From a State in the Making to an Established State
From a State in the Making to an Established State: Does Israel Still Need Zionism?
Zionism is one of the most deeply rooted concepts in the Israeli narrative. Precisely because of its central position, however, its meaning and function should now be reconsidered. For more than a century, it provided the ideological framework that legitimized the establishment of the State of Israel, justified its existence, and helped shape its identity. Yet no historical concept is immune to the test of time. The question that must now be asked is therefore no longer whether Zionism has succeeded, but whether it remains necessary within the reality it itself helped create.
For a long time, it appeared that the state would replace the communities of the Diaspora and that the new nation would become the ultimate framework of identity. Israel, however, ceased long ago to be a national project in the process of construction. And yet one contradiction persists: the sense of exile has not disappeared.
A Jew who wishes to settle in Israel is today required to undertake neither a pioneering act nor a commitment to an ideological project. He or she can become a citizen by virtue of belonging to the “Jewish people.” By contrast, a person who is not Jewish and wishes to make Israel their new homeland encounters restrictions that derive precisely from the national definition of the state. This contradiction raises a fundamental question: is the ideology that made it possible to create a state still the appropriate ideology for governing a state once it has been established?
In many respects, Zionism has surpassed all the expectations of its founders. Israel provided a homeland for a new national collective, transformed an ancient language into a living language, developed a modern culture, and became, in many fields, a model of success. Its historical achievement is precisely the strongest evidence that its original mission has reached its completion.
Yet this achievement has a fundamental limitation. The Zionist project has not resolved the most elementary question of coexistence: the ability of Israel’s Jewish citizens to live in harmony with those who do not belong to the Jewish religion. No worldview is destined to last forever. Ideologies emerge in response to specific historical circumstances. When those circumstances disappear, their function must be reassessed. Israel is no longer a project awaiting realization; it is an established political reality. It therefore no longer requires an ideology whose purpose is to justify its very existence. When reality changes, the concepts that accompanied it must also be subjected to scrutiny.
Wars do not merely transform military and security realities. They also alter the way states understand their own existence and the way they are perceived by the outside world. Since October 7, reflection on national values has acquired a new dimension. On the international stage, Zionism is now frequently interpreted as an expression of a colonial phenomenon. This is not to adopt that interpretation as our own, but to acknowledge a fact: the meaning of historical concepts is never immutable.
A term that was once prestigious, even self-evident, can become the focal point of a global controversy. This is precisely what makes it necessary to reconsider our political categories. A society that refuses to question its historical concepts risks eventually defending symbols that have become problematic rather than the values it genuinely seeks to preserve.
The same problem arises in the debate over a constitution. The demand for a constitution has become one of the most prestigious emblems of the liberal camp. Yet this demand risks displacing the essential question. The issue is not merely whether Israel needs a constitution, but what kind of constitution it would need.
A constitution is not simply a legal mechanism designed to organize the functioning of state institutions. Above all, it is the concentrated formulation of a sufficiently broad consensus regarding the identity of the state. It establishes a hierarchy of collective values and priorities. It is not an administrative operating manual; it expresses a conception of society and a worldview. It defines the relationships between the individual and the state, between religion and secularism, between human rights and national identity, and between the universal and the particular.
A constitution born of political compromises or bargaining among coalitions therefore does not necessarily guarantee stability. On the contrary, it may freeze existing divisions beneath the appearance of consensus. The formula “Jewish and democratic state” provides a particularly revealing example.
In an Israeli society deeply divided between worldviews that are at times almost irreconcilable, it is probably less likely that a constitution would express a coherent national conception than that it would become the product of fragile compromises. The demand for a constitution is therefore not, in itself, a political objective. It points to a much deeper question: What kind of state do we want to live in?
