Moscow, yet the narrative installs the idea that Europe’s future depends directly on Ukraine’s military effort. This rhetoric prepares public opinion to accept decisions that break with traditional European legal norms.
1.3 Locking in sanctions
The third step is to make sanctions against Russia permanent. They would no longer require renewal every six months, stripping Hungary—and others—of their ability to block their extension.
1.4 Forcing Euroclear to transfer Russian funds
The Commission wants to create a legal basis compelling Euroclear and other institutions to transfer the proceeds from frozen assets into funds earmarked for Ukraine. This obligation would apply to all member states, even the most reluctant.
1.5 Qualified majority voting: the end of the veto
Brussels is considering using Article 122 of the Treaty—designed for internal crises—to adopt these measures by qualified majority. Many see this as a circumvention that undermines Europe’s institutional balance.
2. The EU commits to an explicit strategy of “weakening” Russia
A report from the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) confirms that the goal is no longer merely to support Ukraine, but to structurally weaken Russia across multiple geopolitical theaters. Since 2022, 19 sanctions packages have already been adopted.
2.1 Exploiting Russia’s dependence on China
The report highlights Moscow’s growing reliance on Beijing. According to this analysis, the EU could exploit Sino-Russian tensions to limit Kremlin influence, assuming China remains responsive to Western pressure.
2.2 Mediterranean, Africa, Balkans: the new fronts
The EU seeks to strengthen its presence in the Mediterranean, where Russia has lost ground since the collapse of the Assad regime, and in sub-Saharan Africa, where Moscow advances through military companies. Information and influence campaigns are mentioned to counter the Russian narrative. In the Balkans, the objective is to prevent Moscow from slowing NATO expansion.
2.3 Divergences with the U.S. 28-point plan
While Washington negotiates a ceasefire with Russia, the EU—particularly Berlin, Paris, and London—is attempting to amend this plan. Two points generate tension:
- Use of frozen Russian assets: Washington intends them for reconstruction; the EU wants to finance weapons.
- Size of the Ukrainian army: the United States favors a smaller force; the EU wants to keep it large to sustain its defense industry.
Behind aid to Ukraine looms the defense of European strategic and industrial interests. A failure of negotiations would prolong the conflict—and the coalition of the willing appears to be preparing for exactly that.
3. Germany: normalizing a state of pre-war
The German debate over declaring a “state of tension”—one notch below a formal “state of defense”—has taken on a dramatic tone. Article 80a of the Basic Law would allow the activation of a wide array of national mobilization measures.
3.1 An opinion shaped since 2024
Figures such as Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU) openly call for declaring a state of tension. Public broadcasters now relay the idea that Russian hybrid warfare justifies a transformation of the legal framework. Public opinion is being acclimated to the notion of a Germany “between peace and war.” In France, already politically and economically fragile, the idea of a direct conflict with Russia meets clear resistance.
3.2 Powers triggered by the state of tension
If activated, this status would entail:
- the immediate return of conscription for all men aged 18 and over;
- domestic deployment of the Bundeswehr to protect infrastructure;
- requisition laws (civilian personnel, equipment, vehicles, private buildings);
mandatory mobilization of strategic sectors. - This would mark a major shift: the military would fully enter the management of civilian society.
3.3 A society already integrated into wartime logic
The Bundeswehr has drawn up coordinated plans with Berlin hospitals, including a controversial protocol: reverse triage, giving medical priority to lightly wounded soldiers over severely injured civilians. In the event of mass influxes, there is even discussion of allowing “non-recoverable” patients to die — a clear sign of militarized medicine.
In France, preparations are underway for a voluntary military service targeting 3,000 young people in the first year and 50,000 by 2035 — figures that look derisory compared to losses on current battlefields.
4. A European economy drifting toward a war model
The German Hospital Federation has published a study listing the investments required to make medical infrastructure fit for a major conflict:
- backup generators,
- water reserves,
- decontamination equipment,
- satellite communications,
- underground facilities,
- alternative emergency care units.
Total cost: €15 billion, drawn from the special rearmament fund.
The contrast is striking: while civilian hospitals lack resources, “war budgets” suddenly become plentiful. France has not yet embarked on this path. Its colossal debt first requires economic and political stabilization. A war economy would mask its difficulties rather than resolve them.
Conclusion: Europe entering a permanent state of exception?
Between:
- the circumvention of European law to use Russian funds,
- the explicit strategy of weakening Russia,
- attempts to reshape a peace plan to serve the defense industry,
- the normalization of a pre-war state in Germany,
- Europe is drifting toward a political architecture built on exception.
The rhetoric of perpetual crisis justifies measures once considered unthinkable. The central question remains: Is the EU merely preparing for an unstable period, or is it shifting into a model where security overrides law and diffuse militarization becomes the norm? In France, the possible invocation of Article 16 adds another layer of concern: the temptation for exception to become the rule.
Thus moves our continent, advancing step by step toward an era in which peace is no longer the natural state, but a fragile interlude