Ben Gvir is fighting against Arab citizens instead of fighting crime

The year 2025 closed as the deadliest year ever recorded for Arab citizens of Israel in the context of violence and crime. Two hundred and fifty-five Arab men and women were killed — another grim increase after years of steady deterioration. These figures are not merely disturbing; they reflect a deep and ongoing failure of governance.

The persistent framing of violence in Arab society as a “sectoral issue” is misleading and dangerous. Organized crime does not remain confined to one community. Where the state loses control, criminal organizations expand into local politics, public tenders, and economic life. History is clear: when the state retreats, everyone eventually pays the price.

For Arab citizens of Israel, violence and crime have become the most urgent issue of daily life. Almost every family has been affected. Young people are being killed at unprecedented rates: more than 70 percent of the victims are between the ages of 18 and 40, many of them under 30. This is not simply a criminal phenomenon; it is a sustained erosion of personal security, trust in institutions, and the possibility of normal life.

This reality is the result of political choices. The current government—and above all the Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben Gvir—has failed catastrophically. Rather than confronting organized crime through serious, coordinated state action, Ben Gvir has turned violence into a political instrument. He does not treat crime as a threat to citizens’ lives, but as an opportunity to advance a broader political agenda directed at Arab society itself.

Instead of isolating criminal organizations, Ben Gvir consistently blurs the line between criminals and the Arab public as a whole. His rhetoric and policies frame Arab citizens not as people entitled to protection, but as a collective security problem. This is not an abstract claim; it is reflected in concrete policy choices.

Under Ben Gvir’s leadership, policing priorities have increasingly focused on measures that target Arab civilians rather than criminal networks. One prominent example is his emphasis on house demolitions in Arab towns — despite the fact that the state itself has failed for decades to approve zoning plans that would allow legal construction. Enforcing demolitions under these conditions is not law enforcement in any meaningful sense; it is the criminalization of daily life.

Similarly, Ben Gvir has pushed aggressive policing of political expression, including demonstrations in Arab towns against the war. Protest — protected speech in any democracy — has been treated as a security threat, further reinforcing the message that Arab citizens are viewed first and foremost through a lens of suspicion, not citizenship.

Perhaps most alarming is his recent instruction to impose what he termed a “siege” on Bedouin towns in the Negev, a form of collective punishment that restricts movement and access to essential services for entire communities. The stated justification is that some individuals from these towns are involved in property-related crimes in nearby Jewish localities. This rationale collapses any distinction between individual criminal responsibility and collective punishment.

Such measures do nothing to disrupt organized crime. They do, however, deepen alienation, erode trust, and undermine precisely the cooperation between communities and law enforcement that is essential for effective policing. It is difficult to imagine such an approach being proposed, let alone accepted, if applied to a Jewish community anywhere in Israel.

At the same time, real tools for addressing crime have been neglected or dismantled. Under the previous government, Israel began to see measurable progress: increased inter-ministerial coordination, dedicated budgets for prevention and enforcement, improved cooperation with Arab local authorities, and a more serious attempt to address the structural conditions that allow criminal organizations to thrive. These efforts were far from perfect, but they demonstrated that a different approach was possible — and that it could yield results.

Much of that progress has since been frozen, reversed, or hollowed out. Budgets have been reclaimed or redirected, long-term programs have been cut, and professional coordination has been replaced with headline-driven initiatives. Crime-solving rates remain low, illegal weapons continue to circulate freely, and criminal organizations operate with growing confidence. Ben Gvir has not merely failed to reduce violence; he has actively undermined the state’s capacity to confront it.

The danger extends well beyond Arab towns and cities. Organized crime is becoming more entrenched and more powerful. Without decisive intervention, it will continue to expand into Jewish communities as well. This is not alarmism; it is a pattern repeatedly observed when governments choose political theater over effective governance.

Any future government will be judged by whether it treats violence in Arab society as a national challenge rather than a marginal one. Leadership must come directly from the Prime Minister’s Office, with clear responsibility and measurable outcomes. The police must be strengthened through investment in manpower, investigative capacity, and intelligence, not weaponized against civilians or bypassed through symbolic alternatives. Continuity of long-term programs and genuine partnership with Arab local and national leadership are not optional; they are prerequisites for success.

The violence facing Arab citizens is a real and worsening tragedy. When a government exploits it for political gain instead of confronting it seriously, it bears direct responsibility for the consequences.