Groupthink Nation
Paraphrasing the old joke of defining an expert as someone who knows more and more about less and less until he knows everything about nothing, one might describe the present panels of commentators and experts in the Israeli media as individuals who disagree on less and less about more and more until they are in agreement about everything.
It makes no material difference if you are watching channel 11, 12, 13 or 14 or listen to Reshet Bet or Army Radio, except for nuances on the edges, one can discern nary a voice of dissent from the Jerusalem consensus. The panelists almost in unison sing the praise of the government’s policies favoring the bombing of Iran based on the premise that Iran was preparing nuclear weapons, which it most certainly would put to use against Israel once they were ready.
Panelists are similarly, almost in unison, supportive of the effort to change the regime in Tehran, one that has developed deep roots in the country since it came into being in 1979, based on the assumption that it’s nevertheless quite feasible to achieve this lofty aim.
Similarly, the consensus is that it is possible to destroy the Iranian nuclear program to the extent it exists or nip further nuclear ambitions in the bud even though we are talking about a huge country, almost five times the size of Germany, with a population of 90 million.
And, of course, it’s a given that it is perfectly reasonable to demand from a sovereign state that it put limits on its missile forces on demand. Clearly, the ideological disagreement on the political scene in Israel does not carry over to the professional environment, where there is an abundance of experts who are worryingly short of disagreement. Or else, for whatever reason, they keep it well hidden.
Israel’s history over the last 50 years shows a recurrent pattern: the convergence of elites on one or more core concepts, followed by the marginalization of dissenting voices, and then an almost inevitable strategic surprise or failure.
In the period leading up to the October 1973 War, there was a near-unanimous belief within military intelligence and among the political leadership (the “Conceptzia”) that Egypt and Syria would not go to war before they achieved air superiority. Clear warning signs, including troop movements and alarming reports from highly placed intelligence sources, were ignored or misinterpreted based on the Conceptzia. The outcome? Strategic surprise, heavy casualties, national trauma, a decade of depressed economic growth.
In summary, the classic Israeli example of institutional groupthink later analyzed by the Agranat Commission.
Almost 10 years later, in the first Lebanon war, groupthink indicated that the operation would be short, limited in range (40 km), and strategically decisive. This view was shared by the political leadership, notably Arik Sharon, much of the military and large parts of the media, early on. All ignored mission creep, entanglement in Lebanese internal politics and the risks of a long-term occupation. The outcome? Years-long entanglement, the advent of Hezbollah, Sabra and Shatila, with its fallout, and deep internal division in Israel. Consensus masked internal dissent and facilitated escalation of the war way beyond the original mandate.
Another decade later, the optimism inspired by the Oslo process to settle the conflict with the Palestinians led to the widespread belief, especially among elites, that it would gradually lead to peace. This was shared by the political leadership (Yitzhak Rabin’s camp), much of academia and security elites (with notable exceptions). What was overlooked or not sufficiently addressed were the internal dynamics of the Palestinians, incitement, weak institutional capacity of the Palestinian Authority and spoilers like radical Islamists. The consequence? A collapse into the Second Intifada. While not a total consensus, Oslo was nevertheless a dominant narrative that marginalized skepticism in mainstream discourse.
Twenty years later, another groupthink determined that Hamas in Gaza was deterred and primarily interested in governing Gaza and not in large-scale confrontation. This line of thinking was shared by the security establishment, the political leadership and many media analysts. Ignored were signals of strategic intent, training patterns and ideological drivers. What happened? The October 7 attack and a massive intelligence and operational failure. Fifty years later, to the day, an echo of the 1973 overconfidence, conceptual rigidity and systemic suppression of alternative interpretations.
And looming over all this is our overreliance on technological superiority, where groupthink calls for fences, sensors, cyber and precision strikes in lieu of deeper political or strategic solutions. This is agreed on by the military, the political echelon and widely shared by the public. What is missed is human intelligence, adaptability of the adversary and last but not least, the political roots of the conflict. The result? Repeated tactical success but strategic surprise or stalemate (see Oct. 7th).
Groupthink is clearly not an aberration in Israel—it is a recurring mindset, and today’s media landscape reflects it almost perfectly. This is not merely an intellectual flaw; it is a national security liability. A system that has difficulty tolerating dissent has problems anticipating failure. If Israel prides itself on being a start-up nation, challenging assumptions and thinking outside the box, it must apply that same discipline to its own strategic thinking. The cost of not doing so is already written in our history.