Suraj Rajan Kadanthodu

India’s Warning to its Jewish Communities: One-Time or a New Normal?

25-foot steel menorah lighting during Chanukah 2008 in front of the Gateway of India in Mumbai just weeks after the Mumbai Terror attacks. Photo by Serge Attal/Flash90. Courtesy, Chabad.org

In the aftermath of the recent terror attack targeting a Hanukkah lighting ceremony hosted by Chabad in Bondi beach, Australia, reports indicated that Indian intelligence agencies had issued security advisories to Jewish communities across India, warning of possible threats to Jewish religious institutions and celebrations in the coming weeks. While such alerts may appear routine in a volatile global environment, in the Indian context they raise a far more unsettling question: is this merely a temporary precaution, or does it point to a deeper and lasting shift in India’s relationship with its Jewish communities? Similar advisories, though rare, mark a departure from India’s long-standing assumption that Jewish life within its borders does not require exceptional state protection. The very act of issuing a warning, rather than responding to a specific local incident signals a pre-emptive recognition of vulnerability that was previously absent in the Indian Jewish experience.

India occupies a unique place in Jewish historical memory. Across centuries, Jewish communities, from the Bene Israel and Cochin Jews to Baghdadi Jews and more recently, the Bnei Menashe lived in India without facing pogroms, forced conversions, or institutionalized antisemitism. This absence of hostility became a defining marker of Indian Jewish identity, often contrasted with Jewish experiences in Europe and from the Arab world. Even among Indian Jews who migrated to Israel, pride in this Indian legacy of tolerance and acceptance has remained strong.

That is precisely why recent developments feel so striking.

The first major rupture came with the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks in 2008, when Nariman House (Chabad House) was deliberately targeted by terrorists. Investigations later confirmed that the Jewish center was not a random choice but a symbolic one, reflecting a global pattern in which Chabad institutions are increasingly viewed by extremist groups as visible embodiments of Diaspora Jewry and by extension, the State of Israel. Since then, Chabad centers across continents, from Latin America to North America have figured prominently in threat assessments. In 2014, a plot targeting Jewish institutions, including Chabad-linked sites, was disrupted in Peru, while in the United States and Europe, Chabad houses have repeatedly appeared in security advisories issued by local authorities. These institutions are often singled out not only because of their visibility, but because extremist groups perceive them as symbolic representatives of global Jewish presence and continuity.

What has changed since October 7, however, is the convergence of physical security concerns with a noticeable shift in India’s public discourse.

In the months following the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, several scholars, including myself have noted a rise in antisemitic and aggressively anti-Zionist rhetoric within Indian social media spaces. Some content is explicitly antisemitic; other narratives cloak themselves in the familiar disclaimer of being “only anti-Zionist, not anti-Jewish,” while still deploying tropes, collective blame, and conspiratorial framing historically associated with antisemitism. Global monitoring bodies such as the Anti-Defamation League have documented a sharp worldwide spike in antisemitic incidents and online discourse following October 7, a trend that India has not remained immune to (ADL Global Antisemitism Report).

In a country where Jews are numerically tiny, politically marginal, and largely invisible in public life, the sudden intensity of such rhetoric is striking. It suggests that global conflicts are being imported into Indian digital and ideological spaces with little historical grounding, collapsing distinctions between Israeli state policy, Zionism, and Jewish identity itself. Such collapses matter because they often precede physical threats; online normalization of conspiratorial or dehumanizing language and has historically functioned as an early warning signal rather than a harmless outlet for political dissent.

This shift is not merely rhetorical; it is increasingly becoming visible on the ground.

During my visits to the Paradesi Synagogue in Cochin and the Magen David Synagogue in Mumbai, after Oct 7 attacks, the sight of armed police personnel stationed outside these historic places of worship was impossible to ignore. Security itself is not unusual in today’s world. But in India, where Jewish religious spaces historically required no protection, this visible securitization represents a symbolic rupture. It signals an acknowledgment by the Indian state that Jewish spaces may no longer be automatically safe, not because of internal communal tensions, but due to externally influenced threats and radicalized narratives.

This makes India’s broader political posture more significant. Despite condemning the October 7 attacks, India has not officially designated Hamas as a terrorist organization, unlike many Western states. This strategic ambiguity, rooted in India’s balancing of its relations with Israel, the Arab world, and domestic considerations, sits uneasily alongside intelligence warnings, synagogue security, and growing concern within Jewish communities and some Christian minorities.

The contradiction is difficult to ignore, if the threat is serious enough to warrant nationwide advisories and security deployment, what does the reluctance to name Hamas as a terrorist organization signal, both domestically and internationally?

None of this negates India’s long and genuine tradition of pluralism. Nor does it suggest that antisemitism is endemic to Indian society. But it does indicate that India is no longer insulated from global ideological currents, digital radicalization, and transnational terror narratives. The Jewish community, small, symbolically visible, and historically secure has now become entangled in these broader shifts.

So, is this warning a one-time response to extraordinary global circumstances, or the beginning of a new normal for Indian Jewry? For the first time in India’s long Jewish history, the question itself feels unavoidable and that, perhaps, is the most profound change of all.

 

About the Author
Suraj Rajan Kadanthodu is currently enrolled as a PhD Student at the Department of Israel Studies, University of Haifa, Israel. His PhD work is focused on the Indian Jewish migration and integration in the State of Israel. He is interested in non-traditional aspects that connect India and Israel, which falls outside the realm of diplomacy.
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