Gulf countries fear the process, not the aftermath
In recent weeks, the world has begun to speculate about the next move by Trump and Israel in the Middle East, under a liberal Western vision aimed at weakening Iran’s current government in order to pave the way for a new regime.
It is understandable that, within this context, even one of my own viewpoints sees such an action as a possible solution to curb the nuclear threat posed by the ayatollahs. Logic suggests that the regime’s time may be running out, or that it has “pulled the rope too far” with its threats—some of which have already materialized, such as the attack on Israel. Technically, attacks against the West have already been taking place through Hezbollah in northern Israel or via international terrorist operations, highlighting that a large-scale attack is not as far from reality as it may seem, especially with Trump in power.
What the West often takes for granted is that the Gulf countries will align with this objective, since some of them also perceive Iran as a threat and do not support the ayatollahs’ regime. However, as is often the case, Western media tends to overlook crucial perspectives that, while present in Arab outlets, rarely make Western headlines. Gulf countries, in fact, harbor deep concerns that lead them to refrain from speaking publicly—and it is this perspective that this article seeks to unpack.
An Oil Market That Can Shift Within Hours
It is well known and recent experience confirms that a high-intensity conflict in the Middle East has an almost immediate impact on financial and energy markets. During the most recent regional escalation, known as the “12-day war,” just a few days of fighting were enough to trigger a significant rise in oil prices, even without a direct disruption of supply.
This example illustrates one of the Gulf countries’ primary fears. Even limited Iranian attacks could shake global energy markets within hours, disrupt strategic transportation routes, and generate sharp price volatility. For economies whose stability depends heavily on oil and gas production and exports, the risk is neither abstract nor long-term it is immediate.
From the Gulf perspective, in the short term, any real or even perceived Iranian retaliation could undermine market confidence, disrupt trade flows, or drive up maritime insurance costs in key areas such as the Strait of Hormuz. In the medium term, according to this same assessment, a prolonged escalation or an abrupt collapse of the regime in Tehran could produce deeper distortions, jeopardizing the region’s economic and financial stability. From this standpoint, opposition to an attack is not rooted in political sympathy for Iran, but rather—according to Gulf leaders in a logic of economic survival.
Vulnerable Strategic Infrastructure
The Gulf countries’ strategic infrastructure represents one of their main vulnerabilities in the face of a potential Iranian response. Oil and gas production and transportation facilities, desalination plants, military bases especially those hosting US forces and symbols of state power are all considered potential targets. Recent experience shows that even Iranian actions described as “limited” can have highly destructive effects, as seen in the attack on Qatar in June 2025 or the missile and drone strikes against Saudi Aramco facilities in 2019. Added to this is the possibility of a disruption to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately a quarter of the oil and gas exported by the Gulf countries themselves passes directly affecting their energy security, economic stability, and domestic functioning.
Tehran’s Reactions Before the Emergence of a Moderate Government
Possible reactions from Tehran in a scenario of pressure or confrontation prior to the emergence of a more moderate government are a central concern from the Gulf countries’ point of view. Faced with direct attacks or threats, Iran could resort to its regional proxies, such as the Houthis, not only to act against Israel but also to interfere with Red Sea navigation and potentially extend hostile actions toward the Gulf States themselves. At the same time, these countries fear both direct Iranian attacks and the unintended consequences of a rapid regime collapse, which according to their assessment could trigger scenarios of instability, internal power struggles, and the emergence of unpredictable actors.
From this perspective, Gulf countries tend to view a weakened and contained Iran, focused on its internal problems, as preferable to an abrupt transition toward a post–Islamic Republic scenario that, in the short term, they perceive as less predictable. This preference, however, reflects more a defensive calculation of immediate risk than a long-term strategic assessment of what kind of Iran might ultimately emerge once the transition process is complete.
