How to break the deadlock on investigating October 7 failures

It is incomprehensible that the same country and the same security forces that managed to defeat a formidable state like Iran – rich in capabilities – could fail so abjectly against a low-capacity terrorist organization like Hamas. How can October 7 be reconciled with June 13? The success against Iran clearly demonstrates the sophistication, daring, and capacity we possess to overcome our enemies. Why did these not serve us on Simchat Torah, 5784? This is a subject that requires – indeed demands – a professional, in-depth, and unbiased investigation. Only in this way can we prevent the next disaster.

The primary instrument for this task is a State Commission of Inquiry. More than three-quarters of Israelis support the establishment of such a body, yet more than a year and a half after the attack, it still has not been formed.

The reason is obvious: According to Israeli law, the government has the authority to establish the commission and define its mandate, while the chief justice of the Supreme Court appoints its members. However, the government fears that the chief justice will use this power to assemble a confrontational commission intent on placing the political leadership in its crosshairs. Attempts at compromise have failed, and we remain without a professional analysis of how we reached that horrifying day and what is required to fix the situation. The State of Israel remains dangerously exposed to the possibility of another monumental failure.

We believe the mistrust between branches of government can be overcome, and a State Commission of Inquiry should be established immediately – one that directly investigates the failures and offers corrective measures. The solution lies in appropriately defining the commission’s role, its mandate granted by the government.

Most State Commissions of Inquiry have functioned as judicial commissions. They examined the issue before them substantively and sought to identify the failures and assign blame. Much like standard legal proceedings, relevant officials appeared before them, fearful that their fate hung in the balance. As such, witnesses were accompanied by vigorous legal counsel seeking to justify their actions.

Consequently, not only did the process become bogged down and prolonged – sometimes for many years – but the testimony itself, and hence the pursuit of truth, was tainted by personal interests geared for self-preservation. Moreover, conclusions reached by State Commissions of inquiry are not binding; the government can choose to accept or reject them. In today’s divisive climate, where political views are scripted according to identity group, the commission’s findings – if, say, they place blame on political leadership – would not be accepted broadly as credible. Indeed, over the years, the judicial impact of commissions on senior decision-makers has weakened significantly. The conclusions of the Meron Disaster Report are clear proof of this.

However, it is possible to establish a State Commission of Inquiry that does not operate as a judicial body, but rather as a corrective body. We have experience with this model, having taken part in the State Commission of Inquiry into the government’s handling of the Gush Katif evacuees following the 2005 Gaza Disengagement (the “Mazza Commission”). We uncovered multiple, complex government failures, but we chose, as a matter of policy, not to assign blame to any individuals. We saw greater benefit in expeditiously understanding the failures and recommending appropriate systemic responses. The welfare of the evacuees, the state, and the society was more important than pursuing justice against those who failed. Indeed, the recommendations of the Mazza Commission were tendered within a year, adopted, and implemented relatively swiftly and effectively. This model can and should be applied in the current context as well.

A State Commission of Inquiry should be established with a mandate that does not focus on finding who is to blame – in the government, the security forces, or any other institution – but on correcting reality; on investigating the past to change the future. A corrective commission would investigate processes and systems, not individuals. This greatly increases the chances that the government will agree to establish such a commission; that it will receive candid cooperation from those involved; that it will be able to uncover the truth; that the process will be relatively swift; that its conclusions will be met with broad public trust; and most important – that its recommendations will be implemented and internalized.

There will, of course, be objections to our proposal: If someone failed, why should they not be held accountable? Don’t we – and certainly the families of the victims and many others harmed by the failure – deserve to see justice done to those responsible? Can true correction happen without identifying the guilty parties? To all of these, we respond: between being right and being wise, sometimes it is better to be wise.

Our focus must be on preventing future failures. A judicial commission has little likelihood of being formed and, even if it is, will do little to prevent the next disaster. A corrective commission has far better odds. Let us set aside the question of blame: some of the top security officials have already left their positions, and the politicians will face the court of public opinion. What we need now is correction and rebuilding. Define the mandate and establish the commission now.

This article was co-authored by Dr. Haim Zicherman, a Jewish People Policy Institute senior fellow and a senior lecturer in law at the Ono Academic College.