Hostages first, Hamas collapse later

Sixteen months into the war, the tension between Israel’s goals of freeing all the hostages and collapsing the Hamas rule in Gaza is coming to a head. Israel has dealt a debilitating blow to Hamas’s military capability, yet it has not registered a corresponding blow to its governance capacity and has not produced a viable alternative to it. This was clearly demonstrated in the images of our tortured hostages emerging from the dungeons to be paraded in displays of Hamas control in Gaza.

The tension between these two goals was built into the phased outline of the hostage deal that the Biden administration put forward in May, based on Israeli proposals. Both Israel and Hamas preferred a phased framework rather than a comprehensive deal that releases all hostages in one swoop. Israel wanted to maintain the option of continuing the war until Hamas is completely defeated. Hamas wanted to keep some hostages as an insurance policy to help preserve its weapons and rule.

Entering Phase I of the deal, we managed to bridge this contradiction through linguistic acrobatics and commitments to Israel by the outgoing and incoming US administrations that would enable Israel to return to fighting Hamas at the end of Phase I. Hamas went along from a position of weakness, having lost hope that Israel would be dragged into a major regional war that would stop it in Gaza. However, transitioning from Phase I to Phase II demands a clear determination of Israel’s order of precedence between these two goals, both of which are indispensable.

The Trump administration, which supports these two goals and was instrumental in getting the parties to Phase I, also faces this choice, but this is first and foremost an Israeli matter. At this juncture, it appears that Israel’s government prefers to pursue the complete devastation of Hamas rather than implement Phase II of the deal.

It is not too late for Israel to reconsider its position and opt for prioritizing the release of our hostages through Phase II at the cost of halting the war in Gaza for the time being. Hostages first, crushing Hamas later.

Painful price

The arguments against any deal or against entering Phase II should not be dismissed out of hand just because some of those expressing them have introduced shameful political considerations into this delicate debate. Indeed, any deal with a brutal terrorist organization is problematic, involves the painful price of releasing murderous terrorists, and comes with security risks. We have experienced this in past deals, most memorably in the Shalit deal that released Yahya Sinwar.

Naturally, the real and present danger to the lives of the hostages weighs in favor of a deal now. As for the future security risks associated with the deal, including leaving Hamas in power, Israel can minimize them through effective preventive measures based on the lessons of October 7th, and Israel is strong enough to complete the removal of Hamas from power any time after the release of the hostages. The IDF’s control of the Gaza perimeter makes it harder for Hamas to regroup and with the hostages out the IDF will have more freedom of action.

But what ultimately tips the balance is Israel’s internal fabric. Israeli society is in deep trauma with open wounds. The return of the hostages is part of its essential healing process. The state is obligated to provide its citizens with security, and to do its utmost to obtain their freedom should they fall into captivity. This is what every Israeli citizen expects and deserves and what every soldier enlisting in the IDF should have in mind. Today, the state’s obligation to ransom hostages is all the more paramount given its failure to provide security to its citizens on October 7th.

A national problem

Those who oppose the deal and claim that the cries of the hostage families must not be allowed to override the general security interest, overlook that this is not merely a personal problem of these families, it is a national problem that touches on the foundations of the unwritten covenant between the state and its citizenry.

Prioritizing the full destruction of Hamas in Gaza means a war that will last for many months, while gravely endangering the lives of the hostages, pouring salt in the open wound in Israeli society, and missing the existing opportunity to pursue a Saudi deal. The attempt to advance this goal through an ultimatum to Hamas leaders in Gaza to lay down their arms and be given safe passage out of the Strip carries low chances of success and high chances of scuttling the deal. Contrary to pessimist predictions, when Israel decides to renew its military pressure on Hamas in due course, no force can stop it, and Hamas will likely provide it with ample justifications. There is an excellent chance that we can form understandings on this issue with the Trump administration. These could include additional measures based on Trump’s own playbook, such as allowing Gazans to leave voluntarily.

Hamas is a brutal enemy that must be decimated and removed from power. Phase II of the deal may well be thwarted by Hamas, but Israel has the obligation to give it a real chance. If we try and fail, we will have full legitimacy to continue to crush Hamas in Gaza. If we succeed, we will free our hostages, advance the process of internal healing, and open space to realize strategic goals no less important than crushing Hamas, such as neutralizing the Iranian nuclear threat and breaking through to peace with Saudi Arabia.