Egypt holds the key ‘To the day after’

Since almost the beginning of the Israel Hamas war one question has been consistently raised. What will the day after look like for the Palestinians of Gaza?  As the war in Gaza seems to be in its final weeks/months, this question looms even larger. There have been many creative ideas with regard to this question including emigration to countries like the Sudan, Somaliland, and Somalia. However the most realistic logical solution is in plain sight. Egypt must be at the heart of a sustainable solution. Cairo has flatly rejected this idea as an option and given a variety of reasons for their decision, but these rejections must not stand.  The Egyptians has the capacity to house them, they have a responsibility to their fellow Arabs, and a level of culpability for the OCT 7^th massacre.

Egypt’s stance is that the Palestinian people must stay on their land, and solutions must be found within Gaza itself. Their rejection combines their claims of security fears about Sinai, economic/demographic strain, and political opposition to undermining Palestinian sovereignty. One could argue that Egypt’s true intransience is rooted in their own desire to fight against Israel and they see the Palestinian question as a way to weaken Israel both in terms of her security as well as her international standing. Sadly the Palestinian civilians are the biggest losers in this equation. If they authentically cared about the lives of the Palestinian people they would make every accommodation to ensure their physical safety. Instead they condemn those who want to escape the war to remain in Gaza.

The United States can create conditions to neutralize Cairo’s purported concerns and apply significant pressure on Cairo to make this a reality. Al-Sisi’s ability to stabilize Egypt has in no small part been kinetically supported by Israel’s military and intelligence services in recent years. The kinetic military support by Israel coupled with the economic and military hardware support of the United States cannot be overstated and the leverage that that creates can cause Cairo to act in accordance with said objectives.

From an economic standpoint Egypt’s reliance on the US should not be underestimated. In Fiscal Year 2023 alone, the US pledged about $1.54 billion in aid to Egypt — of which approximately 80 percent (around $1.24 billion) was military financing. Only 19.6 percent (~$300 million) was economic assistance. In total since 1946, Washington has provided Egypt with nearly $90 billion in bilateral assistance—military and economic combined. These numbers are not abstract — they represent a tangible anchor of Egypt’s military preparedness without which Egypt’s very survival is dependent. Cairo needs to understand that failing to take responsibility could cost them their own country. A cost/ benefit analysis should be forced upon them.

The international community — led by the US, Israel and aligned Arab partners — can craft a nuanced pressure campaign in the following ways:

1. Egypt’s legacy role as the “first peace partner” of Israel has long granted it prestige and leverage. But if Cairo refuses to engage constructively on Gaza, the center of Arab-Israeli diplomacy will continue shifting toward the Saudi–UAE axis. The Abraham Accords already showcase this pivot. If Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Jerusalem consolidate their alignment, Egypt risks being sidelined — politically and economically — in the very sphere where it stills hold primacy. This prospect of irrelevance, more than withheld aid, could be a decisive motivator.
2. Willingness to Redirect or hold back funds: Congress and the administration have precedent — $95 million of Egypt’s Foreign Monetary Fund was once redirected to Lebanon over human rights objections.
3. Alignment with Gulf donors or international institutions to offer temporary sanctuary or development packages could cushion the domestic burden of hosting Gaza’s displaced in Egypt.
4. Parallel American support for Sinai security operations remains vital — not as a blank check, but as reassurance that Egypt need not destabilize itself while being responsive.

If approached quietly and without pressure from the “Arab street”, Egypt can make concessions. This approach, taking into account optics, can accomplish this most logical outcome. The answer lies just a few feet away from Gaza, not hundreds of miles away in a foreign land.

Egypt’s current stance — to remain aloof from any post-crisis Gaza integration — ought not be the end of the conversation. Through precision diplomacy, calibrated incentives, and the looming risk of diplomatic marginalization, the US and its allies can make clear that flexibility is in Egypt’s best interest— economically, securely, and diplomatically.

If executed sensitively and with international support, such pressure can align Egyptian interests with regional peace, offering Gaza a pathway to recovery without destabilizing Cairo and without upsetting the wider Middle East equilibrium.