Don’t Blame AIPAC for Democrats’ Israel Problem
Eric Alterman’s op-ed, “AIPAC Has Failed,” relies on a selective reading of history to reach a conclusion that his evidence doesn’t support. His piece, which appeared in the New York Times on October 5, at best reflects a misunderstanding of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s (AIPAC) mission. At worst, he contributes to a growing effort to turn support for Israel into a political liability.
Alterman’s selective account begins with AIPAC’s founding and extends to some of the most consequential events in Israel’s history.
Alterman writes that AIPAC was founded in response to the 1953 Israeli raid on Qibya, which killed approximately 69 Arab civilians. But the organization’s roots predate that incident, tracing back to efforts to secure U.S. funding for Israel following its 1948 war of independence. Moreover, although Alterman describes the Qibya raid as a massacre, historian Benny Morris has questioned whether the available evidence establishes that Israeli forces deliberately targeted civilians.
Alterman’s treatment of the 1948 war is similarly selective. Alterman writes that Israel “expelled” roughly 750,000 Palestinians during its 1947-1948 war of independence. That description conflates several causes of displacement. Benny Morris’s research distinguishes between Arabs directly expelled by Israeli forces and those who fled combat, feared advancing Israeli troops or abandoned their homes amid the collapse of the Arab society. To characterize the entire refugee population as having been expelled obscures those distinctions. A more accurate statement would be that 750,000 Arabs were displaced because of the war started by the Arab nations when they refused to accept the U.N. partition.
Alterman’s interpretation of history becomes more consequential when he turns to AIPAC’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. He claims that AIPAC “grudgingly” supported the Oslo peace process under Yitzhak Rabin and covertly tried to undermine it by lobbying President Clinton to move the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. But AIPAC fully endorsed the Oslo Accords, and the effort to move the embassy began in 1988 and was formalized by congressional resolutions in 1990, under the George H.W. Bush administration. President Trump moved the embassy during his first term, and Biden supported leaving it in Jerusalem. Rabin also supported the move. Oslo failed principally because of Arafat’s refusal to make peace, but whatever responsibility he bears, Alterman offers no convincing evidence that AIPAC played a role.
Alterman sees AIPAC’s conduct during Oslo as part of a broader ideological shift. He argues that the organization began to “march rightward” in 1995, embracing the support of Christian Zionists. It is true that some Christian Zionists expressed their support for Israel through involvement with AIPAC, but there is nothing inappropriate or nefarious about that. The Israeli government moved rightward over the last couple of decades, but that was not because of AIPAC. AIPAC has consistently defined its mission in bipartisan terms, supporting politicians from both parties who favored a strong U.S.-Israel relationship. Individual endorsements may be controversial, but they do not, by themselves, establish that the organization has abandoned its bipartisan mission. Until the last several years, it has had strong support from Democrats and Republicans.
Alterman identifies 2015 as the year when AIPAC’s supposed rightward drift became a rupture with Democrats. The evidence tells a more complicated story. In 2015, AIPAC lobbied against Obama’s Iran nuclear deal (the “JCPOA”), and Prime Minister Netanyahu came to speak to Congress at the invitation of the Republican leadership. Reasonable people can disagree about whether it was wise for Netanyahu to speak to Congress, but it is not accurate to claim this was the cause of Democrats’ abandonment of Israel. Much of the resentment among Democrats, which included the boycott of Netanyahu’s speech by approximately 60 members of the party, was directed at Speaker Boehner and the Republicans, not AIPAC.
If the 2015 controversy marked a decisive rupture between AIPAC and Democrats, the subsequent record hardly supports that conclusion. Hillary Clinton spoke at the AIPAC convention in 2016, Pelosi and Schumer spoke at its conference in 2017, at least 19 Democrats spoke at the 2018 conference, and AIPAC endorsed 59 Democrats in 2022, including 27 who supported the Iran deal.
More fundamentally, Alterman confuses AIPAC’s declining popularity with the failure of its mission. AIPAC exists to strengthen the U.S.-Israel relationship, not to win popularity contests among progressive activists. Its effectiveness should be judged by its ability to sustain congressional support for Israel, preserve security cooperation and maintain bipartisan relationships. By those measures, its record is considerably better than Alterman acknowledges. Losing the support of some Democrats does not, by itself, establish that AIPAC has failed.
Why Democrats abandoned AIPAC
The more important question is why AIPAC has become increasingly unpopular among Democrats despite decades of bipartisan support. Alterman blames AIPAC’s political tactics. But changes within the Democratic Party offer an alternative explanation.
He blames AIPAC because it identified with “both the methods and the goals of the Republican Party” over the last decade. He cites ads produced by AIPAC that accused “radicals in the Democratic Party” of “pushing their antisemitic and anti-Israel policies down the throats of the American people.”
But Democrats did not abandon AIPAC because of the ads it produced or because of its supposed alignment with the Republican Party. The attack ads Alterman condemns have been used generously by both parties. AIPAC’s support for Republican candidates does not establish that it has abandoned its bipartisan mission. The organization has continued to support Democrats who favor a strong U.S.-Israel relationship, even when they disagree with AIPAC on other issues. In recent years, however, support for Israel has been stronger among Republicans than Democrats.
While Alterman focuses on AIPAC’s political tactics, he largely overlooks the growing influence of Democrats whose opposition to Israel extends well beyond disagreements over lobbying. The abandonment of AIPAC accelerated around 2018 with the election of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Ilhan Omar (D-MN) and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), and other members of the so-called “squad.” They were aligned with Bernie Sanders, and they embraced explicitly anti-Israel policies with rhetoric that was, at times, antisemitic.
After October 7 and Israel’s response in Gaza, Democratic support for Israel collapsed and AIPAC became the scapegoat. In October 2023, Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) called AIPAC “an extremist organization that destabilizes US democracy.” In April 2025, Sanders said that “If you’re a Democrat, you have to worry about the billionaires who fund AIPAC.” In September 2025, Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) said some Democrats were reluctant to criticize Israel and “I think AIPAC is a big part of that.” In 2026, Brad Schneider (D-IL) said, “I think the folks who are talking the most about AIPAC are seeking to demonize Israel.” In April 2026, Ro Khanna (D-CA) said, “anyone who wants to lead the party must condemn and reject AIPAC money.”
The Pew Research Center reported in April 2026 that 80% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents held an unfavorable view of Israel, up from 53% in 2022.
The shift in public opinion has been accompanied by a reluctance among Democratic leaders to confront attacks on AIPAC from within their own party. Neither of the leaders of the Democratic Party, Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY), have mounted a sustained, public defense of AIPAC against attacks from fellow Democrats. Nor have they actively defended Israel against the false claims of genocide, ethnic cleansing and apartheid that have been increasingly made by Democrats.
Instead of acknowledging and critically analyzing the scapegoating of AIPAC, Alterman advances this misguided rhetoric. Nowhere in his op-ed does Alterman present evidence that AIPAC has done anything other than advance the U.S.-Israel relationship. He presents no evidence that AIPAC is different from other lobbying organizations that support politicians from both parties.
When AIPAC became a political liability
The consequences of this growing hostility are no longer confined to rhetoric. Democratic politicians who once welcomed AIPAC’s support increasingly regard association with the organization as a political liability. Those rejecting AIPAC support include Seth Moulton (D-MA), Ruben Gallego (D-AZ), J.B. Pritzker (D-IL) and Gavin Newsom (D-CA). Their reasons vary and include objections to Israel’s actions in Gaza, AIPAC’s perceived alignment with Netanyahu and, by extension, Trump, and broader concerns about accepting certain donations.
Alterman attributes this to a perception that AIPAC is inflexible, adheres to an “Israel right or wrong” mindset, and supports Israeli policies on “race, immigration, economics – and, in these days, democracy” that are “anathema to most American Jews.” But this is based on a false premise. AIPAC does not endorse Israel’s domestic policies on race, immigration or economics. AIPAC’s reluctance to criticize Israel does not establish an “Israel right or wrong” philosophy. AIPAC is an advocacy organization with a defined mission. Its purpose is to strengthen American support for Israel, not to serve as an independent evaluator of Israeli government policies.
AIPAC appears to have recognized the political difficulties. On October 21, it announced it would end candidate endorsements and direct PAC contributions beginning with the 2028 election cycle, while retaining its super PAC.
Alterman declared that “The age of AIPAC’s unmatched political power and influence is at an end.” But that assertion does not square with its electoral record. In the 2026 election cycle thus far, AIPAC helped 290 pro-Israel candidates win elections while defeating 29 candidates it considered hostile to the U.S.-Israel relationship. Alterman mistakes growing hostility toward AIPAC among progressive Democrats for evidence that the organization can no longer fulfill its mission.
By treating AIPAC’s commitment to Israel as evidence of ideological rigidity, Alterman overlooks a more consequential question: Why has support for Israel itself become increasingly controversial within the Democratic Party? Alterman fails in his attempt to blame AIPAC, and makes no attempt to assess other explanations, such as bias in the media and academia, the growth of progressive activism or the perceived need to appeal to younger and more liberal demographic cohorts.
Alterman concludes by suggesting that AIPAC redirect its efforts toward combating anti-Israel voices on the right, such as Tucker Carlson. But AIPAC is not a public relations organization or a watchdog for antisemitism. Its mission is to strengthen the relationship between the United States and Israel, regardless of which party controls Congress or the White House. Alterman would have readers believe that AIPAC has failed because it abandoned Democrats. The more troubling possibility is that a growing faction of Democrats has abandoned the bipartisan commitment to Israel that AIPAC was created to defend.
