Hamas out, Arab criminal gangs in?
The unchecked wave of murders and other shocking crimes in Israeli Arab communities has highlighted the authorities’ hands-off approach when it comes to Arab criminal gangs. While failing to restore any semblance of security among Arab citizens, police have even reportedly blocked local communal leaders’ attempts to resolve disputes internally. Is it possible that the Israeli government is exploring and testing the empowerment of Arab criminal gangs as a partner or proxy for the control of the Palestinian population, both in Israel and the West Bank, as well as in Gaza?
The fundamental problem facing the Israeli government is that between the “river and the sea,” there are an equal number of Jewish Israeli and Arab Palestinians – 7 million. That means that Israel cannot control the Palestinians, especially on the West Bank and in Gaza, without either turning the IDF into a police force, thus sacrificing its war-fighting ability, or employing some Palestinian sub-contractor or proxy. That was the Israeli logic behind Oslo 30 years ago. In exchange for increasing degrees of statehood, the Palestinian Authority (PA) would police the West Bank. Given the security that the PA provided (together with the General Security Service and specialized units in the IDF and the police), the settlements and the Jewish-Israeli presence in the West Bank greatly expanded.
But this arrangement began to break down as Netanyahu became increasingly worried that a legitimate and effective Palestinian Authority would lead to a Palestinian state. So around 2015, he started to systematically undermine and “starve” the PA. Eventually, they got the message that they were doing Israel’s dirty work without receiving anything in exchange. So, they began to shut down operations. It was not that they “could not” operate in Jenin or Nablus. They chose not to. In the meantime, Netanyahu began cultivating Hamas as a tacit partner.
As early as 1996, when Palestinian terror bombings paved his path to the Prime Minister’s Office, Netanyahu began to understand that he and Palestinian extremists had common interests. Arguing that Hamas was, at bottom, interested in economic development, he surmised that supporting its control of Gaza would have the knock-on effect of preventing a Palestinian state. Hamas was not interested in a peace process, and since Palestinian leadership was split, Netanyahu could assert there was no one with whom to negotiate a peace agreement.
Well, this arrangement blew up in his (and our collective) face on October 7, 2023. After Israel had largely damaged or destroyed Hamas, though, it was still left with the problem of finding a Palestinian partner or proxy, especially as Netanyahu continued to invalidate the Palestinian Authority. This problem dovetailed with the question of “the day after:” Who would manage Gaza after Hamas?
Apparently, it was at this point that the solution of the Arab criminal gangs of Gaza suggested itself. Israel was looking for a local Gazan element to cooperate with, one that was not Hamas. The problem was that almost all such elements, such as local merchants and notables were intimidated by Hamas. The criminal gangs may be, to some extent, an exception. In fact, International aid organizations in Gaza have alleged that Israeli soldiers allow them to hijack food and water from the humanitarian aid and even cooperate with them.
We find a similar development in Israel itself. A few years ago, the police dismantled Jewish organized crime in Israel. However, nature abhors a vacuum, and very quickly Arab gangs moved into the space vacated by the Jews (narcotics, trafficking in sex workers, etc.). Newly powerful, the Arab gangs became arbiters in Arab Israeli society, a development that was enhanced by the laissez-faire attitude of the state. Intervening in feuds and disputes between individuals and clans, the gangs mete out their own violent punishment and deterrence.
Even before the current government, the state neglected the Arab sector, but it seems to have intensified with National Security Minister Ben Gvir, who, together with the then-police commissioner, proffered familiar explanations – “Arabs kill one another. It’s their nature.” Police have also reportedly thwarted the “reconciliation committees” set up by the local Arab authorities to help settle disputes without violence.
In other words, there are indications that the Israeli government is testing the waters in regard to cooperation with Arab criminal gangs – in Israel and in Gaza. This is congruent with Netanyahu’s style of government. Like Donald Trump, Netanyahu is transactional – governance by the deal. Criminal gangs are similarly transactional and if they get what they want, they are reliable.
If it is the case that Israel is planning to form a tacit partnership in Gaza with Arab criminal gangs, the scheme is clever and solves short-term problems, but in the long run, it could all too easily backfire. It is hard to imagine that the enormous quantities of weapons that these gangs are alleged to have will not be turned on Israelis and Jews.