If Israel did explode Hezbollah’s devices… what’s next?

The smirk that became a fixture on Nasrallah’s face on October 7th vanished on Monday. The reports from Lebanon suggest that the campaign of exploding communication devices were a significant and astonishing blow to Hezbollah, showcasing an impressive combination of penetration, technological, and intelligence capabilities.

According to reports from Lebanon and a statement by its health minister, the explosions of Hezbollah operatives’ pagers on Monday resulted in at least 12 fatalities and around 3,000 to 4,000 injured, including approximately 200 severe cases. These public numbers are expected to rise. The blasts struck Hezbollah strongholds in the Dahia district of Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the Beqaa Valley. There have also been reports of explosions in Syria and injuries to the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon (raising questions about why an ambassador is involved with a terror organization’s operational communications).

On Tuesday, just a day later, a second wave occurred, with hundreds of tactical radio communication transceivers blowing up, killing at least nine, injuring hundreds of Hezbollah members, and impacting their vehicles, offices, and homes.

If Israel is indeed behind these operations, as Hezbollah claims, its objective seems to be to sharpen Hezbollah’s dilemma: how much is the terror group in Lebanon willing to pay for its continued attacks on Israel in support of Sinwar? The operation may also serve to communicate that terrorist attacks deep within Israel—such as those in Megiddo, Yarkon Park, and the recent exposure by the Shin Bet—will come at a high cost. Moreover, an organization that prides itself on secrecy and high operational security has now found itself compromised, penetrated and exposed.

In this context, it is essential to consider the broader picture, including the recent raid on Masyaf in Syria. Beyond the systemic blow inflicted through the pagers’ attacks, these efforts are also aimed squarely at undermining the organization’s ongoing military buildup. Together, these actions indicate that Israel, if it chooses, can challenge the rules of the game — and that it has additional cards at its disposal.

That said, it is clear that Israel is not seeking war at this time, though it surely considers it a possible outcome. Israel seems primarily focused on severing the link between Gaza and Lebanon—a connection that Nasrallah continues to insist on maintaining. Despite the heavy blows Hezbollah has suffered, it remains doubtful that Israel can compel the organization to withdraw its forces from the border for the long term, and ensure the safe return of northern residents, at least, not without either a war or a hostage and ceasefire deal in Gaza. The immediate top priority remains the return of the 101 hostages from Gaza.

The ball is now in Hezbollah’s court, as it accuses Israel of violating Lebanese sovereignty. However, Iran may also be drawn into the response, particularly if it regards the injury to its ambassador in Lebanon as reason to intervene, especially in addition to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.

One thing is certain: after 11 months of Nasrallah’s attempts to dictate the rules of engagement, the recent operation fundamentally changed the game, and everyone knows it. While Nasrallah has long preferred to operate within fixed equations, his formulas are no longer relevant.

What comes next? Several scenarios are possible:

Sharp escalation: A severe response from Hezbollah and/or Iran, followed by an intense Israeli retaliation, potentially leading to a regional war. Israel will need to ensure that the military and political gains of such an eventuality justify the costs to its home front, military, diplomatic posture, and economy.
Return to “routine” exchanges along the border: continued mutual but limited military attacks, though with a trend toward escalation.
A deal in Gaza: This could provide Israel with an opportunity to explore diplomatic options with Lebanon and better prepare for war if no other solution emerges.

Israel must avoid going to war before exhausting all diplomatic and political avenues, even as it ensures detailed war planning, including clear objectives, desired end states, strategies for achieving them, off-ramp mechanisms, optimal military readiness, and American support. Adding “the safe return of northern residents to their homes” as a war objective — nearly a year after Hezbollah began attacking Israel — is a necessary move, albeit belated and insufficient.

Given the complex security situation, the prime minister’s focus on replacing an experienced defense minister like Yoav Gallant has been described as “sheer madness” by a senior American official. It is indeed so.

We are heading into tense days as the Jewish holiday season approaches, with tensions also rising in the West Bank. In such a precarious time, sound national security decision-making is crucial and must not be influenced by political or personal agendas.