Hamas can always hire another accountant
On September 23, Israel announced that its forces had struck and killed Mohammad Abu Alwan, head of Hamas’s finance department, in Khan Younis, Gaza. Two days later, the IDF and Shin Bet revealed he was one of 16 senior Hamas financiers eliminated since the war began—a network that moved over $1 billion through exchange houses in Turkey and Gaza. The military issued a stern warning to local money changers: anyone bankrolling Hamas’s military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, is a legitimate target.
Three weeks later, Gaza’s private merchants went on strike. According to reports from Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) to international officials, Hamas was demanding roughly 10,000 shekels in cash for every truck entering the Strip and forcing traders to hand over 30 percent of their goods for quick cash liquidation. When one merchant resisted, Hamas officers arrested his son. This extortionate tax is now spreading across secondary supply chains and even basic drinking water.
These parallel developments highlight a glaring reality in Gaza. Eliminating the managers of Hamas’s money is a necessary tactical step, and Israeli intelligence has repeatedly proven it can track them down. But Hamas’s wealth doesn’t rest on any single individual. It resides in an institutional system built over two decades, designed to churn out cash regardless of whether its CFO survives the week.
Hamas fills vacancies quickly. Every senior manager operates with deputies, couriers, and clerks who know the transfer routes and counterparties, giving the group every reason to promote from within before the next payroll comes due. Meanwhile, the deterrent effect on local businessmen is far weaker than it appears from the outside. A Gaza money changer who gets a warning from Israeli intelligence must weigh that threat against a Hamas officer who knows where his family lives—an immediate and present danger on the ground. Moreover, because low-profile money changers lack public recognition, individual strikes carry little enduring signal. Replacing a bureaucrat is simply business as usual.
Targeted operations are only one tactical slice of a broader strategy that must act across three strategic pillars at once.
First is international enforcement and multilateral cooperation. For instance, the Gaza-linked financial network exposed last December—operating out of Turkey under Iranian direction—functions where an Israeli designation carries no legal leverage. Western designations by the U.S., EU, and UK only work when host governments and local banking regulators actively enforce them. Coordinated listings, shared intelligence, and sustained political pressure on host jurisdictions would raise the cost of illicit transfers far more effectively than targeting individual operatives.
Second is keeping pace with tech-driven financing. Hamas has proven adept at adopting novel fundraising channels, from online crowdfunding to cryptocurrency wallets—evidenced by the U.S. Justice Department’s recent seizure of $560,000 from a Hamas crypto network. Blockchain analytics firms, stablecoin issuers, and financial platforms often spot these movements long before governments do. Building direct, real-time links between state authorities and private tech partners would allow funds to be frozen in hours rather than months.
Third, and most vital, is linking financial disruption directly to Gaza’s economic recovery. The Board of Peace has proposed a $2.45 billion initial reconstruction effort, with long-term recovery estimated at $71.4 billion. This massive capital influx will either starve or sustain Hamas depending entirely on how it is structured. Past Qatari aid injections demonstrated how easily unmonitored cash can be siphoned into military infrastructure—a mistake that cannot be repeated.
The Gaza merchants’ strike highlights where this battle is being waged. While authorized traders pledged to settle transactions through transparent banking channels, Hamas’s cash demands are a deliberate attempt to force the economy back into an informal space it can exploit. Channeling reconstruction contracts through audited banks, issuing aid payments digitally, and offering real protection to compliant merchants turns economic rebuilding into the most potent financial sanction Hamas could face.
The window to act is now, before major reconstruction funds begin to flow. If donor nations establish strict oversight rules after the cash arrives, Hamas will simply rewrite the rules to its own advantage.
Israel will continue to target and eliminate Hamas’s financial operatives, as it must. But the true test of success in Gaza is ensuring the next accountant in line has nothing left to manage.