Visiting Professor Political Science, Tufts University
From Gaza to Teheran
Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, codenamed “Operation Rising Lion,” came to an end after 12 days. The Israeli government set four aims for the operation: 1) Substantially damaging Iran’s nuclear program; 2) Substantially damaging Iran’s missile program; 3) Damaging the Shiite regional axis; 4) Creating the conditions for long-term circumventing of Iran’s nuclear and missile program through diplomatic means. While it will take months, and possibly years, to evaluate the overall success of the operation, at face value it appears that all four goals set out by the government – which noticeably do not include a complete military destruction of the nuclear or missile programs – were substantially advanced. As Israel rides on the waves of its seeming success, it is time to ask – why are the successes against Iran and against Hezbollah not replicated in Gaza?
Israel’s War Doctrine, forged from its War of Independence and the country’s surprising military success in 1956, has always rested on three key principles. First, a vast reliance on intelligence. Israel must not be caught off-guard, and the vast budgets allocated to its different intelligence agencies – the Mossad and the Shin Bet, reflect this emphasis. Second, preemptive strikes. When a war is launched, Israel does not have the territorial or civil depth to withstand the initial hit, and it must be the initiator. And third, keeping military engagements as short as possible, and using them as leverage for diplomatic achievements.
History has shown that the more Israel adheres to its doctrine, the more successful are its military engagements. The monumental success of 1967 stands as a vivid example, where Israel relied on extensive intelligence, took the initiative, and utilized military strength to impose a decisive victory that could be leveraged for diplomacy. Even in those circumstances where some facets of the doctrine failed, like the failure of the intelligence community and the surprise Egyptian-Syrian attack of 1973, the country quickly regrouped and adhered to the third principle of quick decisive action, paving the way for durable ceasefire agreements and a historic peace treaty with Egypt.
Let’s go back to the current war. The escalation with Hezbollah began on October 8th, 2023, with Israel being caught off-guard by barrages of rockets and missiles. Despite this, and amidst evacuation of thousands of civilians, the country contained the daily barrages and responded with limited retaliation until all three doctrine conditions were in place. Then, relying on extensive intelligence and covert operations, pagers and walkie-talkies detonated, Hassan Nasrallah was assassinated, and a campaign was launched to bring about a swift military victory that would pave the way for a diplomatic resolution. With Iran, Israel faced two rounds of escalation, one in April and one in October of 2024. In response to both, Israel took measured military action, until June of 2025. Again, a vast network of intelligence and substantial preemptive strikes brought about a decisive result. While it is still early to determine the overall success, Israel’s current hope relies on diplomatic resolution as well.
The situation in Gaza, in turn, reflects the consistent failure to adhere to the doctrine. The reliance on intelligence was seemingly forgotten in Hamas’ case. The Shin Bet and IDF intelligence’s failure to predict the October 7th attack will be studied for generations. Similarly, while the absence of early-warning intelligence makes a preemptive strike impossible, the campaign against Hezbollah demonstrates that even if the first-shot initiative is lost, the military can still wait for the opportune time to launch a campaign. Against Hamas, in turn, the immediate bombing campaign was followed by a cat-and-mouse game of over 20 months, removing virtually all IDF initiative and placing the military in the role of reacting to Hamas’ attempts to reestablish itself throughout Gaza.
Most importantly, Israel has refused to set achievable goals that could be secured through diplomatic resolution. Unlike the engagement with Hezbollah or Iran, Israel has been consistent only about what it will not accept as an outcome in Gaza, including an armed Hamas presence, governance of the Palestinian Authority, or a future Palestinian State. What the country does hope to achieve has been reduced to an amorphous ‘total victory,’ attained solely through military force. The result – an army stretched beyond capacity and fighting endlessly, deepening internal divisions questioning the war’s aims, cascading international support, and an increasing casualty rate of both Palestinians and Israelis.
Israel’s failure to achieve the first elements of its war doctrine, reliance on intelligence and preemptive strikes, cannot be undone. The final element – limiting the military campaign to quick and achievable goals that pave the way for diplomatic resolutions, can be at least partially achieved. It is, however, not up to the military. At this point, victory can only be achieved by the government setting attainable goals, ones that can be reached through diplomatic resolution and enforcement.